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Cert. to CA 5 
(Br own, Tuttle, Ingraham) 
F~deral/1983 
(same as above) 
, 5e~? k. s; 
Timely 
Gerstein, a Fla. state ' attorney, review in 73-477 of a decision 
A --------------------~ 
o CA 5 which held that the Constitution requires that arrestees held 
-2-
, It 1 1 
for tr1al on informations filed directly by the state attorney must, 
without reasonable delay, be given a preliminary hearing before a 
judicial officer. In 73-5542, certain Fla. prisoners (resps. in 73-. , .. 
477) seek review of that portion of the CA 5 judgment which held that 
a possible six-day lapse between information and preliminary hearing 
-
was permissible. 
2. FACTS: Resps in 73-477, certain prisoners (including alleged 
felons and misdemeanants) awaiting trial in the(i8it ji courts of Fla., 
filed a class action in the SD Fla. (J: King) seeking declaratory and 
----------------------------
inj,unctive relief (42 U. s.c -~ t_hat a preliminary hearing before a 
committing magistrate on probable cause after arrest and before trial 
was _required by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Resps asked the 
court to compel petr, the state attorney in Dade County, Fla., to grant 
such preliminary hearings or to declare that resps were entitled to 
such a hearing. 
Persons ' arrested for felonies and most misdemeanors in Dade 
County, Fla. are routinely taken to the Metropolitan jail. Aside from 
"capital" cases, Fla. law provides that all cases may be commenced by 
the filing of an information by the prosecuting attorney under oath or z 
by grand jury indictment, or by presentment to a justice of the peace 
~ 
for issuance of an arrest warrant. Fla. statutes also provide that 
after arrest, with or without warrant, the officer shall take the 
arrestee before a magistrate without unnecessary delay. The Fla. 
judiciary has consistently held that such hearings are not required 
where the state prosecutes by the filing of an information certifying 
probable cause for arrest. Fla. law provides for arraignment "before 
trial" and the average period between arrest and arraignment in Fla. 
was found by the DC to be 10 to 15 days. 
In its final order of Oct. 12, 1971, the DC found that under 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, "arrested persons, whether or 
not released on bond, have the constitutional ~ight to a judicial 
hearing on the question of probable cause." The DC then directed the 
state attorney to submit a plan of implementation; a plan submitted 
by the Dade County Sheriff, Wilson Purdy, was substantially adopted 
by the court. The elaborate Purdy Plan (App. 47-54) required that 
c arrestees be taken before a committing magistrate within three hours 
of arrest for appointment of counsel if indigent, advisement of consti-
tutional rights, and the setting of a preliminary hearing da~e. Pend-
ing appeal to CA 5, the judiciary of Dade Cou~ty established its own 
system of committing magistrates in felony cases. Soon thereafter, 
however, the Fla. set adopted amendments to the Fla. rules of criminal 
procedures, effective Feb. 1, · 1973. Rule 3.13l(a) provides that "a ·-
defendant, unless charged on an information or indictment, has the 
right to a prelimiJ;l.ary hearing on any felony charge against him." 
CA ·5 then directed the DC to hold a hearing to determine the consti-
tutional validity of the new rules as opposed to the elaborate Purdy 
Plan, as amended by DC orde~. The DC found constitutional violations 
.------... 
in numerous aspects of the new rules; the decision was affirmed by 
CA 5 (reasoning of DC and CA discussed below) • 
...--.____.... 
J -4-
3. DECISION OF CA 5: 
(a) On appeal, the CA 5 held that since the relief sought was 
not "against any pending or future court proceedings as sgch," citing -
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 u.s. 67, 71 n.3, the abstention doctrine of 
Younger v. Harris, 401 u.s. 37 is inapplicable. 
__., ~ 
The court indicated 
that its assertion of jurisdiction would not affect the pending prosecu-
tion of the prisoners but would only require a preliminary hearing for 
' . 
those members of the class who had not already been tried. The CA 
recognized that the resps could "have filed suit in state court for a 
declaratory judgment and other equitable relief," but said that such 
a procedure would require a second state court proceeding to adjudicate 
a federal claim not based on the merits of the defenses to the state 
criminal actions. The CA said that Younger has never been i~terpreted 
to require a federal court to abstain where the federal claim could not 
be "adjudicate¢!. in a ~ingle pending or future state proceeding and we 
decline to so apply it now." The CA therefore ,said it need not consider 
whether the instant case comprised an "exception" to Younger (it should 
be noted that the court in effect indicated that the Younger exceptions 
of irreparable injury and inadequate state remedy were satisfied -- this 
is what the DC said}. 
(b) CA 5 held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require 
that arrestees charged by information in Fla. be afforded preliminary 
hearings without unnecessary delay (thus holding the new rules unconsti-




110 u.s. 516; Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 u.s. 586; Ocampo v. U.S., 234 
u.s. 91; and Beck v. Washington, 369 u.s. 541 as dealing only with 
absence of a procedure for the determination of probable cause prior 
to arrest, as opposed to afterwards. The court found that Fla.'s denial 
of a "probable cause" hearing after arrest but before arraignment is 
constitutionally impermissible because it permits the prosecuting at-
"--
j ! j .f\ " 
torney to certify the existence of probable cause by f~~ an in-
formation, and he is not sufficiently detached to make this decision • 
....-------
Citing McNabb v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332; Coolidge v. NH, 403 U.S. 443; 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 u.s. 471; Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 u.s. 345 
for the proposition that a person required to determine probable cause 
must be neutral and detached. The CA said that its prior decisions to 
the effect that an arre~tee pr~ceeded ~gainst by information has no 
constitut~onal right ~o a preliminary hearing (Jackson v. Smith, 435 
F.2d 1284; Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 F.2d 6) were distinguishable 
because they dealt with whether the absence of a preliminary hearing 
was a denial of constitutional rights which would vitiate the subsequent 
conviction. Here, says CA 5, it is dealing with a question of the 
validity of a present confinement. 
(c) The CA finally directed its attention to the remaining 
portion of the amended rules of criminal procedure in Florida, and 
agreed with the DC's findings. It found that the new rules violated 
equal protection in that they disallowed preliminary hearings for 
-6-:-
misdemeanants, citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 u.s. 25. It found 
that the State had failed to justify the distinction in the new rules 
between the time between arrest and preliminary hearing for capital 
and life offenses (7 days) and all other cases (4 days) and that it 
too was violative of equal protection. As to the provision in the 
rules that where ·the time period between arrest and preliminary 
hearing is less than seven days, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays are 
~ r- ~1e,e. xcluded, the CA f d t d 'd h th · d d 1 ld b re use o ec1 e w e er s1x ays e ay wou e , .. 
unconstitutional as opposed to four · days, since no prisoner among the 
class "argues that he has been accorded a preliminary hearing more 
than four but less than six days after his arrest." 
4. CONTENTIONS: Petr state attorney in 73-477 argues that the 
federal courts should have abstained. He also argues that the decisions 
-----of this Court in Hurtado, Lem Woon, Ocampo, and Beck control and require 
reversal here. Petr argues that many states permit the charging of 
crimes by information without a preliminary hearing. Petr argues that 
the charging by the pros~cutor by information is as sufficient a 
' \ 
determination of probable cause as the charging by the grand jury. 
Petrs also cite conflict with numerous circuits which have determined 
that the absence of preliminary hearings does not constitute a consti-
tutional violation. 
In response, the resps urge that the decision below was correct. 
Recognizing that the decision will produce turmoil in Fla. and that it 
.....--------.. 
decides a constitutional issue never decided by this Court,~ 
state that the_y therefore "do not oppose certiorari." 
./""--. 
-7-
In 73-5542, a cross-petition to the petition in 73-477, resps 
(as petrs therein) argue that theCA's toleration of the four day 
period for preliminary hearing is also a constitutional violation. 
5. DISCUSSION: The petition in 73-5542 should, in my opinion 
be denied, since it raises a question subsumed by the petition in 
73-477. The Younger issue is somewhat unusual since these are state 
prosecutions pending; but the action of the CA does not appear to 
affect those proceedings. The resolution of Steffel v. Thompson, argued 
this week, could conceivably shed some light here. The most important 
issue is the holding as to the requirements of preliminary hearings. --
This Court has never held that the Constitution requires a preliminary 
hearing, and this has also been the consistent view of the federal courts. 
-...____, 
(See cases inn. 113-14 to FRCrP 5, 18 U.S.C.A.) FRCrP prov~des for a 
preliminary hearing for federal prisoners before a committing magistrate, 
but it has not been suggested that this is a constitutional requirement. 
United States , 318 U.S. 332; Mallory v. United States, 
354 u.s. 449. The line of cases leading to Beck, to the effect that a 
State may dispense with a grand jury and charge by information if it 
<lbS< ·H C.:.. 
chooses, does . not, as the CA .correctly suggests, deal with the f:a4lure 
ii.. dt· 'f t ' r~"''"v' \ , ( ,\ 
of~ probable cause~by a neutral magistrate after arrest. The decision 
here is obvious]Y a far-reaching one, and, in my opinion, merits 
-------~ 
consideration by this Court. 
There is a response. 







Cert. to CA 5 
{Brown, Tuttle, Ingraham) 
Federal/1983 
See memo for No. 73-477. 
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Marshall, J .................. . 
White, J ..................... . 
Stewart, J ................... . 
Brennan, J ................... . 
Douglas, J .................... . 
Burger, Ch. J ................ . 
No. 73-477 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Jack Owens DATE: March 25, 1974 
No. 73-477 Gerstein v. Pugh 
(Caution~ Jury Speech follows.) 
Most states utilize grand juries or, if proceeding 
by information rather than indictment, require a hearing be f ore 
a neutral magistrate shortly after arrest. The federal 
government normally proceeds by indictment and grants a pre-
liminary hearing soon after arrest. Thus, most jurisdictions 
generally insure that someone other than law enforcement 
officials makes an early determination of whether it is l akely 
that a criminal suspect or arrestee has committed a crime. 
Florida and a few other states, however, have placed a lower 
premium on protecting liberty and, more than likely, have 
hindered their own interests in reducing jail and police cos ts 
by allowing law enforcement personnel to put people in jail 
on the basis of their own ex parte decision to prosecute and 
to leave those people there for as much as a month before they 
get a hearing. 
Technically speaking, the most relevant (old) 
constitutional precedents allow this. The grand jury requirement --------------- -----------------
of the Fifth Amendment has not been incorporated against the 
states, and states are permitted to proceed by information 
rather than indictment. But it is no great leap for me 
&~no~ 
from cases like Morrissey v. Brewer and~ v. Scarpelli 
0-
(hearing rights of those whose parole/probation is revoked) 
to this case. I think due process notion s,·~ could easily 
evolve to require speedy preliminary hearings for anyone 
arrested on the basis of an information rather than as a 
result of grand ju~y action. In fact, I'm amazed that all 
states don't do this voluntarily. Holding in jail people 
against whom there is no real case is a waste of everyone's 
resources, especially the state ~ , 
Of course it is true that many arrestees have access 
to bail. It is equally true that the detainees will ultimately 
get the most comprehensive hearing there is -- trial. But 
the bail thing doesn't persuade me. If anything, it suggests 
a form of economic discrimination. And although trials are 
held fairly speedily in Florida, I still can't buy holding 
a guy in jail for 30 days on no one's say but the prosecutor. 
Such a system simply should not exist in a free country. And it 
is very simple to fix, to everyone's benefit. It seems 
particularly odd to have all the hoopla about right to a 
hearing over whether X defaulted on the monthly payments for 
·k I think the due process clause should be relied 
on rather than the Fourth Amendment, although both have been 
advanced in this case. 
2. 
j. 
a TV set and yet countenance the crim:j_nal law system Florida c..U> ;} 
1 I n L . A _ _ .tL- .,_..., ' VI ....... .'. L -J-,1 operated prior to this suit. ~~~ '~ ~~-~-, 
At any rate, this looks to me to be a case for 
interring old, bad precedents and for making some sensible 
new law. Florida should be grateful if you do. 
There is a serious Younger v. Harris problem here. ~ 
Technically speaking, the state courts were open to hear this 
constitutional claim and state prosecutions had obviously begun. 
But I think that, without too much violence to precedent and 
without letting too many hobgoblins loose, it is possible to 
conclude (i) that state criminal trial courts were not an 
adequate forum, since by the time trial arrived the damage 
would have been done; and (ii) the relief sought was not the 
enjoining of a state prosecution. 
Flex your muscles a bit. Affirm this one. 
JBO 
Conference 11-30-73 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned' .................. , 19 . . . 
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Brennan, J ................... . 
Douglas, J .................... . 
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TO: DAtE: September 13, 1974 
FROM: Lewis F.Powell, Jr. 
No. 73-477 Gerstein v. Pugh 
The above case was argued here on March 2S, 1974, and at 
our Conference on March 29 the Court voted at least 8 to 1 to 
affirm CAS. But as the discussion at Conference evolved, we 
began to have second thoughts - especially as to the impact 
of our decision on federal practice and the federal rules based 
on early decision of the Court. Accordingly, we finally decided 
to carry this case over to the present term to enable the 
Solicitor General to file a brief (and possibly to argue 
orally). Apparently, an invitation also was extended to the 
attorneys general of the various states to file briefs amici. 
The Question 
At the time this case (and companion cases) were before 
CAS, all criminal cases in Florida, apart from capital cases, 
apparently could be commenced by "an information filed by the 
prosecuting attorney under oath". Apparently most criminal 
actions were commenced upon an information sworn to by the state 
attorney, either before or after arrest; the accused person would 
then be held in jail (if unable or unwilling to post bail) with-
out a hearing of any kind until arraignment. CAS noted that 
this incarceration may last as long as 30 days. CAS held that 
the federal Constitution (4th and 14th Amendments) required 
as a minimum a preliminary hearing before a judicial officer 
promptly following such an arrest. 
The case is confused (at least according to my present 
recollection) as a result of the fact that Florida procedure 
2. 
(in Dade County, which was the county involved) was significantly 
changed in accordance with an order of the federal District Court. 
Moreover, the individuals who instituted this action, as a class 
suit, have long since been convicted on misdemeanor charges, 
served their sentences and are out of jail. Thus, there is a 
lingering question of mootness. 
But we set the case for reargument on the constitutional 
issue, passing the mootness point on the theory (at least 
tentatively) that the issue will reoccur and otherwise would 
evade review. 
General Comments 
The briefs in hand, as of this date, are those filed at 
the last Term, together with perhaps 8 or 9 briefs amicus filed 
by attorneys general of a number of states. The Solicitor 
General's brief (which I am particularly anxious to see) is not 
in hand. 
The original briefs - both on behalf of petitioner and 
respondents - meander all over the subject, and are not really 
helpful. I have examined several of the briefs amicus, and 
at least have been impressed by the fact that if we adhere to 
3. 
decision last March to affirm CAS, we will effect a major change 
in what has been perceived as settled constitutional law. See, 
e.g., amicus briefs filed on behalf of Massachusetts and California. 
Although I have not studied the Federal Rules carefully and 
have never had any experience with federal criminal procedure, 
it does appear that the Federal Rules allow the initiation of 
misdemeanor and petty criminal cases by the filing of sworn 
informations by U.S. attorneys, and that defendants in such cases 
are not entitled to any preliminary hearing prior to arraignment. 
The theory is that the sworn affidavit of the U.S. attorney 
establishes adequate probable cause. 
I invite your attention to Jack Owens' brief memo to me 
of March 25, (which he entitles a "jury speech") which is 
certainly persuasive. 
MY present disposition remains, as it was last March, 
to conclude that due process requires an early hearing before a 
neutral magistrate promptly following arrest. But I do not 
think such a hearing should be elevated to the status of a 
"mini-trial". That is, it should not be adversary in nature, 
counsel should not be required, nor should there be a right to 
confront witnesses. I would think, for purposes merely of 
establishing probable cause for arrest, a neutral magistrate 
need only be convinced by appropriate affidavits or testimony 
of law enforcement officers that probable cause in fact existed. 
All of these are troublesome issues, and I would welcome 
your thoughtful consideration and advice - especially after 
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TO: DATE: September 13, 1974 
FROM: Lewis F.Powell, Jr. 
No. 73-477 Gerstein v. Pugh 
The above case was argued here on March 25, 1974, and at 
our Conference on March 29 the Court voted at least 8 to 1 to 
affirm CAS. But as the discussion at Conference evolved, we 
began to have second thoughts - especially as to the impact 
of our decision on federal practice and the federal rules based 
on early decision of the Court. Accordingly, we finally decided 
to carry this case over to the present term to enable the 
Solicitor General to file a brief (and possibly to argue 
orally). Apparently, an invitation also was extended to the 
attorneys general of the various states to file briefs amici. 
The Question 
At the time this case (and companion cases) were before 
CAS, all criminal cases in Florida, apart from capital cases, 
apparently could be commenced by "an information filed by the 
prosecuting attorney under oath". Apparently most criminal 
actions were commenced upon an information sworn to by the state 
attorney, either before or after arrest; the accused person would 
then be held in jail (if unable or unwilling to post bail) with-
out a hearing of any kind until arraignment. CAS noted that 
this incarceration may last as tgng as 30 days. CAS held that 
-
the federal Constitution (4th and 14th Amendments) required 
as a minimum a preliminary hearing before a judicial officer 
promptly following such an arrest. 
The case is confused (at least according to my present 
recollection) as a result of the fact that Florida procedure 
2. 
(in Dade County, which was the county involved) was significantly 
changed in accordance with an order of the federal District Court. 
Moreover, the individuals who instituted this action, as a class 
suit, have long since been convicted on misdemeanor charges, 
served their sentences and are out of jail. Thus, there is a 
lingering question of mootness. 
But we set the case for reargument on the constitutional 
issue, passing the mootness point on the theory (at least 
tentatively) that the issue will reoccur and otherwise would 
evade review. 
General Comments 
The briefs in hand, as of this date, are those filed at 
the last Term, together with perhaps 8 or 9 briefs amicus filed 
by attorneys general of a number of states. The Solicitor 
General's brief (which I am particularly anxious to see) is not 
in hand. 
The original briefs - both on behalf of petitioner and 
respondents - meander all over the subject, and are not really 
helpful. I have examined several of the briefs amicus, and 




decision last March to affirm CAS, we will effect a major change 
in what has been perceived as settled constitutional law. See, 
~·&·• amicus briefs filed on behalf of Massachusetts and California. 
Although I have not studied the Federal Rules carefully and 
have never ha• any experience with federal criminal procedure, 
it does appear that the Federal Rules allow the initiation of 
misdemeanor and petty criminal cases by the filing of sworn 
informations by u.s. attorneys, and that defendants in such cases 
are not entitled to any preliminary hearing prior to arraignment. 
The theory is that the sworn affidavit of the u.s. attorney 
establishes adeouate probable cause. 
I invite your attention to Jack Owens' brief memo to me 
of March 25, (which he entitles a "jury speech") which is 
certainly persuasive. 
My present disposition remains, as it was last March, 
to conclude that due process requires an early hearing before a 
neutral magistrate promptly following arrest. But I do not 
think such a hearing should be elevated to the status of a 
"mini•trial". That is, it should not be adversary in nature, 
counsel should not be required, nor should there be a right to 
confront witnesses. I would think, for purposes merely of 
establishing probable cause for arrest, a neutral magistrate 
need only be convinced by appropriate affidavits or testimony 
of law enforcement officers that probable cause in fact existed. 
All of these are troublesome issues, and I would welcome 
your thoughtful consideration and advice - especially after 
the SG's brief has been received. 
L.F .P., Jr. 
BOBTAIL MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Joel Klein DATE: October 18, 1974 
No. 73-477, Gerstein v. Pugh 
This case was here last year and you have your own 
notes and memoranda as well as Jack Owens memorandum. 
Before I discuss several jurisdictional problems - none 
of which do I believe necessarily bars review - let me 
address the issue on the merits. 
1. Frankly, I think some confusion arose last time 
around because the Court was somewhat unclear as to what 
was at stake. The Fifth Circuit, and the district court, 
held that a "preliminary hearing" before a neutral magistrate -- ~ --------------
is required before someone is detained pre-t~al. 
~ -------------------------~~~-
The 
simple use of the words "preliminary hearing", however, was 
bound to confuse the issue. A preliminary hearing, as the 
term is now used, encompasses much that is irrelevant to this 
case. Usually, if such a hearing is given at all, it is 
given to all defendants, not only to those who are confined 
pre-trial. Moreover, although~ purpose of a preliminary 
hearing is to determine probable cause, they also serve other 
purposes, such as being a vehicle for discovery. And the 
2. 
rationale upon which a probable cause hearing rests is that 
someone should not be required to face trial unless there is 
probable cause to believe that he has committed an offense. 
The instant case raises an issue that is somewhat 
different from the proader issues inherent in the use of a 
probable cause hearing. Respondents here argue that pre-
trial incarceration, in and of itself, is a substantial 
deprivation of liberty, and therefore due process 
requires a hearing to establish probable cause to confine. 
In effect, I think the gravaman of respondent's contention 
is that bail determinations are insufficient because, even 
before bail is considered, a magistrate should decide that 
there is probable cause. Thus, I would suggest that the 
) issue in this case is what does due process require before 
someone may be required to post bail or, if unable, to remain 
confined pending trial.* 
* My view of the issue is buttressed by the problem of 
relief. Assuming a hearing is given to those who are detained 
pre-trial, and assuming further that probable cause is not 
shown, what relief would then be appropriate? At a usual 
"preliminary hearing," as they are now known, a defendant, be he 
incarcerated or not, is discharged. He can, of course, 
subsequently be reindicted, but a failure to show probable cause 
leads to a dismissal. In our case, however, if what is being 
tested is probable cause to confine pre-trial, then, if the 
court finds no probable cause, presumably the defendant 
should be released pre-trial. The charges against him, 
however, should not be dismissed. 
3. 
Traditionally, of course, either an indictment or 
information is sufficient to bring someone to trial. And 
if the person is likely to flee and cannot meet bail, he 
is incarcerated pending trial. The decisions below would add 
an additional requirement of an adversary hearing with counsel 
and witnesses before someone who has been proceeded against 
by information can be held pre-trial. The first question 
then, must be why should someone who is indicted by a 
grand jury not get a preliminary hearing. After all, those 
indicted by a grand jury do not get an adversary hearing 
with the attendant opportunity of viewing the state's 
evidence. Second, the d~cisions below limit relief 
to those confined pre-trial. That group, however, is 
hardly a fixed group. Presumably if a hearing must be held, 
it should be held rather promptly. Thus defendants who 
must meet a bail requirement can delay payment, get the 
benefits of a preliminary hearing, then meet bail and be 
released. In short, by spending a day or so in jail the 
* defendant could secure a preliminary hearing. 
* As a practical matter, many defendants require 
several days before they can raise bail. 
4. 
In view of these considerations, I think you could 
reject the adversary hearing requirement imposed below. 
If for no other reason than strong historical tradition, .__ 
our system allows pre-trial incarceration on the basis ....___ _ __ 
of an~ parte hearing, typically before a grand j~ry. 
J Thus, I see no reason for not limiting the decision below 
to an ex parte hearing before a neutral magistrate when the 
state proceeds by information. While this may seem to be 
nothing but rubber-stamp, we shouldn't kid ourselves about 
the role played by grand juries either. I also think that this 
kind of~ parte hearing should be required for all defendants, 
irrespective of whether they can post bond. It seems to me t hat 
if the state has not convinced a neutral magistrate of 
probable cause, the state should not be permitted to require 
I bail or even to keep a person answerable for an offense. 
I realize that, in effect, I have suggested no special 
due process for those confined pre-trial. But I see no 
way of speaking eloquently of liberty and then noting that 
pre-trial incarceration is a far greater intrusion than the 
on~ involved in Mitchell v. Grant, et al., without concluding 
that a full preliminary hearing or mini-trial is required. 
It is extremely hard tb make the full due process argument 
and then say that an~ parte hearing is sufficient. Thus, 
I would avoid the general due process line of cases, and 
speak instead in terms of the history of our criminal 
5 . 
PEocedures and some of this Court's early cases. I would 
conclude that rudimentary fairness requires that, after 
* , . I 
arrest, the prosecutor convince a neutral magistrate 
that there is probable cause to proceed with the prosecution 
which includes the possibility that a defendant may be 
confined pre-trial. 
Acceptance of this approach would not have a significant 
impact on the Federal Rules. Presently, whenever there is 
an arrest without a warrant, the government must get a 
complaint under Rule 4(a) which requires that the government 
establish probable cause. Thus, it would appear that only 
in cases where an arrest warrant was issued would there be 
need to expand the rules to require a post-arrest ~ parte 
showing of probable cause. This would be so only if a post 
* I note that when marrest warrant is secured, the 
police must establish probable cause before a magistrate. 
One might argue, therefore, that the prosecutor need not 
make such a showing after arrest. I think that the argument 
is unpersuasive because in determing probable cause for an 
arrest the magistrate might well consider different factors 
from those he would consider after arrest. Since the ex 
Garte procedure is not very cumbersome, the government-can 
ardly complain if it is required to make a post-arrest 
I 
showing. Nevertheless, since the issue is not critical you 
could say that a determination of probable cause is only 
required at some time - either before or after arrest. 
6. 
arrest hearing is required. See preceding note. 
If, on the other hand, a preliminary hearing, 
adversary in form, is required, the federal rules will have 
to be changed for misdemeanor cases since frequently the 
government proceeds by information, and therefore the rules 
do not require a preliminary hearing. The SG claims that 
requiring a preliminary hearing in federal cases when the 
government proceeds without an indictment would have no 
practical consequences. In the District of Columbia, however, 
there are approximately 1,000 misdemeants each year who 
are incarcerated pre-trial, sometimes for so long as 90 
days or more. These people do not now, under the local 
equivalent of the federal rules, get a preliminary hearing.* 
I agree with Jack Owens that it is anomalous, to 
say the least, to require hearings in all of the cases 
in which this Court has required them, and still permit 
pre-trial confinement without an adversary hearing. Indeed, 
* Any holding of this Court requ~r~ng an adversary 
hearing could not reasonably be limited to felons since the 
purpose of the hearing relates to pre-trial detention, which 
is functionally the same for felons and misdemeants. 
7. 
after Morrisey and Gagnon, it is hard to argue that an 
adversary hearing, perhaps without counsel, is not compelled. 
Nevertheless, the costs and difficulties of imposing such 
a constitutional requirement may well outweigh the 
anticipated benefits. 
2. There are also three jurisdictional questions 
presented in this case. 
First is the question of mootness. These respondents 
have been convicted and thus are not longer in need of a 
preliminary hearing. Nevertheless, it would seem that this 
is a classic case for application of the "capable of 
repetition yet avoiding review" doctrine. Pre-trial detention 
will almost invariably be too short to allow an appeal, and 
therefore I would think the abortion cases should be controlling. 
Last year's O'Shea case does not undercut this conclusion since 
in that case there was no clear likelihood of repetition nor 
was it apparent that review would be evaded. Moreover, in 
O'Shea the Court refused to assume that petitioners would 
commit a subsequent crime. Here, like in Spomer, the companion 
case to O'Shea, respondents need not assert that they will 
~~l commit subsequent crimes, but only that they · be arrested 
and not given a hearing. 
Second, this case raises a question under Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, which held that habeas corpus is the only way 
to challenge the fact or duration of state confinement. 
The only relief sought by respondents, however, was a 
hearing, and not release. Likewise, the federal courts 
ordered only a hearing. Thus, a technical application of 
Preiser would appear to allow this as a § 1983 suit. 
8. 
Having said this, though, I am by no means sure that 
Preiser should not be stretched to reach this situation. It 
I seems to me that federal courts should not, by mandatory injunction, require states to give hearings. All that a federal 
court can do is to order that, unless a hearing is given, the 
~ 
prisoner will be released. This should have been the relief 
sought in this case. If it had been, the relief would have 
been a classic form of habeas, requiring exhaustion of 
state remedies. Thus, you might want to consider applying 
Preiser to bar jurisdiction. 
The final issue is a Younger question. In this case, 
there was a state prosecution and respondents did seek 
injunctive relief. As I read the Younger cases, however, I 
think they would not apply here because respondent's 
injunction was not directed at the criminal proceeding "as 
such" but rather at the state's right to detain pre-trial. 
That matter is wholly unrelated to guilt or innocence and thus 
9. 
would not even fall within Perez v. Ledesman, which dealt 
with suppression of federal court evidence. I would think 
that a sensible line for Younger would be whether the 
federal interference goes to the issue of guilt. 
In any event, even if Younger is applicable, I think 
the harm to responden~ is such that the narrow band of 
exceptions to Younger should govern. If an incarcerated 
prisoner cannot get his case considered by a federal court 
before trial, he probably loses all chance for meaningful 
relief. After trial there is no appropriate remedy for 
someone who claims to have been illegally confined pre-
trial. If this case had been a habeas case, with 
exhaustion of state remedies pre-trial, I think federal 
review clearly would be permissible. Hence, if there is any 
bar to federal jurisdiction in this case, it is based on 
the Preiser problem, and not the Younger problem. 
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GERSTEIN v. PUGH -
GERSTEIN v. PUGH et al. -
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit 
No. 73-477. Argued March 25, 1974 -- Reargued October 21, 1974-· 
Decided 1975 
1. The Fourth Amendment requires a judicial 
dete~ination of probable cause as a prerequisite to 
extended restraint on liberty following arrest. Accordingly, 
the Florida procedures challenged here whereby a person 
arrested without a warrant and charged by information may 
be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending trial 
without any opportunity for a probable cause dete~ination 
are unconstitutional. Pp. 7-15. 
(a) The prosecutor's assessment of probable cause, 
standing alone, does not meet the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment and is insufficient to justify restraint of 
liberty pending trial. Pp. 13-15. 
(b) However, the Constitution does not require 
judicial oversight of the decision to prosecute by 
information, and a conviction will not be vacated on the 
ground that the defendant was detained pending trial without 
a probable cause determination. P. 15. 
2. The probable cause determination, as an 
2. 
initial step in the criminal justice process, may be 
made by a judicial officer without an adversary hearing. 
Pp. 15-21. 
(a) The sole issue is whether there is probable 
cause for detaining the arrested person pe~ding further 
proceedings, and this issue can be dete~ined reliably 
by the use of informal procedures. Pp. 16-18. 
(b) Because of its l~ited function and its 
non-adversary character, the probable cause dete~ination 
is not a "critical sta&e" in the prosecution that would 
require appointed counsel. Pp. 18-19. 
483 F. 2d 778, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
No. 73-477 GERSTEIN v. PUGH Argued 10/21/74 
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Justice Powell-
Here's a draft of a proposed memorandum on 
the one case that was held for Gerstein. The 
Gerstein issue is easy, since we addressed it 
explicitly in the opinion, but I wasn't sure 
xke how much we should say about the other issues 
in the case. If you think it unnecessary to 
say anything about them, the memorandum could 
stop at the end of the first paragraph, adding, 
"I therefore will vote to deny the petition." 
I did not attempt to ~ go into the othe~issues 
in any detail, but thought just to alert the 
other Justices to them, in case they wish to 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ~~ 
t;:::: No. 73-477 
Richard E. Gerstein1 State At-
torney for Eleventh Judicial 
Circuit of Florida, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Robert Pugh et nJ. 
On Writ of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit. 
[January -, 1975] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART, concurring. · 
I concur in Parts I and II of the Court's opinion) since 
the Constitution clearly requires at least a timely judicial 
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to pre-
trial detention. Because Florida does not provide all 
I 
defendants in · custody pending trial with a fair and reli-
able determipation of probable cause for their detention, 
the respondents and the rnernbers of the class they repre-
sent are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief. 
Having determined that Florida's current pretrial de-
tention procedures are constitutionally inadequate, I think 
it is unnecessary to go further. I would not, therefore, in 
the abstract, either attempt to define the minimal pro-
cedural safeguards that must be accorded to incarcerated 
suspects awaiting trial or to specify those procedural pro-
tections that are not constitutionally necessary. 
It is the prerogative of each State in the first instance 
to develop pretrial procedures that provide defendants iu 
pretrial custody with the fair and reliable determination 
of probable cause Jor detention required by the Consti-
tutiou. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer1 408 U. S. 471,488. The 
constitutionality of any particular method for determin-
ing probable cuuse can be properly decided only by eval-
uating a State's pretrial procedures as a whole, not by 
73-477-CONCUR 
2 GERSTEIN v. PUGH 
isolating a particular part of its total system. As the 
Court recognizes, gn'at diversity exists among the proce-
dures employed by the States in this aspect of their crimi- · 
nal justice systems. ·Ante, at slip op. 22. 
There will be adequate opportunity to evaluate in an 
appropriate future case the constitutionality of any new 
procedures that may be adopted by Florida in response 
to the Court's judgment today holding that Florida's 
present procedures are constitutionally inadequate. 
To : 'lhc 1;il .... 
Mr. Just•u 
Mr • J u,st:f c~ F; "-1':;1 
;r · Justice \'{:u to 
r . J ust.tco 1:arshall 
Mr. Jus t i ce Blackmun 
~. Justi ce Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 73-477 
Richard E. Gerstein, State At-
torney for Eleventh Judicial 
Circuit of F lorida, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Robert Pugh et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit. 
[January -, 1975] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JusTICE DouG_. 
I.As, MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, AND MR. JusTICE MARSHALL 
join, concurring. 
I concur in Parts I and II of the Court's opinion, since 
the Constitution clearly requires at least a timely judicial 
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to pre-
trial detention. Because Florida does not provide all 
defendants in custody pending trial with a fair and reli-
able determination of probable cause for their detention, 
the respondents and the members of the class they repre-
sent are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief. 
Having determined that Florida's currant pretrial de-
tention procedures are constitutionally inadequate, I think 
it is unnecessary to go further by way of dicta. In par-
ticular, I would not, in the abstract. attempt to specify 
those procedural protections that constitutionally need 
not be accorded incarcerated suspects awaiting trial. 
Specifically, I see no need in this case for the Court to 
say that the Constitution extends less procedural protec-
tion to an imprisoned human being tfianis requiredto 
test the propriety of garnisheeing a commercial bank ac-
count, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 
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W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600; the temporary suspension 
of a public school student. Gross v. Lopez,- U.S.-; 
or the suspension of a driver's license, Bell v. Burson, 402 
U. S. 535. Although it 'may be true that the Fourth 
Amendment's "balance between individual and public 
interests always has been thought to define the 'process 
that is due' for seizures of person or property in criminal 
cases," ante, pp. 21-22, n. 7, this case does not involve 
an .initial arrest, bJ.It rather the continuing incarceration 
of a presumptively innocent person. Accordingly, I can-
not join the Court's effort to foreclose any claim that the 
traditional requirements of constitutional due process are 
applicable in the context of pretrial detention. 
It is the prerogative of each State in the first instance 
to develop pretrial procedures that provide defendants in 
pretrial custody with the fair and reliable determination 
of probable cause for detention required by the Consti-
tution. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,488. The 
constitutionality of any particular method for determin-
ing probable cause can be properly decided 02;9:: br!lva!:_ 
uating a State's retrial procedures as a whole, not by 
isolating a articular art of · system. .As the 
ourt recognizes, great diversity exists among the proce-
dures employed by the States in this aspect of their crimi-
nal justice systems. Ante, at slip op. 20. . , 
There will be adequate opportunity to evaluate in an !~ 
appropriate future case the constitutionality of any new . 
procedures that may be adopted by Florida in response 
to the Court's judgment today holding that Florida's 
present procedures are constitutionally inadequate. 
lfp/ss 2/17/75 No. 73-477 Gerstein v. Pugh 
This case involves the Florida procedur~here an 
arrest is made without a warrant. as ie ~s~al~ ~e 
case'-. 
upon information by the prosecuting attorney,,land held 
in jail/ pending the other steps in the criminal process, 
b .lh . . d .1 ~~· ~.g., a a~ ear~ng, arra~gnment an tr~a. 
-1-?J.d..;. l.A-r ,/ ) J t.. /-<- ~ .J <.. ~t: ""1 /-~..__ 
We hold~tha the prQaee~~er'~~emeftt ~f 
h,-.. , I~ '- ~ " 
/~bable eaase standing alone is not sufficient to 
justify detention pending trial. Rather, the Fourth 
Amendment require~ fair and reliable determination 
of probable caus;i's a condition to any significant 
pretrial restraint on liberty. Moreover, this 
determination must be made by a judicial officer 
promptly after arrest. 
\~ ) i 
But we do not accept respondent's argument/ that 
a full adversary hearing - with counsel, confrontation 
and cross examination of witnesses - is required by 
the 
for 
Constitution. The determination of probable cause 
detentionJ'is merely the first stage in the elaborate 
2. 
criminal justice system~esigned to safeguard the 
rights of those accused of criminal conduct. At this 
initial stage, we think a 
! 
(,; 
and is not necessarily in 
suspect or society. 
t 1 r~. , 
mini-trial is not req ire 
1 
the interest of either the 
Accordingly, and for the reasons more fully set 
forth in our opinion
1
we affirm in part and reverse 
in par~he decision in this case by the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. ., vv.-~E ~ ...IJ:"~ 
ac§t~~n~nion, } Mr. Justice Stewart has filed 
in which Justices Douglas, Brennan 
joined. 
and Marshall have 
. .-"' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
.iu;vrtmt <!foud of tqt ~tb.,jhtttg 
Jlllgftittghm. ~. <!f. 2ll,?'l-~ 
January 10, 1975 
Re: No. 73-477 - Gerstein v. Pugh 
Dear Lewis: 




Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Conference 
/ 
~u:prtntt Qj:ltlttt qf tlft ,-m±tb .itatt• 
jlasftington. ~. <!):. 2llP:~$ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
January 14, 1975 
Re: No. 73-477 - Gerstein v. Pugh 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely'~ / 
',J ('('{ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~mtt Qfourl ~ tqt ~ttitt~ ~fattg 
Jl'agfri:n:gton, ~. <!f. 2.()'_;;:,., 
January 15, 1975 
Re: No. 73 - 477 - Gerstein v. Pugh 
Dear Lewis: 
Would there be any point in adding, at the end of 
footnote 2 on page 2, a phrase such as "See note 20, ~ 
"? When I first read footnote 2, I wondered whether ---
there was an inference that if the described procedure had 
been challenged, there might be a chance of success. Foot-
note 20 provides an answer to this and prompts me to suggest 
the addition to footnote 2. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
.snvrtuU arourlltf tlft ~b .ifattg 
'JrMlfingtou:. ~. ar. 2ll.;t~$ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
January 15, 1975 
Re: No. 74-477 - Gerstein v. Pugh 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
j 
..§u:prmtt <!Jcurl vf fltt ~b ..§t:Utg 
'Jjlr:w~ 10. <!J. 20gi'!-.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
January 16, 1975 
RE: No. 73-477 Gerstein v. Pugh 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me in your concurring opinion 
in the above. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
j 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~ttprtmt <lfoud of tltt ~~tb ~htftg 
'matll[ington. Ill· (If. 2D&i't.~ 
January 16, 197 5 
/ 
Re: No. 73-477 -- Richard E. Gerstein v. Robert Pugh 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me in your concurring opi_nion . 
T . M. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE C H IEF .JUSTICE 
.in:pr.ttttt Qfourl of tqt ~b .itatt• 
•aslfin~ ~. <!f. 2llgt~~ 
January 24, 1975 
Re: No. 73-477 - Gerstein v. Pugh 
Dear Lewis: 
I join in your opinion circulated January 10. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Pow ell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
.§u.prtlttt ~ourt o-f .tire ~b .§hili.ll' 
'J,tJcwlyinghm .. l§. <q. 2ll~'!..;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS February 5, 1975 
Dear Potter : 
Please join me in your 
concurring opinion in 73-47 7, 
GERSTEIN v . PUGH . 
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 
Mr. Justice Stewart 






No. 73-477 Gerstein v. 
1,,~:·\\~':-'":_-, 
Dear Mr ~ ·' Putzel: 
The line up in this case is as follows: 
Our opinion for the Court joined by 
BRW, HAB and WHR. , , 
;.-··;: 
"' .. _,,-. .r, ,, Justice Stewart's concurring op~nion 












JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
.§n;tttntt ~ourl of tlr~ ~t~ $5fattg 
.. as~htn.18. ~· 2U~'!.~ 
February 26, 1975 FILE COPY 
PLEASE RETURN 
TO FILE 
Case held for No. 73-477 Gerstein v. Pugh 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
No. 73-6950 Mega v. West Virginia. 
In this case we held that a person charged by 
prosecutor's information was entitled to a judicial 
determination of probable cause for pretrial detention. 
Our opinion noted expressly that we had no intention of 
changing the settled rule that illegal arrest or detention 
furnish no grounds for vacating a subsequent conviction. 
tfip .QP. at 15. In Mega, · the Petitioner seeks reversal of 
conviction for ·· possession of marijuana because he was 
denied a preliminary hearing after grand jury indictment. 
The statement in Gerstein thus disposes of his claim, with-
out reference to the fact that Petitioner was held under 
indictment rather than an information or other form of 
prosecutor's charge. 
There are other, independent issues raised by the Mega 
petition. Petitioner also raises questions about the State's 
failure to disclose certain evidence, and its refusal to 
grant immunity to an informer witness who was present at 
the time of the alleged drug transaction and who asserted 
a Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify about the 
occurrence. Petitioner contends the informer's testimony 
would have supported his entrapment defense. I do not find 
this claim worthy of our consideration, and I will vote to 





}X ~~~~~ t. ~ l~ ~ ...;t ~ ' ,...... 
~ .......... ~ ~ 0'\ 
~1 I~~~· ,_:j N ~"'-. .......... ~\.;"< 0 ~~~ ~" ~ 
;::::! 
C..v, P-l 
~ . ~t- :> < ' 
~~ 





Q) vJ l.r, t!:l 








·lJ'" ~ ~ ~ ' I=Q ~ "< ' 
~ ~y· ~r~ 11l \? AI r-: ui : ~ ~ ~ ~ "' .;, :f 't§'7 _J {! ~ -~·
~ 
.!.. rfi C'f ~.Cl 
. ~ 
~~ j ~ ( ....., 
~~ '\ ~ 
~ {\\1\ 
0 a;~ 
~ · ~ ~ 
..,('# I 
.....; '" 0 





No. 73-477 GERSTEIN v. PUGH 
MR. JUSTICE POWELLf delivered the opinion of 
the Court. ~ 
The issue in this case is whether a person ~ 
~ Y'V'e'3teJ 
~~ etl~eod~ under a prosecutor's information is 
constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination of 
e ~~+ria.l Y'edratM-1· of liberLt.j. 
probable cause for ~nt1on~ 
I~ 
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson 
were arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged 
. h 1 ff d ' . f . v w~t severa o enses un er a prosecutor s ~n ormat~on. 
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against 
/ ,. 
/ 
him cf rried a potential life sentence, and Henderson was 
held in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500 
bond. 
In Florida, indictments are required only for 
prosecution of offenses punishable by death. All other 
criminal offenses may be prosecuted by information, and 
2. 
violations of municipal ordinances may be prosecuted 
by a simple affidavit or docket entry. Fla. RJsacrim. 
Proc. 3.140 (Supp. 1974). At the time respondents 
were arrested, Florida's rules of criminal procedure 
authorized only one method for determining the existence 
of probable cause to hold a suspect in jail pending 
trial. Fla. R~rim. P~:122 (amended 1972). This 
proceeding, an adversary preliminary hearing, was not 
available to a suspect who had already been charged 
See.. 
by informationJ~Bradley v. State, 265 So. 2d 533 (Fla.) 
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 916 (1973); State ex rel. Hardy v. 
~ jC oc 
0'-V 
Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972)J State v. IlerflilRd 
09 (Fla. 1968)-; Sullivan v. State __ r_e_l.. 
MeODry, 4~ 8~. 2 ~94 (Fla. 1951); Karz v. OVerto , 249~ 
11A l~s~ ;wJa Cf'4 .,._l,.__t.M.. 
So. 2d 763 (FJ:.a. 1)~a preliminary 
hearing was held and the suspect discharged, the 
r'etu.~ k~ 
prosecutor could reinstate the charge and hale him 
3. 
-h 
"back int~custody i:mmeE:ii:atel~ by filing an information. 
See Montgomery v. State, 176 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1965); 
Baugus v. State, 141 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1962). As a result, 
a person charged by information could be detained pending 
trial solely on the decision of a prosecutor. 
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class 
action against Dade County officials in the federal 
district court, \31 claiming a constitutional right to -
; ~ a ') tt1 4 - ~"f.1A~¥"t "-'r 
a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause 0 
4 
~ f_:r_b~ a•kea :je~declaratory and injunctive relief. Cl 
Respondents Turner and Faulk, "~~ u~rQ also ~ in 
-&: ......... 
5 
custody unde~informations, subsequently intervened. 
Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for Dade County, 
6 
was one of several defendants. 
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature 
~ '1):, 
considered a bill that would have ci preliminary 
- . 
e~"W:l . , ('( rf 1l Mt1 ~ .l 
hearings to 9Pe plai~4£f clasa the District Court 
4. 
~ 
1107 ( Fla. 1971) . 
A(-fVl c "_,.c/ / , -f~e.. c ~ S"".. , 
'I~ eou~e-F-H-f-¥ed t:l;u~ Qas~ 
a s a class action under Civ. Pr/213 (b) (2).> ~ 
~ <'..-O·U.Jfi 
~held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments give all 
(' ~ M 0 Ll i V\~ At V'i11'1 .( • 
arrested personsAa r1ght to a judicial hearing on the 
question of probable cause. The District Court ordered 
the Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs 
an lirumediate preliminary hearing to determine probable 
cause for further detention.~ It also ordered them 
to submit a plan providing prelLminary hearings in all 
~-~'-
cases instituted by informat~n~ly one J;lan~ 
by Saeriff-E Wilson Purdy was submitted, and the 
District Court adopted it with modifications. The final 
order prescribed a detailed post-arrest procedure .~ 
te all arreseea ~~~ 336 F. Supp. 490. Upon arrest 
the accused would be taken before a magistrate for a 
"first appearance hearing." The magistrate would explain 
the charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint 
counsel if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable 
5. 
cause determination unless either the prosecutor or the 
accused was unprepared. If either asked for more time, 
the magistrate would set the date for a "preliminary 
hearing," to be held no more than four days later if the 
" 3C~c{ j.lli:lS 1°11\ C!M./.:ltce/"-;j. GVw.( t'Y\.0 'W~c( tt..a. • ~~ Ja.tu. ;) ~ 
~cuL ~tM.. .!ulta -t (. 1 &t'l (' wa.Q. at Hv ~ .. . __ :a- f-tt..t_ . ~T A accused would be entitled to counsel, and he wou d be 
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, 
to summon favorable witnesses, and to have a transcript 
made on request. If the magistrate found no probable 
cause, the accused would be discharged. He then could 
not be charged with the same offense by complaint or 
information, but only by indictment returned within 
thirty days. The plan also provided sanctions for failure 
to hold hearings at the prescribed times. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed 
the District Court's order pending appeal, but while the 
case was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary 
voluntarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. 
6. 
Upon learning of this development, the Court of Appeals 
vacated it&-&£ay an remanded the case for specific 
findings on the constitutionality of the new Dade County 
system. T~ Before the District Court issued its 
~) 
findings~ the Florida Supreme Court~e procedural 
rules governing preliminary hearing~, and the parties 
agreed that the District Court should direct its inquiry 
to the new rules rather than the Dade County procedures. 
Under the amended rules every arrested person 
must be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. 
Fla. R>crim. Pf1'.130. - fhis "first al'p-;aranc0 
1
1
S ~ i tM_fatc to #..t. ~~ 
~ at t~ " fir st appearance hearing'l~~d~red by the District 
l'f\ all recpe(tt~ bu. e ('.h(Jict~ll'tte: 
CourtJ.-1\t he-maga.,s.tr-a.te must :inf-orm the <lef 
eka.rge, 1 give- him- opy of-t ~~laint, advise him o 
---hie cOftStitu.tiona-l }:ights And appoint counsel f-or him i 
used i~ entitled to release on bail or other conditions~ 
t'V\1!15-h-aiv .S 
~· M-_ 'fiot make a determination of probable cause. A_'i:te'f"'. 
7 
~ The rule amendments also changed the procedure for 
preliminary hearings, restricting them to p felony charges 
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to 
persons charged by information or XRBi«emxa indictment. 
Rule 3.131; see In re Rule 3.13l(b), Florida Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, 282 So. 2d ____ (Fla. 1972)~ 
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held 
answered 
that the amended rules had not xemaxeB the basic 
constitutional objection, since a defendant charged by 
information still could be detained pending trial without 
a judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp. 
1286. Reaffirming the original ruling, xe the District 
Court declared that the continuation of this practice 
was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals 
8. 
affirmed, 483 F. 2d 778, modifying the District Court's 
decree in minor particulars and suggesting that the 
form of preliminary hearing provided by the amended 
Florida rules would be acceptable, as long as it was 
provided to all defendants in custody pending trial. 
' Id. 7at 788. ~ State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for 
review, and we granted certiorari because of the importance 





( As framed by the proceedings below, the issues 
are whether a person who is arrested and charged with 
crime is entitled to a judicial determination of probable 
cause to justify restraint o his liberty pending trial, ) 
~ 4- ,. • . /-nc. ;;.,- ~~ J ../.lj) 7A..( 
and if so,~~het er only an adversary earing will serv~ 
~it ~A , . A. 
Hiato:r: ically~ oth the standards and procedures 
for arrest and detention have been derived from the 
Fourth Amendment and its common law antecedents. See 
~r v. h 'r. 4) 'i' ~ u.s. 2.c11, :v-tt/-'24" (rq73); 
A -Gf.er~i-ted &ta-t:ea,..-35 7 tJ. S • "4'8-o, 485 -"'8-6 ( 195 8) J-
Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex Parte 
Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 447 (1806). The standard for 
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and 
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was 
committing an offense o" Beck v. Ohio, 479 U.S. 89, 91 
(1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176 
? 
10. 
(1949); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
This standard represents a compromise between the individual ~ s 
right to liberty and the community's responsibility for 
controlling crime . 
"These long-prevailing standards seek 
to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable 
interferences with privacy and from unfounded 
charges of crime. They also seek t o give fair 
leeway for enforcing the law in the community's 
protection. Because many situations which 
confront officers in the course of executing 
their duties are more or less ambiguous, room 
must be allowed for some mistakes on their 
part. But the mistakes must be those of 
reasonable men, acting on facts leading 
sensibly to their conclusions of probability. 
The rule of probable cause is a practical, 
nontechnical conception affording the best 
compromise that has been found for accommodating 
these often opposing interests. Requiring 
more would unduly hamper law enforcement. 
To allow less would be to leave law-abiding 
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim 
or caprice." 
Brinegar v. United States, supra; at 176. 
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection 
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the 
Court has required that the existence of probable cause 
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever 
possible. The classic statement of this principle appears 




"The point of the Fourth Amendment, 
which often is not grasped by zealous 
officers, is not that it denies law 
enforcement the support of the usual 
inferences which reasonable men draw from 
evidence. Its protection consists in 
requiring that those inferences be drawn 
11. 
by a neutral and detached magistrate instead 
of being judged by the officer engaged in 
the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime." 
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968). 
Re~iring that a magistrate review the factual justification 
for every arrest beforehand would offer maximum protection 
for individual rights, 
needs ef ef:fe.e.H.ve law enforcement. To accommodate these 
opposing interests, the Court has expressed a preference 
for the use of arrest warrants when possible, Beck v. Ohio, 
379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 479-482 (1963), but it has never invalidated an arrest 
supported by probable cause, solely for lack of 
- - -
SeeKer v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United 
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 
13 u.s. 699, 705 (1948). 
.1<' # ~4' ,·c.~~ 




crime. The policeman 1 s judgment ~also j ustif~ a 
-17) -1 ~ b : <'~ d 1 vJ. ~ : -.J • • ., 
brief period of detention ~n connection with the arr~ 
_g, f e f s >U o J.A.-~ a.~~ fe-"c d ,.., J.. (I .. ..J-. J 
) but once the suspect is in custody the reasons that 
justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral 
judgment evaporate. There is no longer any danger that 
the suspect will escape or commit further crimes while the 
police submit their evidence to a magistrate. And, from 
the suspect's point of view, the consequences of prolonged 
detention may be ~ more serious than the interference 
occasioned by arrest. Left~thy~~retrial confinement may 
i&..t_ s u ~ r-c ('ts /(~ 
imperil ~e defendant's job, interrupt his source of 
~A-¥e::u.·~ 
income, and d&Mege his family relationships. Even 
f } I 
., ~ - "t.l•-. ( "Y ·~_  ~ -..., ~~-.tn~ C.t/"J-(,lt /~ 
, -.e.ondit-iona release~~enaing tria~"IDa¥-invo.l.v:e setlsstzautital ) 
. I r (I , f ~ ! r " ~ 1'\. ; r • . ' : er.· -t 
restraintJ on libe~ty~ When the stakes are this high, 
the detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is 
essential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish meaningful 
protection from unfounded interference with liberty. 
Accordingly, we hold that the Fourth Amendment requires a 
lfp/ ss Rider A, p. 9 2 (Gerstein) 12/7/74 
A f d b h d
. b 1 +~~. (I (I ,.. ~ 
s rame y t e procee 1ngs e ow, tne 1ss~  
4-w-o ~ ~ 
1 whether a person arrested and held for trial on an 
j t~'U{' i "l 
information is entitled to a ,., determination -by-B=--'-jud-iei:a. 
~t .. t_~ I ' 
office:)_ of probable cause for /f(he arre s t~ and i f s oJ 
wt (' ~ -l ~ cuJ _p(' t-,.. l~h:1 c ( ' I) t 0~1 ~ I '\ (j ~ l e 
wha-t fo-rmali'l:ies are re~~red iH l the Hlaking of tlti~ 
i!~~~l=J-r-~td ~ 1 k ~ c)t A-w 
(i.M_ hJ. t • ~ •lk ~ I 0 
lfp/ss Rider A, p. 11 (Gerstein) 12/7/74 
Maximum protection of individual rights could be assured 
by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual justifica-
tion prior to any arrest, but such a requirement would 
severely handicap~eeessary an legitimate law enforcement. 
In striking a balance between these opposing interests, 
the Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest 
warrants when possible, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 
(1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-482 
(1963)~ but it has never invalidated an 
t 
{J 
by probable cause solely because ef the 
~~!:'.a~t" M.e.u.NL 0... MttLhl-t a.m. t . "' 
arrest s~~f.ted 
.~ ~~- - ~ 1? 
tf'" ~ ~()t 
absence of aJ. 
13. 
~This result has historical support in the common law 
that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 
~Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). 
At common law it was customary, if not obligatory, for 
an arrested person to be brought before a justice of the 
peace shortly after arrest. 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 
77, 81, 95 (1736); 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 116-17 1~ 
~,cr (<'o kunt?. oJ, McffittJ 115 tJ,S, ~78> t-{Cfg~qq {_tgF5)"':<1 
(4th ed. 1762). The justice of the peace would "examine" 
the prisoner and the witnesses to determine whether there 
was reason to believe the prisoner had committed a crime. 
If there was, the suspect would be committed to jail or 
bailed pending trial. If not, he would be discharged 
from custody. 1 Hale, supra, at 583-585; 2 Hawkins, supra, 
at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of 
14 
England 233 (1883)~he initial determination of probable 
cause could al;d be reviewed by higher courts on a writ 
I 
of habeas corpus. 2 Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen, 
I ~ 
supra, at 243; See Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 
14. 
criminal procedure in America immediately following the 
adoption 
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); 7 u.s. 
\ 
(3 Cranch) 447 (1806); _E_x_P_a_r_t_e __ H_am_~_·l_t_o_n, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
17 (1795)* In re Bailey,~ Fed. Caso 3b3 (Noo 730) J-
(€. c. K~ 1869)-(M' tter, 
lv..:L ~t' 4-C.d-t IC i!. 
itl1 f, 
Circui-t Justi."C"e) J and ~ 
~~ramers of the Bill of Rights 'nay ~regarded it as a 
... -
model for a "reasonable" seizure. See g81UU!a:ll~ Draper v. 
United States, 358 UoS. 307, 317-320 (1959)(Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
Under the Florida procedures ehallenged here, 
a person arrested without a warrant and charged by 
information may be jailed or subjectedm other restraints 
pending trial without any opportunity for a probable cause 
determination. Ljt There is no provision for a test of 
probable cause at the first appearance before a magistrate 
or at the hearing to set bail; Fla. R~rim. P 3.130; 
C4-.l 
see Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8 (3th 8i:.r. 1973). 
I' 
15. 
e suspect cannot demand a preliminary hearing. 
Fla. R~rim. P ~: l3l(a). The Florida Supreme 
Court has held that habeas corpus cannot be used to 
test the probable cause for detention under an information. 
Sullivan v. State ex rel McCrory, 49 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1951).~ 
The arraignment may be delayed as much as a month, 
and it is not clear that the issue of probable cause 
may be raised ~then. ~ 
Petitioner defends this practice on the ground 
p r r t\u uYt 's JJ. "' ; .'1 · ID ~ ·lr 
that the~information~tself~ a determination of 
~-b 
probable cause a~he-pr~eeutor's judgme~~~ 
sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending trial. 
eftt'\~·<' .d ~.0 t.J 
Although a p~see1:1tor 1 ,., dec is ion that the evidence warrants 
tA-- Q..,--. ~~ !YI 
~tion affe~ some protection against unfounded 
" 
detention, we do not think prosecuterial judgment 
m 
standing alone ~ts the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. Indeed, we think the Court's previous 
16. 
decisions compel disapproval of the Florida procedure. 
In Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5 (1927), the 
Court held that an arrest warrant issued solely upon 
a United States Attorney's information was invalid 
because the accompanying affidavits were defective. 
Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly state 
that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish 
probable cause, that conclusion was implicit in the 
judgment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth 
Amendment.~ M0r.e recently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971), the Court held that a 
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is incon-
sistent with the constitutional role of a neutral and 
detached magistrate. We reaffirmed that principle in 
Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972), and 
held that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest 
warrant must be determined by someone independent of 
\ 20~ 
police and prosecution. ~ The reason for this 
"A democratic society, in which respect 
for the dignity of all men is central, 
naturally guards aginst the misuse of 
17. 
the law enforcement process. Zeal in 
tracking down crUne is not in itself an 
assurance of soberness of judgment. Dis-
interestedness in law enforcement does not 
alone prevent disregard of cherished 
liberties. Experience has therefore 
counseled that safeguards must be provided 
against the dangers of the overzealous 
as well as the despotic. The awful 
instruments of the crUninal law cannot be 
entrusted to a single functionary. The 
complicated process of criminal justice is 
therefore divided into different parts, 
responsibility for which is separately 
vested in the variops participants upon 
whom the criminal law -reUe.s for its 
vindication." b 
--
~cNabb v. United States, 318 u.s. 332, 343 (1943). 
In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of 
?'UJ- ;f .J-.«_ -/ _. l .; I 
probable cause eennot justify restraint on liberty pending 
;'\ 
trial, we do not imply that the accused is entitled to 
' I r- f -Vl (. 1 .... IJ~ <"- ' I .r 
judicial oversight of ~decision to prosecute. 
Instead, we adhere to the Court's prior holding that 
L-'J. ? I 
(#!:_&::;p.r.ac.es.s-does-not: m&ke judicial hearing~~ prerequisite 
to prosecution by information. Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. " 
586 (1913) ~ nu. -1 We-a.lso.-intend no ...departure from 
'\ 
the established rule that illegal arrest or detention 
18. 
-a ~ubsr'l.CAC -tT 
does not void attf\uLhetwise val::td conviction. Frisbie v. 
Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 
l~s ) 
(1886). This rule,, as the Court of Appeals noted below, 
a su. ~{Y ~t w-f 1\ '(' F J rt t) : ""~o A 1-\1\~ et. o r ¥ • -tC . .t_ 
~~-a-eha.lleag ~o pt:esent confinerneat ~om 4 
[Yt.e-t-o.O., 0 <! iLU./.1 \-~Yt tC...fl c J: • ~ I (I' J -t...) ~uf- a. ~- -ut-i.r~ 
·a-t:tenrpt to reverse Ot;"-¥aeate--a.. conviction Otl- th.e.....groun;i 
v. '0 ""r{ ..l_ 1"' ~ t t" rt· ..J..IV rf 
;( that the defendant was detained pending trial without 
~ probable cause. eetermina · 483 F. 2d , at 786-87. 
CAS" 
Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 F. 2d 6 (~th €~~. 1968), 
-U,;, A~,. D.c.., ·1 
with Brown v. Fauntleroy,~442 F. 2d 838 (~.e. e~t. 1971), 
.--U. . 1), ~~ 
and Cooley v. Stone 2 414 F. 2d 1213 (D• ·•· c;ir 1969). 
i. cJ;:) 
III 
~lift \( l. ,· .. ~, ~1 C'hu.~-t* C\-MA I L~ C' u~ t 
~ng-questi-on- is whether the adversaryJ 
01 (1-prA Q J.. ~ 0 ct ttat ~ft._t c{ rq ,.._ ; , 17< 'i ~ ~ 
kea~ing ~rdered by the District Court and approved by the 
51 ~~ttfJ(C tL 
~rt? p£.. A-ppeals is manda: d by- th onstitut'ion Under-
.tbe Diser-i-e-t: 1ourt' s ~ree, as- modified on appeal, the 
/ 
ause -determination must be made either at the 
4iX'ilt- appearance cOr several days later . In eiEhe'P <!as.a, 
\. 
-tt must be accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safe-
19. 
and compulsory process for witnesses. _) 
-'A full preliminary hearing of this sort is modeled 
after the procedure used in many states to determine 
whether the evidence justifies going to trial under an 
information or presenting the case to a grand jury. 
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Y Kamisar, W. 
See ,.,__ 
LaFave & J. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedurd( 957-967) qqb-1000 
(4th ed. 1974). The standard of proof required of the 
prosecution is usually referred to as "probable cause," 
but it may appr~ch a prima facie case of guDt. A.L.I dl 
Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, l~~ta~ on_ 
tVo. 




hearing takes this form, adversary procedures are ~a±ffle&t ~ 
a~r•J~ employed. The importance of the issue to both 
the state and the accused justifies the presentation of 
witnesses and full exploration of their testimony on 
~~~0 
cross-examination. This kind of hearingArequires 
appointment of counsel for ~indigent defendant~ Coleman 
~ f>&:PAd"f• t~'- , f, 
v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). And, as the~ ieel!e becomes 
.. 
' 
11 · ~ ~~~_;y_ t?: , ,'.. v -le ~ ~ "X<..r~ -
N ~ ~ ~"'" bk. t' ._,... u.d; t/1aj~ I, -' 1..) -I-
T more difficult and the proced':res more complex, 1 --.!I 
~ -1- t ,t; I' t 
the less likely it is that ~he ~~ iminary hearing can 
~tty 
be held ~ after 
;'\ 
('('I! ... 
arrest. A A.L.I :J Model Code of 
Pre-arraignment Procedure, supra, at 33-34. 
e~se t'al 
These adversary safeguards are not ~eah1~ for the 
r y?}v,;'-'Jf ::I' 
t'r;L 1r 
probable cause determination required by the Fourth 
jfrrst 
Amendme~~A ~ny practice that fosters delay will 
( thwart the 
which must 
purpose of the probable cause determination, 
be held promptly after arrest if it is to 
(Y~ I~· 
:rolv #A/ guarantee freedom from unjustified restraints on liberty. 
flV' #1 f.l-t 
~ f-1-' '\ ) v ,y.-~' \ ~. the issue of probable cause for detention can 
trf ~ . ~ /_.,.)._~ t..U... ~ ~ ~--~-
t-"fi ·...., ~ be determined reliably without a full adversary hearing. 
- _)' ~~ I 
r~. ~ 11fl -
~~ The standard is the same as that for arrest. That 
standard -- probable cause to believe the suspect has 
committed a crime --\ haEi t;aditionally~been decided 
in nonadversary proceedings on hearsay and written 
testimony, and the Court has appr~oed these informal 
I 
21 
modes of proof. 
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt and by evidence 
confined to that which long experience in 
the common-law tradition, to some extent 
embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized 
into rules of evidence consistent with that 
standard. These rules are historically 
grounded rights of our system, developed 
to safeguard men from dubious and unjust 
convictions, with resulting forfeitures 
of life, liberty and property. 
. . . \ . 
din dealing with probable cause, however, 
as the very name implies, we deal with 
probabilities. These are not technical; 
they are the factual and practical considerations 
of everyday life on which reasonable and 
prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The 
standard of proof is accordingly correlative 
to what must be proved." 
~i~egar v. United StateS , 338 u.s. 160, 174-175 (1949) • 
cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). ~e use 
;z-- --,-,--
: tl~ q< (" 
of informal procedures is justified not only by the lesser 
consequences of a probable cause determination but also by 
the nature of the determination itself. ~primary 
~ctio of confrontation and cross-€xamination is to- aid 
in asse'S-sing witness credibility and re j olving conflicts 
6A) / It 
in testimony. -A determination of probable/ cause does 
not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence 
~a.-
that a reasonable-doubt or preponderance standard demands, 
1\ 
t ' ) 
c "' 
lfp/ss Rider A, p. 22 (Gerstein) 12/9/74 
J(ut we find no basis for holding as a matter of 
a \I 
constitutional principle that~ the formalities and safe-
guards of 4 trial must be observed in making the Fourth 
Q- )'~ 
Amendment determination of probable cause. Our system 
of criminal justice already is criticized, fairly in 
(5k,~(A .. H<'(' 
some respects
1
for its obese~ 
'~{•('t(, I f 
to procedural and KKR~KRxxx evident~ 1 formalities ~ich 
result in delayed justice, often in repetitive trials, 
~ IN-
and in burdensome expense ~ both the accused and the 
" 
state. 
Rider A--alternative p. 22 pc 
but in most cases their value would be too slight to 
justify holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, 
that all the formalities and safeguards of trial must be 
employed in making the Fourth Amendment determination of 
probable cause. Our system of criminal justice is already 
overburdened, and it may be fairly criticized when 
overemphasis on procedural and evidentiary formalities 
-- ..... ..... -r .._ _ ~ --
~~ . .Y 
• ~Q~) & ~\~'-
( X'~\ "\O ~ 
'AS'~-~ Jf~ I Jt ' 
1w>., l~\o 22. 
7 \' ...-C-;;\)-~ 
I ~ Y\.>,0 \0 " I 
I 
and credibility determinations are less crucial ~n 
l·c·· ,r t 1 ~~ L lc-
-t=he-issue is tihe existence o~ evidence support .... ~ a 
belief in guilt. to say that confrontation 
and cross-examination might not enhance the reliability 
of probable cause determinations in some cases ~ but the 
delay that might result if live witnesses must be 
produced for every preliminary determination counsels 
against requiring these procedures as a constitutiona~ 
. . 1 23\ pr 1.nc 1. p e .___; 
the other hand, allowing the accused to be 
and participate in the probable rndnat.ion 
2 
~~·ri-~ delay the h~~ng-or burden the ~tate. In 
~ ~O 
respect the post-arrest determination
1
differ 
, f 'he 1 jM..e'~ <i' I' . 
from the procedurej)used in applying for warrants. 
Warrant applications are ex parte proceedings by necessity, 
-Rider .s, I'. 22 
its l;~:od b~r,(~~ ~J._) 
KX~XNEXBiKX~XHKRXHKXKxmiRaxi~ 
Partly because ef 
the probable cause determination 
is not a "critical stage" in the prosecution that ~ 
would require appointed counsel. We have identified 
as "critical stages" those pretrial procedures 
would 
that/impair defense on the merits if the accused 
( Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); \ 
is required to procee without • counsel. United States 
/"\ 
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967 ). In Coleman v. Alabama, 
'-
where the Court held that a preliminary hearing was a 
critical staSe of an Alabama prosecution, the majority 
and concurring opinions identified two critical factors 
that distinguish the Alabama preliminary hearing from 
the probable cause determination required by the Fourth 
Amendment. First, under Alabama law the function of 
~ evi&!A-t"c. 
the hearing was to determine whether t~e "\o<as suf :H:eeen~ 
J't~s-ht·~d 
ev~~nee to just ·::-t~ charginS the suspect with an offense. 
A ~ finding of no probable cause could mean that he would 
not be tried at all. 
~ourth Amendment ) 
efProbable~use determination 
is addressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure, pretrial 
/ 
ltl-der B, eont-~ 
to confront and cross-examine prosecution witnesses at the 
preliminary hearing. The Court noted that the suspect's 
defense on the merits could be compromised if he had no 
legal assistance for exploring or preserving the witnesses' 
testimony. This consideration does not apply to the 
informal, nonadversary procedure required under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
The reasons that make a nonadversary proceeding 
appropriate, however, do not ju~tify denying the suspect 
an opportunity to be present and participate in the 
determination~Our system of justice operates on the 
premise that the subject of a judicial proceeding is 
entitled to participate unless there is good reason to 
exclude him. See Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall . ) 
<._~ fow-c 1t... .4vv\J!M~h~ is 7U>+ iV\0 ~~ fp tudt •tat C41A.~Jt. 
107, 12Z-123 (1873). )\ The procedures normally followed / 
~ CvV\ i4 o...J"tL ~ 
in applying for lllla••n••n-li••,...7~ "ilan:=aate ·~ Fal~ 
iftto t he eate~ery- adiinpreellllli~~ ia ~ ;ilk:~ H:eeessit~ 
k 1U C.4 ~tjJ OJ.)._.. 
Q~etat~ ex parte proceedin~sl\ ;NOtifying the suspect would 
often frustrate the purpose 
~· 
of the warrant. See T. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional 
Interpretation 81-82 (1969). But when the suspect is 
already in custody, and the only issue is probable cause 
for detention, he should be allowed to participate in the 
determination. Allowing him to appear before the magistrate 
) 
and giving him an opportunity to speak or to submit 
written evidence for consideration along with the state's 
presentation could enhance both the reliability and the 
fairness of the proceeding. 
bw(~ ~ ........ t 1/l 
The incomrenienee t~ the 
state would be minimal. Virtually all jurisdictions 
require that arrested persons be presented to a judicial 
seQ. 
officer within a short time after arrest , AA.L.I., Model 
Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure 230-31 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 
dN 
1966) , ~ Every jurisdiction makes some provision for 
setting bail or determining other conditions of pretrial 
L ~ kat~) ~u.stice I s l"e "., n, c At \ cl tA/ \ 
release. See No-t--e-, Bail: An Ancient Practice Re-examinedo-. 
11.\7- 3loS (\ct7~) 
~ 7 Y~le L.J. 966, 977 (1971)~ Since the defendant is 
already in the courtroom, the issue of probable cause may 
be decided at that time with little or no inconvenience 
to the state. In fact, the suspect's first appearance 
before a magistrate ~as 1 traditionally} been considered the 
proper time for determining whether there is probable 
cause for detention. 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 589-90 
(1736); 2 id.
1
at 77-95; 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 116-17 
(4th ed. 1762) ; see McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 
( Awts1VtdaW\ J -pv-cs~~ ' :tfu. "-~t 5~ M; ~~, l, l~t~ • ?lJq.> 
342-44 (1943By' Although the Federal Rules of Criminal ( n~~ ~~r;,·,j 
, I• 1 .J 
Procedure hla:e: 1:aa: er explicitly acknowledge; this function 
of the first appearance, this Court has interpreted them 
to require a determination of probable cause at that 
stage. Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214 (1965); 
2$ 
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957). 
The determination we require under the Fo~ 
Amendment is similar in some respects to th~formal 
preliminary hearings that due process requires upon arrest 
leading to revocation of parole or probation. Morrissey v. 
rewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 
(!u t~ 25. 
( -
determination following arrest, serve to justify 
detention pending a final determination in the case. 
But there are differences. In Morrissey, the lead case, 
we said that at the preliminary hearing the parolee should 
be allowed to bring individuals who can give the parole 
officer relevant information on his behalf, and, on a 
qualified basis, should be able to insist that a person 
who had given adverse infonnation be made available 
for questioning in his presence. 408 U.S. at 487. The 
~ea~~ provision for live testimony is just i fied by 
the differences between proceedings leading up to 
revocation of probation or parole and those preceding a 
criminal trial. In the first place, when criminal 
proceedings are instituted by information the prosecutor 
IIi 
makes an official oath that he is satisfied ~ probable 
(' Y.t. f . 
cause Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.140(g). The formality 
attendant upon this procedure, as well as the professional 
~ I r-' ~t ttf4{ 
afford greater protection 
It 
responsibility of the prosecutor, 
----------~ ------------------------------1 
than the more unstructured 
25 
decision of a probation or parole officer. 
noted in Morrissey, the parolee often is 
arrested "at a place distant" from the state or the 
institution to which he may be returned for the final 
revocation hearing. 408 U.S. at 48). In such a case 
it may be impossible or impra tical to ensure the 
presence of witnesses at the fina~ hearing. Criminal 
prosecutions, however, customarily are held near the 
place of the crime, and the Sixth Amendment protects 
the accused f;orn testimony of witnesses who cannot be 
present at trial. As a result, there is less re~son 
to use the preliminary hearing as a device for gathering 
and preserving live testimonY.. '7-r---------------------------l 
_j 
There is no single proper method for making the 
probable cause determination required by the Fourth 
Amendment. The states have many different patterns of 
criminal procedure, and each may adapt its own to provide 
Florida requires every arrested person to be brought 
before a magistrate within 24 hours, unless sooner 
released. Fla. R~Crim. P ~: l30(b). At that appearance 
the defendant is told of the charges against him, furnished 
a copy of the complaint, advised of his constitutional 
rights, and provided counsel if he is indigent. The 
magistrate then sets bail or prescribes other conditions 
of pretrial release. One of the factors typically 
relied upon in making this decision is the weight of 
evidence against the accused. ABA Standards Relating to 
the Administration of Criminal Justice, Pretrial Release 
;c;;; £StU! cc.. 
§ 5.1 (1974); See 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b). Expanding that 
determination to a test of probable cause would be a 
na~al way of integrating the probable cause decision 
with existing procedures. 
In other states, existing procedures may satisfy the 
~ , 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Some states already ... 
~ 
authorize a hearin2: on orobable cauf:e at or immPdiatPlv 
follo~ing the suspect's first appearance. E.~., Colo. Rev. 
Stat. §39-2-7; Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708-9. Others may 
choose simply to accelerate their existing preliminary 
hearings. What the Fourth Amendment requires for 
pretrial restraint on liberty ~is a reliable determination 
of probable cause made either before or promptly after 
arrest, and preferably no later than the first appearance 
before a judicial officer. If made after arrest, the 
suspect must be allowed to be present. Each state may 
(2 f',; 'I 
choose the procedure that best i~a£e£ this determination 
.{o . . . 
~G 1ts ex1st1ng 
. 'I ' 
practice. / 
IV ~D 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the 
Fourth Amendment requires a timely judicial determination 
of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we 
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we 
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the 
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971. 
On March 16 an information was filed charging him with 
robbery, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of 
a firearm during commission of a felony. Respondent 
Henderson was arrested ,March 2, and charged by information 
on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and entering 
and assault and battery. The record does not indicate 
whether either was arrested under a warrant. 
hearin~ Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970), 
f ,(:'\. , .. yt\; . ~ ~·. t 31 . 
:.) A but that procedure is not challenged in this case. 
3. The complaint was framed under 42 u.s.c. § 1983, 
' 
and jurisdiction in the District Court was based on 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1343(3). 
2. 
4. Respondents did not ask for release from 
state custody, even as an alternate remedy. They only 
asked that the state authorities be ordered to give 
them a probable cause determination. This was also 
the only relief that the District Court ordered for 
the named respondents. F. Supp. ____ . Because 
release was neither asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did 
not come within the class of cases for which habeas corpus 
is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2973-
2974 (1974). 
5. Turner was being held on a charge of auto 
theft, following arrest on March 11, 1971. Faulk was 
arrested on March 19 on charges of soliciting a ride 
and possession of marijuana. 
6. The named defendants included justices of 
the peace and judges of small-claims courts, who were 
authorized to hold preliminary hearings in criminal cases, 
and a group of law enforcement officers with power to 
3. 
7. The District Court correctly held that 
respondents' claim for relief was not barred by the 
equitable restrictions on federal intervention in state 
'IC>u -;y,t ... :,._., ~ot U .5. 31 (1tl'11), 
prosecutions A The injunction was not directed at the 
state prosecutions as such, but only at the legality 
GJ1A t'ss wz. ~ t 
of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing , A~ 
~"'\Ut J, -ft-o...U:..Rrl~ th ~ -fv 1-t. ~al ~~e~~:-rhe. 
~ order to hold preliminary earings could not prejudice 
l SE'c C..C ov~t v. c ic ,, t) 41'1 f.'7d 1073_, IOf:l (CA3 1'1'13)./ -- .. ------../ 
the conduct of trial on the merits ~ ~· Perez v. Ledesma, 
401 U.S. 82 (1971); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 
(195:) J. llu~ eveft ifr't:he -principle 
r 40t •• 37 ( 971), were deemed to 
of Younger v. Harri"' , 
t)lis case 
would qQB ify as one in which equitable r could b 
grant~d. Illegal detention is an irreparable 
"both great nd immediate," and the threat it pos es to 
"' 
a suspect's be eliminated by his defense 
gainst single criminal 





~ Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973), seems 
to provide that every defendant confined for 30 days 
is entitled to a mandatory preliminary hearing upon 
application for writ of habeas corpus, but it apparently 
·has been construed to vest trial courts with discretion 
to deny the hearing. See Evans v. State, 197 So. 2d 323 
~ 
ct. 
(Fla. App. 1967). But cf. Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 " ~ 
(Fla. Ct. App. 1971}. 
tf • A~ ~s rvl\~cr- hJd a s.t~i '1k; islative. ru-_{e" 
• This erder was ~mt otttsid · ri:eaicti 
1AM.~S~11\.a \ > it was ""--<>t ~d.t_ ~ jw-J.A..d.J..£t' 
I( of a singie judge by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 2281. The 
original complaint did not ask for an injunction against 
enforcement of any state statute or legislative rule of 
statewide application, since the practice of denying 
preliminary hearings to persons charged by information 




had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the 
constitutionality of a state "statute" was drawn into 
question for the first time when the criminal rules 
were amended. The District 
't:s 
:Lajttru:ti"e deeree t o itreoti"t'rtte that holding. Its 
supplemental opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory 
judgment that the amended rules were unconstitutional ~ 
-/k ~~~ <! ·'ve tb(! r , ..,. I r'11~l!)'lOlc +~t l-u(~j 
~ and the opinion in the Court of Appeals is not 
l ·-W Cb-v\C .u ,.; ~ j I'~ "Dtcitu t [I~ u tf c:L:cf r t 
inconsistent with f ais eenstreeti~ -&e~ 483 F. 2d at 788 
~ 1,. (.0 e..-v.J-s~{ (I~ tV~ l o-t tt daft"', ' ~q_ -rwc. tl r,'2 ,o178K.. 
j Accordingly, a district court of three judges was not 
required for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 152-55 (1963); Flemming v. 
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 606-08 (1960). 
6. 
I o. 
~ The major difference between the District 
Court's order and that of the Court of Appeals centered 
on the question whether a probable cause hearing is 
required for all arrested 
ck~d. P~~J ~~ ~ ., · l' 
personsAor only for those 
confined pending trial. The District Court's 
original decree required preliminary hearings for all 
33~ F. ('uf ., o..t-. 
arrested persons. On remand, the District Court made 
~ 
an exception for persons charged with misdemeanors who 
neither suffered pretrial detention nor faced imprisonment 
3?5 r c "'r~r 1cd -· 
upon conviction. I\ The Court of Appeals explicitly limited 
the hearing right for misdemeanor defendants to those 
4£ , . 2J) a.+ '1 <6 ~ ~ 
who are jailed pending trial. A Its opinion also suggests, 
· h ~fa~.£, 1· · 1 h h h · · h · w1t out ~ay1~ exp 1c1t y, t at t e ear1ng r1g t 1s 
similarly limited to felony defendants who are confined 
pending trial. l4...1 ~ 78 'fJ 78Cf • 
The Court of Appeals vacated both the portion 
of the District Court's order that prescribed differea~ 
(tf(<'N' i 
time periodsAfrom those eettteine~ in the amended rules, 
h lZI.ll t;1 Qrguifi ilus sanction~ for fail urP ro comn 1 v 
7. 
It affirmed the District Court's holding on remand 
that the amended rule~ extended time periods for 
capital and life-imprisonment offenses was a violation 
of equal protection. In light &~~ur disposition of 
-to 
the specific terms of the 
District Court's decree. 
f. At oral argument counsel informed us that 
the named respondents have been convicted. The i~ 
p re\J..u'C\1 .ft~ 
de~ivatioa -of-. whi:eh-they-eempla-in~ therefore has 
ended, but this case belongs to that narrow class of 
cases in which the termination of a class representative's 
claim does not moot the claims of the unnamed members 
of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa, No. 73-762. Pretrial 
detention is by nature temporary, and it is most 
• 
II/~ 
unlikely that any siagl~individual could have his 
constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is 
either released or convicted. The individual ~d 
nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is 
~-. f?-t1 ~ t· 0 
certain that other persons will be detained under the 
8. 
allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, 
/' 
in short, is one that is "capable of repetition, yet 
" 
evading review." 
At the time the complaint was filed, the named 
respondents were members of a class of persons detained 
without a judicial probable cause determination ~ ~ 
.Distrist Cgu.;~;t suh&il'il1ently ee:r=tifie~e ela:es aeti~ 
8ft beh.ftlf <>£ hose who suffe-red a similar depr±vat+on 
b v.:t -t~ <W'A 
A. 'the record does not indicate whether any of -£h~ Ram.ed ~ 
- wkw ~~ 
respondents )were still in custody a~aiting trial~ 
~-, sfr ,·c. T Co-wr C..u-rt:-h d -f-tt_ c r cU .. o 
~iffi~ Despite the absence of such a showing, which would 
k avotd t.~.s 
ordinarily be required )\under Sosna, this case is not 
moot. The length of pretrial custody cannot be ascertained 
at the outset, and it may be ended at any time by release 
on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or a guilty 
plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. 
It is by no means certain that any given individual would 
be jn nretrial cur-:;todv lonq enouqh for a Clir-:;t:riC'.t i11do-P 
9. 
Mo <'ovvt> 
to certify a class action. ~aetheless~ this is the 
kind of case in which the constant existence of a class 
of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The 
attorney representing the named respondents is a public 
clients 
~ .. 
with a continuing live interest in the cas e . ~ 
;th_ (HJNU ~.) 
A ease~ therefore, is 
$_osvya 
a suitable exception to the ~rule 
cJC\ss afl J , + · ~ •'s 
that Stl:BBCEJ:UCHS. mootness of aA"capable of repetition, 
() f'd. 1 : lJ I 
d . . " l . .:.;.I . d b d .. yet eva 1ng rev1ew e asa aet10~ 1s governe y eterm1n1ng 
whether the named representatives were members of the 




__ ; ,$· Rivera v. Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159 ~gst Cb:~ 1972). 
Another aspect of Trupiano was overruled in 
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), which 
was overruled in turn by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752. 
The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated 
the most controversy, and which remains unsettled, is 
whether and under what circumstances an officer may enter 
10. 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971); i d. 
at 510-512 (White, J., dissenting); Jones v. United States 
357 u.s. 493, 499-500 (1958). 
• The primary motivation for the requirement 
seems to have been the penalty for allowing an offender 
to escape, if he had in fact committed the crime, and 
the fear of liability for false imprison ent, if he had 
not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant 
of commitment, called a mittimus, was required for more 





'~hen a private person hath arrested a 
felon, or one suspected of a felony, he may 
detain him in custody till he can reasonably 
dismiss himself of him; but with as much 
speed as conveniently he can, he may do either 
of these things. 
1. He may carry him to the common gaol, 
. but that is now rarely done. 
2. He may deliver him to the constable 
of the vill, who may either carry him to the 
common gaol, ••• or to a justice of peace 
to be examined, and far ther proceeded against 
as case shall require • • • . 
3. Or he may carry him immediately to 
any justice of peace of the county where he 
is taken, who upon examination may discharge, 
bail, or commit him, as the case shall r equire. 
And the bringing the offender either by the 
constable or private person to a justice of 
peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler 
will expect a Mittimus for his warrant of detaining. 
;!1 id. at 589-90. _ , 
11. 
'* ~ The examination of the prisoner was 
inquisitorial, and the examination of the witnesses 
was conducted outside the prisoner's presence. The 
process was considered quite harsh until statutory 
reform was accomplished in 1848, 1 J. Stephen
7
at 
225, but it was well established that if the investigation 
turned up insufficient evidence of the prisoner's 
guilt, he was entitled to be discharged. 
~ 
In Ex yarte Bollman, two men charged in the 
I 
Aaron Burr treason were committed following an examination 
in the circuit court of the District of Columbia. They 
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court. 
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, 
affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to persons 
in custody by order of f ederal trial courts. Then, 
following arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement 
of probable cause, the Court surveyed the evidence against 
the prisoners and held that it did not establish probable 
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12. 
15. A similar procedure at common law, the 
warrant for recovery of stolen goods, is said to have 
furnished the model for a "reasonable" search under the 
Fourth Amendment. The victim was required to 
appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath of 
probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular 
place. After the warrant was executed, and the goods 
seized, the victim and the alleged thief would appear 
before the justice of the peace for a prompt determination 
of the cause for seizure of the goods and detention of 
the thief. 2 Hale, supra at 149-52; T. Taylor, Two 
Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969~; 
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-629 (1886). 
~ -- 3.120 
16.~la. R. Grim. P./governs the procedure for 
;_,.-h._ , t ~"'1 ] 
~uing arrest warrants. A- warrant may be issued upon a 
sworn complaint that states facts showing that the suspect 
has committed a crime. The magistrate may also take 
testimony under oath to determine if there is reasonable 
13. 
Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973), seems 
to provide 
~ 
is prelim·nary he~ring upon 




cf. Karz v. Overton, 
18. The District Court found that the procedures 
used in filing i nformations allow a delay of a month or 
more between arrest and arraignment. First, processing 
of the information does not begin until the arresting 
officer appears before an assistant state attorney and 
files an affidavit of facts. This appearance is delayed 
anywhere from 24 hours to two weeks after arrest. If the 
state attorney decides to file an information, the papers 
are prepared and the information is filed and set for 
14. 
@ 
officer appears and the time of arraignment is ten to 
fifteen days. 
The Court of Appeals assumed, for purposes of 
this case, that the defendant would have an opportunity 
to challenge the probable cause underlying the information 
~ut 
at his arraignment) "The basis for that a.ss-~i{)n..wasa 
.ehe ~r&~:i:sion for a: bi:H of part-i~.:rs It noted 
that if the assumption was groundless, a person charged 
by information would have no opportunity to challenge 
probable cause before trial. 483 F. 2d at 781, n. 8. 
The Florida rule governing arraignment does not suggest 
that the procedure contemplates a challenge to probable 
cause or any consideration of pretrial custody. It merely 
provides that the arraignment shall consist of reading 
the indictment or information to the defendant and calling 
upon him to plead. Fla. R:r crim. Pf~.16o. 
15. 
19. By contrast, the Court has held that 
an indictment, "fair upon its face," and returned by 
a "properly constituted grand jury" conclusively determines 
the existence of probable cause and requires issuance 




United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250 (1932). ~ S~e ~ls9 
,rue~ 
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 487 (1958). 
The willingness to let a gran! jury's judgment substitute 
for that of a neutral and detached magistrate is attributable 
to the grand jury's relationship to the courts and its 
historical role of protecting individuals from unjust 





20. The Court had earlier reached a different 
result in Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914) , 
a criminal ~Q from the Phillipine Islands. Under a 
statutory guarantee substantially identical to the Fourth 
Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c~ 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. 
693-694, the Court held that an arrest warrant could 
issue solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court 
has since held that interpretation of a statutory guarantee 
1 s en c t.,v. 1 ~ • 
applicable to the Phillipines ~ not interpretation 
of a cognate provision in the ~ederal Constitution Green v. 
-,. 1... 
United States, 355 u.s. 184, 194j(8 (1957) . 
the result reached in Ocampo is incompatible with the later 
holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, and Shadwick. 
21. See also Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962). 
JZh :::P --
:, The opinion in Beck cites Ocampo v. United States, 234 
U.S. 91 (1914), for the same proposition, but the validity 
of prosecution by information without a prelDffiinary hearing 
was not at issue in that case. The only issues were whether 
'l1· 
ilA• Because the standards are identical, there 
is no need for further investigation -following arr-es~ 
before the probable cause determination can be made. 
~~resumably~ whomever the police arrest they must 
{I~ arrest on probable cause.M It is not the function v ~ of the police to arrest, as it were, at large and to 
use an interrogating process at police headquarters 
in order to determine whom they should charje before 
a committing magistrate on (~robable cause. J ,, 
~ \;,' 
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 456 (1957). 
)\ In Morrissey v. _Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon 
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee 
or probationer arrested prior to revocation is entitled to 
an informal preliminary hearing at the place of arrest, with 
some provision for live testimony. 408 u.s., at 487; 411 
U.S., at 786. That preliminary hearing, more than the 
probable cause determination required by the Fourth ~RRB~ 
Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and preserving 
frequently 
live testimony, since the final revocation hearing~is 
held at some distance from the place where the violation 
occurred. 408 u.s.J at 485; 411 u.s.1 at 872-873 n.5. 
Moreover, revocation proceedings may offer less protection 
from initial error than the more formal criminal process, 
where violations are defined by statute and the prosecutor 
has a professional duty not to charge a suspect with 
1N"f !~ ~ ~ e 1 r sdt:~;~i r ~ < 
crime ~ing ind.ep.endent ass-essment o~ probable 
cause. See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, D.R. 
7-103(A) (the prosecubor has a professional responsibility 
"not [toJ institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges 
Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4(c). 
The procedures suggested in the Uniform Rules 
of Criminal Procedure (Proposed Final Draft 1974) and [ 
the A.L.I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent. 
f'Jo• No. 
DraftAS, 1972, and Tent. Draft ASA, 1973) are instructive. 
Under the Uniform Rules, a person arrested without a 
warrant is entitled, ''without unnecessary delay," to a 
first appearance before a magistrate and a determination 
that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest warrant. 
The determination may be made on affidavits or testimony, 
in the presence of the accused. Rule 311. Persons who 
remain in custody for inability to qualify for pretrial 
release are offered another opportunity for a probable 
cause determination at the detention hearing, held no 
more than 5 days after arrest. This is an adversary hearing, 
and the parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay 
18. 
@ 
may be considered. Rule 344. 
The Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure 
also provides a first appearance, at which a warrantless 
arrest must be supported by a reasonably detailed 
written statement of facts. § 310. The magistrate may 
~ make a determination of probable cause to hold the accused, 
/ 
but he is not required to do so and the accused may 
request an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the 
first appearance to be held within 2 "court days ~'.' At 
that session, the magistrate makes a determination of 
probable cause upon a combination of written and live testimony: 
~The arrested person may present written and 
1 testimonial evidence and arguments for his 
discharge and the state may present additional 
written and testimonial evidence and arguments 
that there is reasonable cause to believe that 
he has committed the crime of which he is 
accused. The state's submission may be made 
by means of affidavits, and no witnesses shall 
be required to appear unless the court, in the 
light of the evidence and arguments submitted 
by the parties, determines that there is a 
basis for believing that the appearance of one 
or more witnesses for whom the arrested person 
seeks subpoenas might lead to a finding that 
there is no reasonable cause. 
No• 




~ In an amicus brief filed on behalf of the 
United States, the Solicitor General suggested that McNabb 
~,d ~ t , u 1 r .,. r I' ,\ o te ~ " ; ""e • 
v. Mallory had mistaken the purpose of the first appearance , 
0~ Note.~ l}ob:~lok, Ca«~ ~ ~ r~~ahel i Waft/(cu>1-tfe~<fs., t/5 So,Caf. 
~ .McNabb, of course, was a ecided before the adoption of the l~l~v, 
(l<l 7~)' 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It interpreted a _ll 
statutory requirement that an arrested person be brought before 
a magistrate without unnecessary delay. 318 u.s.
1 
at 342. 
Mallory was decided after the federal rules were adopted, 
and although the interpretation of the federal rules was 
dictum, it clearly outlined the Court's view: 
- "The scheme for initiating a federal 
prosecution is plainly defined. The police 
may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only 
on "probable cause." The next step in the 
proceeding is to arraign the arrested person 
before a judicial officer as quickly as 
possible so that he may be advised of his rights 
~ · and so that the issue of probable cause 
may be promptly determined." 
C( 354 U.S •1 at 454. _(The use of the word "arraign" was . 
rY' e.l,.~-t ~ "'l; 
mists~ as arraignment occurs later in the process. Fed. 
R~rim. P~~-
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The issue in this case is whether a person arrested 
under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally en-
titled to a judicial determination of probable cause for 
pretrial restraint of liberty. 
I 
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were 
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged 
with several offenses under a prosecutor's information.1 
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against 
him carried a potential life sentence, and Henderson was 
held in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500 
bond. 
1 Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971. On March 16 
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a con-
cealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a 
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrested March 2, and charged 
by information on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and 
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate 
whether either was arrested under a warrant. 
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu-
tion of offenses punishable by death. All other criminal 
offenses may be prosecuted by information, and viola-
tions of municipal ordinances may be prosecuted by a 
simple affidavit or docket entry. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 
,3.140 (Supp. 1974). At the time respondents were ar-
rested, Florida's rules of criminal procedure authorized 
only one method for determining the existence of probable 
cause to hold a suspect in jail pending trial. Fla. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). This proceeding, an 
adversary preliminary hearing, was not available to a 
suspect who had already been charged by information. 
See Bradley v. State, 265 So. 2d 533 (Fla.), cert. denied, 
411 U.S. 916 (1973); State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 
So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972).2 In those instances when a pre-
liminary hearing was held and the suspect discharged, the 
prosecutor could reinstate the charge and return him to 
custody by filing an information. See Montgomery v. 
State, 176 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1965) ; Baugus v. State, 141 
So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1962). As a result, a person charged by 
information could be detained pending trial solely on the 
decision of a prosecutor. 
Respondents Pugh and· Henderson filed a class action 
against Dade County officials in the Federal District 
Court,8 claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hear-
ing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declara-
tory and injunctive relie£.4 Respondents Turner and 
2 Florida law also denies preliminary hearings to persons confined 
under indictment, Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970), 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131, but that procedure is not challenged in 
this case. 
8 The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and juris-
diction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). 
4 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as 
an alternate remedy. They only asked that the state authorities be 
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was 
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Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently 
intervened.5 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for 
Dade County, was one of several defendants.6 
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature con-
sidered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hear-
ings to persons charged by information, the District Court 
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. 
Supp. 1107 (SD Fla. 1971). After certifying the case 
as a class action under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (2), 
the Court held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments give all arrested persons charged by information a 
right to a judicial hearing on the question of probable 
cause. The District Court ordered the Dade County 
defendants to give the named plaintiffs an immediate 
preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for 
further detention.7 It also ordered them to submit a 
also the only relief that the District Court ordered for the named 
respondents. - F. Supp. -. Because release was neither asked 
nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class of cases for 
which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2973-
2974 (1974). 
5 Turner was being held on a charge of auto theft, following arrest 
on March 11, 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges 
of soli citing a ride and posse~sion of marihuana. 
6 The named defendants included justices of the peace and judges 
of small-claims courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary 
hearings in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officers 
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only 
one who petitioned for certiorari following the Court of Appeals' 
decision. 
7 The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for 
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal inter-
vention in state prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, 
but only at the legality of pretrial detf'ntion without a judicial hear-
ing, an issue that could not be raised in defense to the criminal 
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not 
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plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases instituted 
by information. 
Only one such plan was submitted, and the District 
Court adopted it with modifications. The final order 
prescribed a detailed post-arrest procedure. 336 F. 
Supp. 490. Upon arrest the accused would be taken be-
fore a magistrate for a "first appearance hearing." The 
magistrate would explain the charges, advise the ac-
cused of his right's, appoint counsel if he was indigent, 
and proceed with a prooable cause determination unless 
either the prosecutor or the accused was unprepared. If 
either asked for more time, the magistrate would set the 
date for a "preliminary hearing," to be held no more than 
four days later if the accused was in custody and no more 
than 10 days later if he had been released pending trial. 
At the hearing the accused would be entitled to counsel, 
and he would be allowed to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses, to summon favorable witnesses, and to 
have a transcript made on request. If the magistrate 
found no probable cause, the accused would be discharged. 
He then could not be charged with the same offense by 
complaint or information, but only by indictment re-
turned within 30 days. The plan also provided sanc-
tions for failure to hold hearings at the prescribed times. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the 
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case 
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary volun-
tarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon 
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals re-
manded the case for specific findings on the constitu-
tionality of the new Dade County system. Before the 
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida 
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. Monte-
muro, 477 F. 2d 1073, 1082 (CA3 1973); cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 
U. S. 82 (1971); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (1951). 
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Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing 
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed 
that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the 
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures. 
Under the amended rules every arrested person must 
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130. This "first appearance" is simi-
lar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the Dis-
trict Court in all respects but the crucial one: the magis-
trate does not make a determination of probable cause. 
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for 
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges 
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to 
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule 
3:131; see In re Rule 3.181 (b), Florida Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, 282 So. 2d- (Fla. 1972).8 
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held 
that the amended rules had not answered the basic con-
stitutional objection, since a defendant charged by in-
formation still could be detained pending trial without 
a judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp. 
1286. Reaffirming the original ruling, the District Court 
declared that the continuation of this practice was uncon-
stitutionaP The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d 
8 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973), seems to provide that every 
defendant confined for 30 days is entitled to a mandatory preliminary 
hearing upon application for writ of habeas corpus, but it apparently 
has been construed to vest trial courts with discretion to deny the 
hearing. See Evans v. State, 197 So. 323 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967). But 
cf. Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971). 
9 Although this ruling held a statewide '"legislative rule" unconsti-
tutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by vir-
tue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for 
an injunction against enforcement of any state statute or legislative 
rule of statewide application, since the practice of denying prelim-
inary hearings to persons charged by information was then em-
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778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor par-
ticulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hear-
ing provided by the amended Florida rules would be ac-
ceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in 
custody pending trial. I d., at 788.10 State Attorney 
· bodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had 
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appeals 
· had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand , the ronstitu1 ionality 
of a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when 
·the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental 
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory · judgment that the 
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never 
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court 
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conrlusion that the District 
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the state~ide rule. See 483 F. 
2d, at 788. Accordingly, a district court of three judges was not 
required for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez , 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 
U.S. 603,606-608 (1960). 
'10 The major differenre between the Dist~ict Court's order and 
that of the Court of Appeals centered on the question whether a 
' probable cause hea'ring is required for all arrested persons charged 
by informntion or only for those ronfined prnding trial. The DiRt rict 
Court's original decree required pn;liminary hearings for all arrested 
persons. 332 F. Supp., at-. On remand, the Dist rict Court made 
an exception for persons charged with misdemranors who neither 
suffered pretrial detention nor faced imprisonment upon conviction. 
355 F. Supp., at -. The Court of Appeals explicitly limited the 
hearing right for misdemeanor defendants to those who are jailed 
· pending trial. 483 F. 2d, at 789. Its opinion also Sllf/;gests , without 
stating explicitly, that the hearing right is similarly limited to felony 
defendants who are confined pending trial. !d., at 787, 789. 
The Court of Appeals vacated both the portion of the District 
Court's order that prescribed time periods different from those in 
the amended rules, and the sanrtions for failure to comply with the 
hearing requirements. It affirmed the District Court's holding on 
remand that the amended rules' extended time periods for capital 
and life-imprisonment offenses was a violation of equal protection. 
Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to address the spe-
cific terms of the District Court's decree. 
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Gerstein petitioned for review, and we granted certiorari 
because of the importance of the issue.11 We affirm in 
part and reverse in part. 
II 
As framd by the proceedings below, this case presents 
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial 
11 At oral argument counsel informed us that the named respond-
ents have been convicted. Their pretrial detention therefore has 
ended, but this case belongs to that narrow class of cases in which 
the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot the 
claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa, No. 
73-762. Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most 
unlikely that any given individual could have his constitutional claim 
decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted. The 
individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is 
certain that other persons similarly situated will be detained under 
the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, in short, is 
one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were 
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable 
cause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any 
of them respondents were still in custody awaiting trial when the 
District Court certified the classification. Despite the absence of 
such a showing, which would ordinarily be required to avoid moot-
ness under Sosna, this case is not moot. The length of pretrial 
custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended 
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or 
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is 
by no means certain that any given individual would be in pretrial 
custody long enough for a district judge to certify a class action. 
Moreover, this is the kind of case in which the constant existence of 
a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney 
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we may 
safely assume that he has other clients with a continuing live interest 
in the case. This controversy, therefore, is a suitable exception to 
the Sosna rule that mootness of a class action that is "capable of 
repetition, yet evading review" ordinarily is governed by determining 
whether the named representatives were members of the class at 
the time of certification. See Sosna, supra, at -; cf. Rivera v. 
Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159 (CA9 1972). 
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on an information is entitled to a judicial determination 
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the 
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and 
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the 
Constitution. 
A 
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and '· 
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amend-
ment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v. 
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294- 295 (1973); Ex parte 
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Bur-
ford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 447 (1806). The standard for 
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and 
oircumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
believing that the [suspect 1 had committed or was com-
mitting an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 479 U. S. 89, 91 
(1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175- 176 
(l949); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948). 
This standard represents a compromise between the indi-
vidual's right to liberty and the community's responsi~ 
bility for controlling crime. 
"These long-prevailing standards seek to safe-
guard citizens from rash and unreasonable inter~ 
ferences with privacy and from unfounded charges 
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for 
enforcing the law in the community's protection. 
Because many situations which confront officers in 
the course of executing their duties are more or less 
'ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes 
'on their part. But the mistakes must be those of 
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to 
their conclusions of probability. The rule of prob-
able cause is a practical, nontechnical conception 
affording the best compromise that has been found 
for accommodating these often opposing interests. 
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Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforce~ 
ment. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding 
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." 
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176. 
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection 
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the 
Court has required that the existence of probable cause 
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate when· 
e~er possible. The classic statement of this principle 
appears in Johnson v. United States, supra, at 13-14: 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often 
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies 
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its pro-
tection consists in requiring that those inferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead 
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20- 22 (1968). 
Maximum protection of individual rights c_ould be 
a~sured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual 
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement 
would severely handicap legitimate law enforcement. In 
striking a balance between these opposing interests, the 
Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest 
warrants when possible, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96 
(1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-
482 (1963), but it has never invalidated an arrest sup-
ported by probable cause solely because the officers had 
failed to secure a warrant. See Ker v. California, 374 
U. S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 
(1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 705 
(1948).12 
12 Another aspect of Trupiano was overruled in United States v. 
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Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the-
scene assessment of probable cause is legal justification 
for arresting a person suspected of crime. The police-
man's judgment also justifies a brief period of detention 
to take the administrative steps necessary for arrest, but 
once the suspect is in custody the reasons that justify 
dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evapo-
rate. There is no longer any danger that the suspect will 
escape or commit further crimes while the police submit 
their evidence to a magistrate. And, from the suspeces 
point of view, the consequences of prolonged detention 
may be more serious than the interference occasioned by 
arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's 
job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family 
relationships. Even pretrial release may be accompanied 
by burdensome conditions that effect a significant re-
straint on liberty. See R. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91 
(1965); L. Katz, Justice Is the Crime 51-62 (1972). 
When the stakes are this high , the detached judgment 
of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth Amend-
ment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded 
interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold that the 
Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of 
probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint on 
11berty following arrest. 
This result has historical support in the common law 
that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), which was overruled in turn by 
'Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752. 
The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most con-
troversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what 
circumstances an officer may enter a suspect's home to make a war-
rentless arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474 
(1971); id., at 510-512 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Jones v. United 
States, 357 U. S. 493, 499-500 (1958). 
73-477-0PINION 
GERSTEIN v. PUGH 11 
(1925). At common law it was customary, if not obliga-
tory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice 
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 77, 81, 95 (1736); 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 
116- 117 (4th ed. 1762). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 
U. S. 478, 498-499 (1885).1 a The justice of the peace 
would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to deter-
mine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner 
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would 
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he 
would be discharged from custody. 1 Hale, supra, at 
583-585; 2 Hawkins, supra, at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen, 
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 ( 1883) .14 
, 18 The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have 
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact 
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment, 
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of 
commitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief 
detention. 
"When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected 
of a felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dis-
miss himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can, 
he may do either of these things. 
. "1. He may carry him to the common goal, ... but that is now 
rarely done. 
"2. He may deliver him to the constable of the vill , who may either 
carry him to the common gaol, ... ore to a justice of the peace to 
be examined, and farther proceeded against as case shall require .... 
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to :my justice of peace of the 
county where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail, 
or commit him, as the case shall require. 
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private 
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler 
will expect a Mittimus for his warrant of detaining." 
1 id., at 589-590. 
14 The examination of the prisoner was inquisitorial, and the ex-
amination of the witnesses was conducted outside the prisoner's pres-
ence. The process was considered quite harsh until statutory reform 
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The initial determination of probable cause also could be 
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus. 
2 Hawkins, supra, at 112- 115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at 
243; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75, 97-
101 ( 1807). This practice furnished the model for 
criminal procedure iri America immediately following the 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Boll-
man, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 (1807); 15 Ex parte Burford, 
7 1J. S. (3 Cranch) 447 (1806); Ex parte Hamilton, 3 
U. "8. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and there are indications that 
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model 
for a "reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States, 
358 U.S. 307, 317-320 (1959) (DouGLAS, J:, dissenting).16 
was accomplished in 1848, 1 J. Stephen, at 225, but it was well estab· 
lished that if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of the 
prisoner's guilt, he was entitled to be discharged. 
15 In Ex pm·te Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr treason 
were committed following an examination in the circuit court of 
the District of Columbia. They filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief 
Justice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to 
persons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following 
arguments on the Fourth Amendrpent requirement of probable cause, 
the Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that 
it did not establish probable cause· that they were guilty of treason. 
The prisoners were discharged; 
16 A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery 
of stolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reason-
able" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was re-
quired to appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath 
of probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular place. 
After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim 
and the alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace 
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods 
and detention of the thief. 2 Hale, supra, at 149-152; T. Taylor, 
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969); 
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U. ~· 616, 626-629 (1886). 
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B 
Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a per~ 
son arrested without a warrant and charged by informa-
tion may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending 
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause deter-
mination.17 There is no provision for a test of probable 
cause at the first appearance before a magistrate or at 
the hearing to set bail, Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130; see 
Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8 (CA5 1973), 
and the suspect canot demand a preliminary hearing. 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a). The Florida Supreme 
Court has held that habeas corpus cannot be used to test 
the probable cause for detention under an information. 
Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 49 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 
1951). The arraignment may be delayed as much as a 
month, and it is not clear that the issue of probable cause 
may be raised then.18 
17 A person arrested under a warrant would have received a prior 
judicial determination of probable cause. Under Fla. Rule Crim. 
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that 
states facts showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The 
magistrate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there 
is reasonable ground to believe the complaint is true. 
18 The District Court found that the procedures used in filing 
informations allow a delay of a month or more between arrest and 
arraignment. First, processing of the information does not begin 
until the arresting officer appears before an assistant state attorney 
and files an affidavit of facts. This appearance is delayed anywhere 
from 24 hours to two weeks after arrest. If the state attorney 
decides to file an information, the papers are prepared and the 
information is filed and set for arraignment. The avrrage delay 
from the time the arresting officer appears and the time of arraign-
ment is 10 to 15 days. 
The Court of Appeals assumed, for purposes of this case, that the 
defendant would have an opportunity to challenge the probable 
cause underlying the information at hi arraignment, but noted 
that if the assumption was groundless, a person charged by informa-
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Petitioner defends this practice on the ground that the 
prosecutor's decision to file an information is itself a 
determination of probable cause and that furnishes suffi-
cient reason to detain a defendant pending trial. Al-
though a conscientious decision that the evidence war-
rants affords a measure of protection against unfounded 
detention, we do not think prosecutorial judgment 
standing alone meets the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. Indeed, we think the Court's previous 
decisions compel disapproval of the Florida procedure. 
In Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 5 (1927), the 
Court held that an arrest warrant issued solely upon a 
United States Attorney's information was invalid because 
the accompanying affidavits were defective. Although 
the Court's opinion did not explicitly state that the 
prosecutor's official oath could not fun'lish probable cause, 
that conclusion was implicit ih the judgment that the 
arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment.10 More 
recently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
449-453 ( 1971) , the Court held that a prosecutor's 
tion would have no opportunity to challenge probable cause before 
trial. 483 F. 2d, at 7 1, n. 2. The Florida rule governing arraign~ 
· ment doe not suggest that the procedure contemplates a challenge 
to probable cause or any consideration of pretrial custody. It 
merely provides that the arraignment shall consist of reading the 
indictment or information to the defendant and calling upon him 
·to plead. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.160. 
io By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon 
its face," and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" con-
clusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires 
issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parte 
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v. 
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a 
'grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached 
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the 
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust 
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responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the 
constitutional role of a neutral and detached magistrate. 
We reaffirmed that principle in Shadwick v. City of 
Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 (1972), and held that probable 
cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant must be 
determined by someone independent of police and prose-
cution.20 The reason for this separation of functions was 
expressed by Justice Frankfurter in a similar context: 
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dig-
nity of all men is central, naturally guards against 
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal 
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance 
(')f soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law 
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cher-
ished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled 
that safeguards must be provided against the dan-
gers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The 
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be 
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated 
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into 
different parts, responsibility for which is separately 
vested in the various participants upon whom the 
criminal law relies for its vindication." MeN abb v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 332,343 (1943). 
20 The Court had earlier reached a different result in Ocampo v. 
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the 
Philippine Islands. Under a statutory guarantee substantially iden-
tical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5, 
32 Stat. 693-694, the Court held that an arrest warrant could issue 
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court has sinre held 
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philip-
pines is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision in 
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 
194-198 (1957). Even if it were, the result reached in Ocampo 
is incompatible with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, and 
Shadwick. 
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In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable 
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty 
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is en-
titled to judicial oversight or review of a prosecutor's de-
Cision to prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's 
prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite 
to prosecution by information. Lem W oon v. Oregon, 
229 U.S. 586 (1913).21 Nor do we retreat from the estab-
lished rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void 
a subsequent conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 
519 (1952); Ker v·. Illinois, 119- U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, 
as the Court of Appeals noted below, a suspect who is 
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for 
that confinement, but a conviction will not be vacated 
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending 
trial without probable cause. 483 F. 2d, at 78fr-787. 
Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 F. 2d 6 (CAS 1968), 
with Brown v. Fauntleroy,- U. S. App. D. C.-, 442 
F. 2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone,- U. S. App. 
D. C. -, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969). 
III 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
held that the determination of probable cause must be 
a'ccompanied by the full panoply of adversary safe-
g.uards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and 
QOmpulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary 
hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in 
21 See also Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541 (1962). The 
opinion in Beck cites Ocampo v. United States, 234 U. S. 91 (19i4), 
for the same proposition, but the validity of prosecution by infor-
mation without a preliminary hearing was not at issue in that case. 
The only issues were whether grand juries were required in the 
Philippines and, as discussed in n. 20, supra, whether the prosecutor's 
decision to file an information furnished sufficient probable cause for 
·an arrest warrant. 
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many States to determine whether the evidence justifies 
going to trial under an information or presenting the 
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 
1 (1970); Y Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern 
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974). 
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is 
usually referred to as "probable cause," but it may ap-
proach a prima facie case of guilt. A. L. I. Model Code 
of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Commentary on Article 
330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972). When the 
hearing takes this form, adversary procedures are custo-
marily employed. The importance of the issue to both 
the State an the accused justifies the presentation of wit-
nesses and full exploration of their testimony on cross-
examination. This kind of hearing also requires appoint-
ment of counsel for indigent defendants. Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 ( 1970). And, as the hearing as-
sumes increased importance and the procedures become 
more complex, the less likely it is that it can be held 
promptly after arrest. See A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-
arraingment Procedure, supra, at 33-34. 
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the 
probable cause determination required by the Fourth 
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable 
cause for detaining the arrested person pending such 
further proceedings as may be afforded by law. This 
issue can be determined reliably without a full adversary 
hearing. The standard is the same as that for arrest. 22 
22 Because the standards are identical, there is no need for further 
investigation before the probable cause determination can be made. 
"Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must arrest on 'prob-
able cause.' It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were, 
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters 
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing 
magistrate on 'probable cause.'" Mallory v. United States, 354 
U.S. 449,456 (1957). 
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That standard- probable cause to believe the suspect has 
committed a crime- traditionally has been decided in 
nonadversary proceedings on hearsay and written testi-
mony, and the Court has approved these informal modes 
of proof. 
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that 
which long experience in the common-law tradition, 
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has 
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with 
that standard. These rules are historically grounded 
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men 
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting 
forfeitures of life, liberty and property. 
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the 
very name implies, we deal with probabilities. 
These are not technical; they are the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correla-
tive to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949). 
Cf. M ~Gray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300 ( 1967). 
The use of these informal procedures is justified not 
only by the lesser consequences of a probable cause de-
termination but also by the nature of the determination 
itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflict-
ing evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a prepond-
erance standard demands, and credibility determinations 
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence sup-
ports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, The De-
cision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64-109 (1969). 
This is not to say that Confrontation and cross-examina-
tion might not enhance the reliability of probable cause 
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determinations in some cases, but in most cases their 
value would be too slight to justify holding, as a matter of 
constitutional principle, that these formalities and safe-
guards designed for trial must also be employed in mak-
ing the Fourth Amendment determination of probable 
cause.23 Our system of criminal justice is already over-
ourdened, and it is subject to valid criticism when over-
emphasis on procedural and evidentiary formalities re-
sults in delayed justice, repetitive trials, and burdensome 
e'Xpense for both the State and the accused. 
Because of its limited function and its nonadversary 
character, the probable cause determination is not a 
'
1critical stage" in the prosecution that would require 
appointed counsel. We have identified as "critical 
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair de-
fense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed 
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 
23ln Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee or proba-
tioner arrested prior to revocation is entitled to an informal pre-
liminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live 
testimony. 408 U. S., at 487; 411 U. S., at 786. That preliminary 
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by 
t.he Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and pre-
serving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently 
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred. 
408 U. S., at 485; 411 U. S., at 872-873 n. 5. Moreover, revocation 
proceedings may offer less protection from initial error than the 
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute 
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect 
with crime unless he is satisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code 
of' Professional Responsibility, D. R. 7-103 (A) (the prosecutor has 
a professional responsibility "not [to] institute or cause to be insti-
tuted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the 
charges are not supported by probable cause") ; ABA Standards 
Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution 
Functino, §§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); American College of Trial Lawyers, 
Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4 (c). 
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(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967). 
In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held that a pre-
liminary hearing was a critical stage of an Alabama prose-
cution, the majority and concurring opinions identified 
two critical factors that distinguish the Alabama prelim-
inary hearing from the probable cause determination re-
quired by the Fourth Amendment. First, under Alabama 
law the function of the hearing was to determine whether 
the evidence justified charging the suspect with an of-
fense. A finding of no probable cause could mean that 
he would not be tried at all. The Fourth Amendment 
probable cause determination is addressed only to pre-
trial custody. To be sure, pretrial custody may affect to 
some extent the defendant's ability to assist in prepara-
tion of his defense, but this is not the kind of substantial 
harm identified as controlling in Wade and Coleman. 
Second, Alabama allowed the suspect to confront and 
cross-examine prosecution witnesses at the preliminary 
hearing. The Court noted that the suspect's defense on 
' the merits could be compromised if he had no legal as-
sistance for exploring or preserving the witnesses' testi-
mony. This consideration does not apply to the informal, 
nonadversary procedure required under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The reasons that make a nonadversary proceeding ap-
propriate, however, do not justify denying the suspect an 
opportunity to be present and participate in the deter-
mination .24 Our system of justice operates on the premise 
24 The procedures suggested in the Uniform Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (Proposed Final Draft 1974) and the A. L. I. Model Code 
of Pre-arraignment Proredure (Tent. Draft No . 5, 1972, and Tent. 
Draft No. 5A, 1973) arc instructive. Under the Uniform Rules, a 
person arrested without a warrant is entitled, "without unnecessary 
delay," to a first appearance before a magistrate and a determination 
that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest warrant . The determi-
nation may be made on affidavits or testimony, in the presence of 
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that the subject of a judicial proceeding is entitled to 
partic!pate unless there is good reason to exclude him. 
See Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107, 
122-123 (1873). The Fourth Amendment is not incon-
~istent with that concept. The procedures normally fol-
lowed in applying for warrants are ex parte proceedings 
by necessity, as notifying the suspect would often frus-
trate the purpose of the warrant. See T. Taylor, Two 
Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 81-82 (1969). 
But when the suspect is already in custody, and the only 
issue is probable cause for detention, he should be allowed 
to participate in the determination. Allowing him to ap-
pear before the magistrate and giving him an opportunity 
the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remnin in custody for inability 
to qualify for pretrial release are offered another opportunity for a 
probable cause determination at the detention hearing, held no more 
than 5 days after arrest. This is an adversary hearing, and the 
parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay may be con-
sidered. Rule 344. 
The Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure also provides a 
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported 
by a reasonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. The 
magistrate may make a determination of probable cause to hold the 
accused, but he is not required to do so and the accused may request 
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be 
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes 
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written 
and live testimony: 
"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence 
and arguments for his discharge and the state mny present addi-
tional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of 
which he is accused. The state's submission may be made by means 
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the 
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the 
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appear-
ance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks 
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause." 
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. SA, 1973). 
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to speak or to submit written evidence for consideration 
along with the State's presentation could enhance both 
the reliability and the fairness of the proceeding. The 
burden on the State would be minimal. Virtually all 
jurisdictions require that arrested persons be presented 
to a judicial officer within a short time after arrest, see 
A. L. I., Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure 230-
231 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966) , and every jurisdiction 
makes some provision for setting bail or determining other 
conditions of pretrial release. See L. Katz, Justice Is 
the Crime, Appendix B, at 247- 365 (1972). Since the 
defendant is already in the courtroom, the issue of prob-
able cause may be decided at that time with little or no 
inconvenience to the State. In fact , the suspect's first 
appearance before a magistrate traditionally has been 
considered the proper time for determining whether there 
is probable cause for detention. 1 Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 589-590 (1736); 2 id., at 77-95; 2 Hawkins, Pleas 
of the Crown 116--117 (4th ed. 1762); see M cNabb v. 
United States , 318 U. S. 332, 342- 344 (1943); Amster-
dam, Perspective on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. 
Rev. 349, 391 & n. 408 (1974). Although the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly acknowl-
edge this function of the first appearance, this Court has 
interpreted them to require a determination of probable 
cause at that stage. Jaben v. United States, 381 U. S. 
214 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 
(1957).2 5 
25 In an amicus brief filed on behalf of tho United States, the 
Solicitor General suggested that McNabb v. Mallory had mistaken 
the purpose of tho first appearance, and that actual practice is other-
wise. Cf. Note, Probable Cause at the Initial Appe..1.rance in War-
rantless Arrests, 45 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1128 (1972) ; M cNabb, of course, 
was decided before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. It interpreted a statutory requirement that an arrested 
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'JThere is no single proper method for making the prob-
able cause determination required by the Fourth Amend-
ment. The States have many different patterns of crimi-
nal procedure, and each may adapt its own to provide a 
swift and reliable probable cause determination with the 
least burden to its system. · Like many jurisdictions, 
Florida requires every arrested person to be brought 
before a magistrate within 24 hours, unless sooner 
released. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.310 (b). At that 
appearance the defendant is told of the charges against 
him, furnished a copy of the complaint, advised of his 
constitutional rights, and provided counsel if he is indi-
gent. The magistrate then sets bail or prescribes other 
conditions of pretrial release. One of the factors typi-
cally relied upon in making this decision is the weight of 
evidence against the accused. ABA Standards Relating 
to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Pretrial 
Release § 5.1 ( 1974); see 18 U. S. C. § 3146 (b). Ex-
panding that determination to a test of probable cause 
would be a natural way of integrating the probable cause 
decision with existing procedures. 
In other States, existing procedures may satisfy the 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Some States 
already authorize a hearing on probable cause at or 
immediately following the suspect's first appearance. 
person be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay. 
318 U. S., at 342. Mallory was decided after the federal rules were 
adopted, and although the interpretation of the federal rules was 
dictum, it clearly outlined the Court's view: 
"The scheme for initiating a federal prosecution is plainly defined. 
The police may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only on 'probable 
cause.' The next step in the proceeding is to arraign the arrested 
person before a judicial officer as quickly as possible so that he may 
be advised of his rights and so that the issue of probable cause may 
be promptly determined." 354 U. S., at 454. 
The use of the word "arraign" was in error, as arraignment occurs 
later in the process. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 10. 
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E. (J., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-2-7; Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708-
709. Others may choose simply to accelerate their exist-
ing preliminary hearings. What the Fourth Amendment 
requires for pretrial restraint on liberty 26 is a reliable 
determination of probable cause made either before or 
promptly after arrest, and preferably no later than the 
first appearance before a judicial officer. If made after 
arrest, the suspect must be allowed to be present. Each 
.State may ch'oose the procedure that best accommodates 
th.is determination to its existing practice.2'7 
IV 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that' the Fourth 
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of 
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we 
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we 
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the 
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree, 
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
·, 26 Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional 
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those 
S)Jspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition 
that they appear for trial. There arc many kinds of pretrial release 
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146; 
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, 
Pretrial Reelase § 5.2 ( 1974); Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Rule 331 (Proposed Final Draft 1974). We cannot define spe-
cifically those that would require a prior probable cause determina-
tion, but the key factor is significant restraint on liberty. 
27 Of course, if the State incorporates the probable cause determi-
nation into a multipurpose hearing, the necessity for appointed coun-
. sel at the combined proceeding must be governed by the principle 
of Coleman v. Alabama, S!Upra. 
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Mn. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opmwn of the 
Court:· 
The issue in this case is whether a person arrested 
under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally en-
titled to a judicial determination of probable cause for 
pretrial restraint of liberty. 
I 
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were 
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged 
with several offenses under a prosecutor's information.1 
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against 
him carried a potential life sentence, and Henderson was 
held in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500 
bond. 
1 Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971. On March 16 
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a con-
cealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a 
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrested March 2, and charged 
by information on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and 
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate 
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu-
tion of offenses punishable by death. All other criminal 
offenses may be prosecuted by information, and viola-
tions of municipal ordinances may be prosecuted by a 
simple affidavit or docket entry. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 
3,140 (Supp. 1974). At the time respondents were ar-
rested, Florida's rules of criminal procedure authorized 
only one method for determining the existence of probable 
cause to hold a suspect in jail pending trial. Fla. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). This proceeding, an 
apversary preliminary hearing, was not available to a 
suspect who had already been charged .by information. 
See Bradley v. State, 265 So. 2d 533 (Fla .) , cert. denied, 
411 U. S. 916 (1973); State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 
So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972).2 In those instances when a pre-
liminary hearing was h~ld and .the suspect discharged, the 
prosecutor could reinstate the charge and return him to 
custody by filing an information. See Montgomery v. 
State, 176 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1965); Baugus v. State, 141 
So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1962). As a result, a person charged by . 
information could be detained pending trial solely on the 
decision of a prosecutor. 
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action 
against Dade County officials in the Federal District · 
Court,3 claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hear-
ing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declara-
tory and injunctive relie£.4 Respondents Turner and 
2 Florida law also denies preliminary hearings to persons confined 
vnder indictment, Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970), 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131, but that procedure is not challenged in 
this case. 
3 The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and juris-
diction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). 
4 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as 
an alternate remedy. They only asked that the state authorities be 
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was 
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Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently 
intervened.5 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for 
Dade County, was one of several defendants.6 
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature con-
sidered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hear-
ings to persons charged by information, the District Court 
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. 
Supp. 1107 (SD Fla. 1971). After certifying the case 
as a class action under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (2), 
~e. the ¢ourt held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments give all arrested persons charged by information a 
right to a judicial hearing on the question of probable 
cause. The District Court ordered the Dade County 
defendants to give the named plaintiffs an immediate 
preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for 
further detention.7 It also ordered them to submit a 
also the only relief that the District Court ordered for the named 
respondents. - F. Supp. -. Because release was neither asked 
nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class of cases for 
which habeas corpus is the exrlusive remedy. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2973-
2974 (1974) . 
5 Turner was bring hrld on a chnrge of auto theft, following arrest 
on March 11 , 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges 
of soliciting a ride and posseRsion of marihuana. 
6 The named defendants included justices of the peare and judges 
of small-claims courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary 
hearings in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officers 
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only 
one who petitioned for certiorari<ifoUowing th@ Court. of Appeal~ 
deei~;ion.,_-
7 The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for 
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal inter-
vention in state prosecutions, Younaer v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
·The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, + 
but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hear- __,....-1 
ing, an issue that could not be raised in defense f the criminal 0 
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not 
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plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases instituted 
by information. 
Only one such plan was submitted, and the District 
Court adopted it with modifications. The final order 
prescribed a detailed post-arrest procedure. 336 F . 
.. Supp. 490. Upon arrest the accused would be taken be-
fore a magistrate for a "first appearance hearing." The 
magistrate would explain the charges, advise the ac-
cused of his rights, appoint counsel if he was indigent, 
and proceed with a probable cause determination unless 
either the prosecutor or the accused was unprepared. If 
either asked for more time, the magistrate would set the 
date for a "preliminary hearing," to be held no more than 
four days later if the accused was in custody and no more 
than 10 days later if he had been released pending trial. 
At the hearing the accused would be entitled to counsel, 
and he would be allowed to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses, to summon favorable witnesses, and to 
have a transcript made on request. If the magistrate 
found no probable cause, the accused would be discharged. 
He then could not be charged with the same offense by 
complaint or information , but only by indictment re-
turned within 30 days. The plan also provided sanc-
tions for failure to hold hearings at the prescribed times. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the 
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case 
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary volun-
tarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon 
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals re-
manded the case for specific findings on the constitu-
tionality of the new Dade County system. Before the 
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida 
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. Monte-
muro, 477 F. 2d 1073, 1082 (CA3 1973); cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 
U. S. 82 (1971); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (1951). 
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Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing 
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed 
that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the 
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures. 
Under the amended rules every arrested person must 
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130. This "first appearance" is simi-
lar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the Dis-
trict Court in all respects but the crucial one: the magis-
trate does not make a determination of probable cause. 
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for 
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges 
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to 
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule 
3.131; see In re Rule 3.181 (b), Florida Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, 282 So. 2d - (Fla. 1972).8 
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held 
that the amended rules had not answered the basic con-
stitutional objection, since a defendant charged by in-
formation still could be detained pending trial without 
a judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp. 
1286. Reaffirming the original ruling, the District Court 
declared that the continuation of this practice was uncon-
stitutionaJ.9 The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d 
8 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973), seems to provide that every 
defendant confined for 30 days is entitled to a mandatory preliminary 
hearing upon application for writ of habeas corpus, but it apparently 
has been construed to vest trial courts with discretion to deny the 
hearing. See Evans v. State, 197 So. 323 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967). But 
cf. Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971). 
9 Although this ruling held a statewide "legislative rule" unconsti-
tutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by vir-
1rue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for 
an injunction against enforcement of any state statute or legislative 
rule of statewide application, since the practice of denying prelim-
inary hearings to persons charged by information was then em-
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778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor par-
ticulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hear-
ing provided by the amended Florida rules would be ac-
ceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in 
custody pending trial. I d., at 788.'0 State Attorney 
bodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had . 
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appmls 
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the constitutionality 
of a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when 
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental 
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the 
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never 
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court 
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District 
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. Sec 483 F. 
2d, at 788. Accordingly, a district court of threP judges was not 
required for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 
U.S. 603,606-608 (1960). 
1.o The major difference between the District Court's order and 
that of the Court of Appeals centered on the question whether a 
probable cause hearing is required . for all arrested· persons charged 
by inform~tion or onlv for those confined pending trial. The District 
Court's original decree required preliminary hearings for all arrested 
persons. 332 F. Rupp., at--. On remand, the District Court made 
an exception for persons charged with misdemeanors who neither 
suffered pretrial detention nor faced imprisonment upon conviction. 
355 F. Supp., at -. The Court of Appeals explicitly limited the 
hearing right for misdemeanor defendants to those who arc jailed 
pending trial. 483 F. 2d, at 789. Its opinion also ~uggest8, without 
stating explicitly, that the hearing right is similarly limited to felony 
defendants who are confined pending trial. Id., at 787, 789. 
The Court of Appeals vacated both the portion of the District 
Court's order that prescribed time periods different from those in 
the amended rulPs, nnd the sanrtions for failure to comply with the 
hearing requirements. It affirmed the District Court's holding on 
remand that the amended rules' extended time periods for capital 
and life-imprisonment offenses was a violation of equal protection. 
Our disposition of the case makPs it unnecessary to address the spe-
cific terms of the District Court's decree. 
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Gerstein petitioned for review, and we granted certiorari 
because of the importance of the issue.11 We affirm in 
part and reverse in part. 
II 
As fr~ by the proceedings below, this case presents 
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial 
11 At oral argument counsel informed us that the named respond-
ents have been convicted. Their pretrial detention therefore has 
ended, but this case belongs to that narrow class of cases in which 
the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot the 
claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa, No. 
73-762. Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most 
unlikely that any given individual could have his constitutional claim 
decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted. The 
individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is 
certain that other persons similarly situated will be detained under 
the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, in short, is 
one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were 
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable 
cause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any 
of them FeSf:l6f'lfieHt!l;hwere still in cus~ awaiting trial when the 
District Court certified the class!S}~,M\.· Despite the absence of 
such a showing, which would ordinarily be required to avoid moot-
ness under Sosna, this case is not moot. The length of pretrial 
custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended 
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or 
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is 
by no means certain that any given individual would be in pretrial 
custody long enough for a district judge to certify a class action. 
Moreover, this is the kind of case in which the constant existence of 
a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney 
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we may 
safely assume that he has other clients with a continuing live interest 
in the case. This controversy, therefore, is a suitable exception to 
the Sosna rule that mootness of a class action that is "capable of 
repetition, yet evading review" ordinarily is governed by determining 
whether the named representatives were members of the class at 
the time of certification. See Sosna, supra, at -; cf. Rivera v. 
Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159 (CA9 1972). 
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on an information is entitled to a judicial determination 
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the 
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and 
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the 
Constitution. 
A 
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and 
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amend-
ment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v. 
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291 , 294-295 (1973); Ex parte 
Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Bur-
ford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 447 (1806). The standard for 
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and 
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was com-
mitting an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 479 U. S. 89, 91 
(1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175~176 
(1949); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948):/ 
This standard represents a ~mpr:£na:is8tbe ween the indi- -/J-jA,; 
,...... ___ vidual's ri~ht to liberty and theJo6HtMURit~i!Cresp~si \ ,--
L ei1ity tOf-.COD~rime. ;-...,.._ ..__ __ 
( ~ "These long-prevailing standards seek to safe-
guard citizens from rash and unreasonable inter-
ferences with privacy and from unfounded charges 
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for 
enforcing the law in the community's protection. 
Because many situations which confront officers in 
the course of executing their duties are more or less 
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes 
bn their part. But the mistakes must be those of 
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to 
their conclusions of probability. The rule of prob-
able cause is a practical, nontechnical conception 
affording the best compromise that has been found 
for accommodating these often opposing interests. 
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Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforce-
ment. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding 
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." 
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176. 
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection 
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the 
(!;ourt has required that the existence of probable cause 
oe decided by a neutral and detached magistrate when-
ever possible. The classic statement of this principle 
appears in Johnson v. United States, supra, at 13-14: 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often 
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies 
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its pro-
tection consists in requiring that those inferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead 
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968). 
Maximum protection of individual rights could be 
assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual 
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement 
r ('" would se¥e~ety haooi0a.p legitimate law enforcement. In 
striking a balance between these opposing interests, the 
Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest 
warrants when ~' Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96 
(1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 479-
482 (1963), but it has never invalidated an arrest sup-
ported by probable cause solely because the officers had 
failed to secure a warrant. See Ker v. California, 374 
U. S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 
(1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 705 
(1948).12 
J. 2 Another aspect of Trupiano was overruled in United States v. 
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Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the-
scene assessment of probable cause is legal justification 
for arresting a person suspected of crime. The police-
man's judgment also justifies a brief period of detention 
to take the administrative steps necessary for arrest, but 
once the suspect is in custody the reasons that justify 
dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evapo-
rate. There is no longer any danger that the suspect will 
escape or commit further crimes while the police submit 
their evidence to a magistrate. And, from the suspect's 
point of view, the consequences of prolonged detention 
may be more serious than the interference occasioned by 
arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's 
job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family 
relationships. Even pretrial release may be accompanied 
by burdensome conditions that effect a significant re-
straint on liberty. See R. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91 
(1965); L. Katz, Justice Is the Crime 51-62 (1972). 
When the stakes are this high, the detached judgment 
of a neutral magistrate is et':sential if the Fourth Amend-
ment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded 
interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold that the 
Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of 
probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint on 
liberty following arrest. 
This result has historical support in the common law 
that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), which was overruled in turn by 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752. 
The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most con-
troversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what 
circumstances an officer may enter a suspect's home to make a war-
r~ntlcss arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474 
(1971); id., at 510-512 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Jones v. United 
States, 357 U.S. 493,499-500 (1958). 
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(1925). At common law it was customary, if not obliga-
tory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice 
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 77, 81, 95 (1736); 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 
l16-117 (4th ed. 1762). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 
U. S. 478, 498-499 (1885).13 The justice of the peace 
Would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to deter-
:rp.ine whether thete was reason to believe the prisoner 
had committed a crime. If there was, tne suspect would 
be committed to jail or bailed pending· trial. If not, he 
would be discharged from custody. 1 Hale, supra, at 
583-585; 2 Hawkii1s, supra, at 116-119'; 1 J. Stephen, 
History of the Criminal Law of England' 233 (1883).14 
u The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have 
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact 
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment, 
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of 
commitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief 
detention. 
"When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected 
of a felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dis-
miss himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can, 
he may do either of these things. 
"1. He may carry him to the common ~1, ... but that is now 
rarely done. 
"2. He may deliver him to the constable of the viii, who may either 
carry him to the common gaof, ... o1t to a justice of the peace to 
be examined, and farther proceeded against as case shall require .... 
"3. Or he may c;;.ry him immediately to any justice of peace of the 
county where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail, 
or commit him, as the case shall require. 
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private 
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler 
will expect a Mittimus for his warrant of detaining." 
1 ii, at 589:._590. 
14 The examination of the prisoner was inquisitorial, and the ex-
amination of the witnesses was conducted outside the prisoner's pres-
~nce. The process was considered quite harsh until statutory reform 
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The initial determination of probable cause also could be 
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus. 
2 Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at 
243; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75, 97-
101 ( 1807). This practice furnished the model for 
criminal procedure ih America immediately following the 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Boll-
man, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 (1807); 15 Ex parte Burford; 
7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 447 (1806); Ex parte Hamilton, 3 
U. R (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and there are indications that 
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model 
for a "reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States, 
358 U.S. 307, 317-320 (1959) (DouGLAS, J., dissenting).16 
was accomplished in 1848, 1 J. Stephen, at 225, but it was well estab- pi"''I6a61e 
l~hed that if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of ~ 
p;iseHeP'~~ was entitled to be discharged. 
1 5 In Ex; parte' Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr treason 
were committed following an examination in the circuit court of 
the District of Columbia. They filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief 
Justice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to 
persons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following 
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause, 
the Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that 
it did not establish probable cause that they were guilty of treason. 
The prisoners were discharged. 
16 A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery 
of stolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reason-
able" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was re-
quired to appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath 
of probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular place. 
After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim 
and the alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace 
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods 
and detention of the thief. 2 Hale, supra, at 149-152; T. Taylor, 
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24- 25, 39-40 (1969); 
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, G26-629 (1886). 
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B 
Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a per-
son arrested without a warrant and charged by informa-
tion may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending 
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause deter-
mination.17 There is no provision for a test of probable 
cause at the first appearance before a magistrate or at 
the hearing to set bail, Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130; see 
Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8 (CA5 1973), 
and the suspect canot demand a preliminary hearing. 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a). The Florida Supreme 
Court has held that habeas corpus cannot be used to test 
the probable cause for detention under an information. 
Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 49 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 
1951). The arraignment may be delayed as much as a 
month, and it is not clear that the issue of probable cause 
may be raised then.18 
, 17 A person arrested under a warrant would have received a prior 
judicial determination of probable cause. Under Fla. Rule Crim. 
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that 
states facts showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The 
magistrate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there 
is reasonable ground to believe the complaint is true . 
. 18 The District Court found that the procedures used in filing 
informations allow a delay of a month or more between arrest and 
arraignment. First, processing of the information does not begin 
until the arresting officer appears before an assistant state attorney 
and files an affidavit of facts. This appearance is delayed anywhere 
from 24 hours to two weeks after arrest. If the state attorney 
decides to file an information, the papers are prepared and the 
information is filed and set for arraignment. The average delay 
from the time the arresting officer appears and the time of arraign-
ment is 10 to 15 days. 
The Court of Appeals assumed, for purposes of this case, that the 
defendant would have an opportunity to challenge the probable 
cause underlying the information at his arraignment, but noted 
that if the assumption was groundless, a person charged by informa-
? 
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Petitioner defends this practice on the ground that the 
prosecutor's decision to file an information is itself a 
determination of probable cause and that furnishes suffi-
ci~nt reason to detain a defendant pending trial. Al-
ose.~.t.ib'oll\ though a conscientious decision that the evidence war-
pr ~affords a measure of protection against unfounded 
detention, we do not think prosecutorial judgment 
standing alone meets the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. Indeed, we think the Court's previous 
decisions compel disapproval of the Florida procedure. 
In Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 5 (1927), the 
Court held that an arrest warrant issued solely upon a 
United States Attorney's information was invalid because 
the accompanying affidavits were defective. Although 
the Court's opinion did not explicitly state that the 
prosecutor's official oath could not furnish probable cause, 
that conclusion was implicit in the judgment that the 
arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment.19 More 
recently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
449-453 (1971), the Court held that a prosecutor's 
tion would have no opportunity to challenge probable cause before 
trial. 483 F. 2d, at 781, n. 2. The Florida rule governing arraign-
m1mt does not suggest that the procedure contemplates a challenge 
to probable cause or any consideration of pretrial custody. It 
merely provides that the arraignment shall consist of reading the 
indictment or information to the defendant and calling upon him 
to plead. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.160. 
19 By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon 
its face," and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" con-
clusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires 
i~suance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parte 
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v. 
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 4 7 (1958). The willingness to let a 
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached 
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the 
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust 
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346 
(1974). 
73-477-0PINION 
GERSTEIN v. PUGH 15 
responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the 
constitutional role of a neutral and detached magistrate. 
We reaffirmed that principly in Shadwick v. City of 
Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 (1972), and held that probable 
cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant must be 
,determined by someone independent of police and prose-
cution.2Q The reason for this separation of functions was 
expressed by Justice Frankfurter in a similar context: 
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dig-
nity of all men is central, naturally guards against 
tlie misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal 
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance 
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law 
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cher-
ished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled 
that safeguards must be provided against the dan-
gEi"rs of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The 
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be 
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated 
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into 
different parts, responsibility for which is separately 
vested in the various participants upon whom the 
c"riminal law relies for its vindication." MeN abb v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943). 
20 The Court had earlier reached a different result in Ocampo v. 
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the 
Philippine Islands. Under a statutory guarantee substantially iden-
tical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5, 
32 Stat. 693-694, the Court held that an arrest warrant could issue 
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court has since held 
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philip-
pines is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision in 
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 
194-198 (1957). Even if it were, the result reached in Ocampo 
is incompatible with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, and 
Shadwick. 
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In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable 
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty 
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is en-
titled to judicial oversight or review of a prosecutor's de-
cision to prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's 
prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite 
to prosecution by information. Lem Woon v. Oregon, 
229 U.S. 586 (1913). 21 Nor do·we retreat from the estab-
lished rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void 
a subsequent conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 
519 ( 1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436 ( 1886). Thus, 
as the Court of Appeals noted below, a suspect who is 
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for 
that confinement, but a conviction will not be vacated 
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending 
trial without probable cause. 483 F. 2d, · at 786-787. 
Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 F. 2d 6 (CA5 1968), 
with Brown v. Fauntleroy, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 442 
F. 2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone, - U. S. App. 
D. C.-, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969). 
III 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
held that the determination of probable cause must be 
accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safe-
guards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and 
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary 
hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in 
21 See also Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541 (1962). The 
opinion in Beck cites Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (19i4), 
for the same proposition, but the validity of prosecution by infor-
mation without a preliminary hearing was not at issue in that case. 
The only issues were whether grand juries were required in the 
Philippines and, as discussed inn. 20, supra, whether the prosecutor's 
decision to file an information furnished sufficient probable cause for 
an arrest warrant. 
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many States to determine whether the evidence justifies 
going to trial under an information or presenting the 
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 
1 ( 1970); Y Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern 
·Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974). 
'\('he standard of proof required of the prosecution is 
usually referred to as "probable cause," but it may ap-
J?roach a prima facie case of. guilt. A. L. I. Model Code 
of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Commentary on Article 
330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972) .. When the 
hearing takes this form, adversary procedures are custo-
marily employed. The importance of the issue to both 
the St~he accused justifies the presentation of wit-
nesses and full exploration of their testimony on cross-
examination. This kind of hearing also requires appoint-
ment of counsel for indigent defendants. Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970). And, as the hearing as-
sumes increased importance and the procedures become 
more complex, the less likely it is that it can be held 
promptly after arrest. See A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-
arraiv~ent Procedure, supra, at 33-34. 
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the 
probable cause determination required by the Fourth 
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable 
cause for detaining the arrested person pending such 
further proceedings as may be afforded by law. This 
issue can be determined reliably without a full adversary 
hearing. The standard is the same as that for arrest. 22 
22 Because the standards are identical, there is no need for further 
investigation before the probable cause determination can be made. 
"Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must arrest on 'prob-
able cause.' It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were, 
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters 
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing 
magistrate on 'probable cause.'" Mallory v. United States, 354 
U.S. 449, 456 (1957). 
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That standard-probable cause to believe the suspect has 
committed a crime-traditionally has been decided in 
nonadversary proceedings on hearsay and written testi-
mony, and the Court has approved these informal modes 
of proof. 
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that 
which long experience in the common-law tradition, 
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has 
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with 
that standard. These rules are historically grounded 
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men 
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting 
forfeitures of life, liberty and property. 
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the 
very name implies, we deal with probabilities. 
These are not technical; they are the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correla-
tive to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949). 
Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). 
The use of these informal procedures is justified not 
only by the lesser consequences of a probable cause de-
termination but also by the nature of the determination 
itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflict-
ing evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a prepond-
erance standard demands, and credibility determinations 
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence sup- n .,.. 
(ri'i t'y-OSeCM.I.~C7Y\: 
ports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller,,l.The De-
cision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64-109 (1969). 
This is not to say that,~onfrontation and cross-examina-, 
tion might not enhance the reliability of probable cause 
/ 
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determinations in some cases, but in most cases their 
value would be too slight to justify holding, as a matter of 
constitutional principle, that these formalities and safe-
guards designed for trial must also be employed in mak-
ing the Fourth Amendment determination of probable 
eaus._e.23 J Our· ,system of criminal justice is already ove~­
burdened, and it is subject to valid criticism when over-
emphasis on procedural and evidentiary formalities re-
\ 
suits in delayed justice, repetitive trials, and burdensome 
expense for both the State and the accused. 
Because of its limited function and its nonadversary 
character, the probable cause . determination is not a 
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require 
appointed counsel. ~l.<Ien1i1ie'Oas r critical 
!ltages" those pretrial procedures that would impair de-
fense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed 
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 
23ln Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) , and Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 ( 1973), we held that a parolee or proba-
tioner arrested prior to revocation is entitled to an informal pre-
liminary hearing at the place of arrest , with some provision for live 
testimony. 408 U. S., at 487; 411 U. S., at 786. That preliminary 
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by 
the Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and pre-
serving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently 
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred. 
408 U.S., at 485; 411 U.S., at 872-873 n. 5. Moreover, revocation 
proceedings may offer less protection from initial error than the 
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute 
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect 
with crime unless he is satisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code 
of Professional Responsibility, D. R. 7-103 (A) (the prosecutor has 
a professional responsibility "not [to] institute or cause to be insti-
tuted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the 
charges are not supported by probable cause") ; ABA Standards 
Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution 
Funct~ §§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); American College of Trial Lawyers, 
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(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,226 (1967). 
In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held that a pre-
liminary hearing was a critical stage of an Alabama prose-
cution, the majority and concurring opinions identified 
two critical factors that distinguish the Alabama prelim-
inary hearing from the probable cause determination re-
quired by the Fourth Amendment. First, under Alabama 
law the function of tb-e)fearing was to determine whether 
the evidence justified charging the suspect with an of-
fense. A finding of no probable cause could mean that 
he would not be tried at all. The Fourth Amendment 
probable cause determination is addressed only to pre-
trial custody. To be sure, pretrial custody may affect to 
some extent the defendant's ability to assist in prepara-
tion of his defense, but this is not the kind of substantial 
harm identified as controlling in Wade and Coleman. 
Second, Alabama allowed the suspect to confront and 
cross-examine prosecution witnesses at the preliminary 
hearing. The Court noted that the suspect's defense on 
the merits could be compromised if he had no legal as-
sistance for exploring or preserving the witnesses' testi-
mony. This consideration does not apply to the informal, 
nonadversary procedure required under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The reasons that make a nonadversary proceeding ap-
propriate, however, do not justify denying the suspect an 
opportunity to be present and participate in the deter-
mination.24 Our system of justice operates on the premise 
24 The procedures suggested in the Uniform Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (Proposed Final Draft 1974) and the A. L. I. Model Code 
of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972, and Tent. 
Draft No. 5A, 1973) are instructive. Under the Uniform Rules, a 
person arrested without a warrant is entitled, "without unnecessary 
delay," to a first appearance before a magistrate and a determination 
that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest warrant. The determi-
nation may be made on affidavits or testimony, in the presence of 
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that the subject of a judicial proceeding is entitled to 
participate unless there is good reason to exclude him. 
See Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U. S. (19 Wall.) 107, 
122-123 ( 1873). The Fourth Amendment is not incon-
-sistent with that concept. The procedures normally fol-
lowed in applying for warrants are ex parte proceedings 
by necessity, as notifying the suspect would often frus-
trate the purpose of the warrant. See T. Taylor, Two 
Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 81-82 (1969). 
But when the suspect is already in custody, and the only 
issue is probable cause for detention, he should be allowed 
to participate in the determination. Allowing him to ap-
pear before the magistrate and giving him an opportunity 
the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remain in custody for inability 
to qualify for pretrial release are offered another opportunity for a 
probable cause determination at the detention hearing, held no more 
than 5 days after arrest. This is an adversary hearing, and the 
parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay may be con-
sidered. Rule 344. 
The Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure also provides a 
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported 
by a reasonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. ·The 
magistra.te may make a determination of probable cause to hold the 
accused, but he is not required to do so and the accused may request 
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be 
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes 
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written 
and live testimony: 
"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence 
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present addi-
tional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of 
which he is accused. The state's submission may be made by means 
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the 
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the 
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appear-
ance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks 
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause." 
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973). 
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to speak or to submit written evidence for consideration 
along with the State's presentation could enhance both 
the reliability and the fairness of the proceeding. The 
burden on the State would be minimal. Virtually all 
jurisdictions require that arrested persons be presented 
to a fudicial officer within a short time after arrest, see 
A. L. I., Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure 230-
231 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966), and every jurisdiction 
makes some provision for setting bail or determining other 
conditions of pretrial release. See L. Katz, Justice Is 
the Crime, Appendix B, at 247-365 (1972). Since the 
defendant is already in the courtroom, the issue of prob-
able cause may be decided at that time with little or no 
inconvenience to the State. In fact, the suspect's first 
appearance before a magistrate traditionally has been 
considered the proper time for determining whether there 
i's probable cause for detention. 1 Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 589-590 (1736); 2 id., at 77-95; 2 Hawkins, Pleas 
of the Crown 116--117 (4th ed. 1762); see McNabb v. 
United States, 318 U. S. 332, 342-344 (1943); Amster-
dam, Perspective on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. 
Rev. 349, 391 & n. 408 (1974). Although the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly acknowl-
edge this function of the first appearance, this Court has 
interpreted them to require a determination of probable 
cause at that stage. Jaben v. United States, 381 U. S. 
214 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 
(1957) .25 
25 In an amicus brief filed on behalf of the United States, the 
Solicitor General suggested that McNabba;:Mallory had mistaken 
the purpose of the first appearance, and that actual practice is other-
wise. Cf. Note, Probable Cause at the Initial Appearance in War-
rantless Arrests, 45 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1128 (1972); McNabb, of course, 
was decided before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. It interpreted a statutory requirement that an arrested 
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There is no single proper method for making the prob-
able cause determination required by the Fourth Amend-
ment. The States have many different patterns of crimi-
nal procedure, and each may adapt its own to provide a 
swift and reliable probable cause determination with the 
least burden to its system. Like many jurisdictions, 
Florida requires every arrested person to be brought 
before a magistrate within 24 hours, unless sooner 
released. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.310 (b). At that 
appearance the defendant is told of the charges against 
him, furnished a copy of the complaint, advised of his 
constitutional rights, and provided counsel if he is indi-
gent. The magistrate then sets bail or prescribes other 
conditions of pretrial release. One of the factors typi-
cally relied upon in making this decision is the weight of 
evidence against the accused. ABA Standards Relating 
to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Pretrial 
Release § 5.1 (1974); see 18 U. S. C. § 3146 (b). Ex-
panding that determination to a test of probable cause 
would be a natural way of integrating the probable cause 
decision with existing procedures. 
In other States, existing procedures may satisfy the 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Some States 
already authorize a hearing on probable cause at or 
immediately following the suspect's first appearance. 
person be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay. 
318 U. S., at 342. Mallory was decided after the federal rules were 
adopted, and although the interpretation of the federal rules was 
dictum, it clearly outlined the Court's view: 
"The scheme for initiating a federal prosecution is plainly defined. 
The police may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only on 'probable 
cause.' The next step in the proceeding is to arraign the arrested 
person before a judicial officer as quickly as possible so that he may 
be advised of his rights and so that the issue of probable cause may 
be promptly determined." 354 U. S., at 454. 
The use of the word "arraign" was in error, as arraignment occurs 
later in the process. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 10. 
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E. g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-2-7; Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708-
709. Others may choose simply to accelerate their exist-
ing preliminary hearings. What the Fourth Amendment 
requires for pretrial restraint on liberty 211 is a reliable 
determination of probable cause made either before or 
promptly after arrest, and preferably no later than the 
first appearance before a judicial officer. If made after 
arrest, the suspect must be allowed to be present ach 
State may choose the procedure that best accommodates 
this determination to its existing practice.27 
IV 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth 
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of 
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we 
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we 
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the 
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree, 
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
26 Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional 
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those 
suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition 
that they appear for trial. There are many kinds of pretrial release 
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146; 
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, 
Pretrial Reelase § 5.2 (1974); Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Rule 331 (Proposed Final Draft 1974). We cannot define spe-
cifically those that would require a prior probable cause determina-
tion, but the key factor is significant restraint on liberty. 
. _ '3-v\J 27 Of course, if the State incorporates the probable cause determi-
lAV'\IteJ. $'t~UJ.l.v. Wak nation into a multipurpose hearing, the necessity for appointed coun-
. at the combined proceeding must be governed by the principles 
uAColeman v. Alabama, srupra. 
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The issue in this case is whether a person arrested 
under a prosecutor's inforrrration is constitutionally en-
titled to a judicial deterrrrination of probable cause for 
pretrial restraint of liberty. 
I 
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were 
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged 
with several offenses under a prosecutor's inforrrration.1 
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against 
hirrr carried a potential life sentence, and Henderson~ Y'eH\-\CitVV: d 
fleti in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500 
bond. 
1 Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971. On March 16 
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a con-
cealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a 
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrested March 2, and charged 
by information on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and 
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate 
whether iithe1.1 a&anested under a warrant 
,H u a.; · • ~ , v+ktt o rt~c::.. 
Footnote 2A: 
Two other procedures may provide an opportuni ty to 
challenge probable cause about a month after 
arrest. One, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973), seems 
to provide that every defendant confined for 30 days is 
entitled to a maRB&RBK~ preliminary hearing upon 
application for writ of habeas corpus. It has apparently 
been construed to vest trial courts with discretion to 
2 
deny the hearing. See Evans v. State, 197 So. 323 (Fla. 
Ct. App. 1967). But cf. Karx v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 
(Fla. Ct. App. 1971). ~a:u8¥a~ Counsel for Petitioner 
~represented at oral argument that arraignment 
s 
afford the suspect an opportunity to "attack the 
sufficiency of the evidence ., to hold him." Tr. Oral 
Argument, Mar. 25, 1974, at 17. This may in fact be 
the practice, although the Florida rules provide no 
$tlt2... 
support for it, AFla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.160. 
District Court found that the procedures used in filing 
informations allow a delay of a month or more ~between 
~~~ 
arrest and arraignrnent o 332 F. Supp., at F6'r"' 
'. J ... l f ""' ... ,+, I ~ n. A . ,II +. "' "" 0. "· ,., ' (l 
In Florida, indictments are required only for 
prosecution of offenses punishable by death. Prosecutors 
may charge all other crimes by information, without a 
prior preliminary hearing and without obtaining leave 
of court. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.140 (Supp. 1974); 
Montgomery v. State, 176 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1965); Baugus 
v. State, 141 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1962). At the time 
respondents were arrested, a Florida rule seemed to 
authorize ..-w adversary preliminary hearings to test 
probable cause for detention in all cases. Fla. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the Florida courts 
had held that the filing of an information foreclosed the 
suspect's right to a preliminary hearing. See ·Bradley 
v. State, 265 So. 2d 533 (Fla.), cert_denied, 411 U.S. 
916 (1973); State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 
fitai&i!!'IIIIK .lhe Sta~ o-ff~ 
172 (Fla. 1972). J\HJrRnlr:&BB~:K 44o ather pFoeeettre uaa 
~ ... t.P -w A"- c o~~ ~ t t tt bfVt, -1 t4 ~Uftl cl 
JIJ&illalilui s;\ tRI~ 'Wffiieh f\ -per-&rm charged by informa tio 
·~ 
~ obtain a judicial determination of probable cause 
f or de tention. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCror~ 
L ~~A ()')\ ~~d. ~ iV' ·vy,;t_~~ 
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' 2 Florida law also denies preliminar~· hearings to persons confined 
under indictment, Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970), 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131, but that procedure is not challenged in 
this case. 
· · 8 The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and juris-
diction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). 
4 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as 
an alternate remedy. They 1only(asked)that the state authorities be 
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Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently 
intervened.5 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for 
Dade County, was one of several defendants.6 """- '[ v~ . ~ j )-
After an initial dela.y while the Florida legislature con- ___ '){1;;_0 ~-v 1 sidered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hear- 1+r. tl 
ings to persons charged by information, the Distr. ict Court ~· t! j. 
granted the relief sought. Pu~ainy;atet;~33~ F . · · d, 
Supp. 1107 (SD Fla. 1971).~ffi% ~ ase tDf.:"1 
as a ,~l~s3 action under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (2), ~· 
~held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments give all arrested persons charged by information a 
right to a judicial hearing on the question of probable 
eause. The District Court ordered the Dade County 
defendants to give the named plaintiffs an immediate 
preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for 
further detention.7 It also ordered them to submit a 
also the only relief that the District Court ordered for the named 
respondents. - F. Supp. -. Because release was neither asked 
nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class of cases for 
which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2973-
2974 (1974). 
5 Turner was being held on a charge of auto theft, following arrest 
on March 11, 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges 
of soliciting a ride and possession of marihuana. 
• 6 The named defendants included justices of the peace and judges 
of small-claims courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary 
hearings in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officers 
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only 
one who petitioned for certiorari following the Court of Appeals' 
decision. 
7 The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for 
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal inter-
vention in state prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, 
but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hear- r 
·0\ 
ing, an issue that could not be raised in defense ..wt1i'e criminal 
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not 
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plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases instituted 
by information . 
.Gfily one sHefi f'la:n was sabt~ and the District 
Court adopted it with modifications. The final order 
prescribed a detailed post-arrest procedure. 336 F. 
Supp. 490. Upon arrest the accused would be taken be-
fore a magistrate for a "first appearance hearing." The 
magistrate would explain the charges, advise the ac-
cused of his rights, appoint counsel if he was indigent, 
and proceed with a probable cause determination unless 
e~ther ;p~~{futor or. the accused .was unprepared. If 
either a,~ more time, the magistrate would set the ~ 
date for a "preliminary hearing," to be held ~
four days -~ if the accuS€d was in custody and M mere ~ 
~ 10 days~ if he had been released pending trial. 
~he heaf'iftlj...the accused would be entitled to counsel, 
and he would be allowed to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses, to summon favorable witnesses, and to 
have a transcript made on request. If the magistrate 
found no probable cause, the accused would be discharged. 
He then could not be charged with the same offense by 
complaint or information , but only by indictment re-
turned within 30 days. l'Be }31RI'l al~" p1 "~ided sttll@o 
tiQj;JS IQr faihm~ to h-old hQ.aring ~t~ pr€mberl Mffi@8. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the 
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the caS€ 
was awaiting decision , the Dade County judiciary volun-
tarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon 
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals re-
manded the cac::e for specific findings on the constitu-
tionality of the new Dade County system. Before the 
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida 
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. Monte-
muro, 477 F. 2d l073, 1082 (CA3 1973); cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 
U. S. 82 (1971); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (1951). 
-
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Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing 
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed 
that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the 
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures. 
Under the amended rules every arrested person must 
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130. This "first appearance" is simi-
lar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the Dis-
trict Court in all respects but the crucial one: the magis-
trate does not make a determination of probable cause. 
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for 
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges 
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to 
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule 
3.131; see In re Rule 3.181 (b), Florida Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, 282 So. 2d - (Fla. 1972) .8 
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held 
that the amended rules had not answered the basic con-
stitutional objection, since a defendant charged by in-
formation still could be detained pending trial without 
a judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp. 
1286. Reaffirmmg t;e original ruling, the District Court 
declared that the continuation of this practice was uncon-
stitutionaP The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d 
8 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973), seems to provide that every 
defendant confined for 30 days is entitled to a mandatory preliminary 
hearing upon application for writ of habeas corpus, but it apparently 
has been construed to vest trial courts with discretion to deny the 
hearing. See Evans v. State, 197 So. 323 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967). But 
cf. Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971). 
9 Although this ruling held a statewide "legislative rule" unconsti-
tutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by vir-
tue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for 
an injunction against enforcement of any state statute or legislative 
rule of statewide application, since the practice of denying prelim-
inary hearings to persons charged by information was then em-
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778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor par-
ticulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hear-
i'ng provided by the amended Florida rules would be ac-
ceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in 
custody pending trial. !d., at 788.10j State Attorney 
bodied only in judi'ci'al deci'sions. The ~strict Court therefore had 
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appeals 
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On rrmand, the constitutionality 
of a state "statute" was drawn i'nto question for the first time when 
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental 
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the 
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never 
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court 
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District 
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. See 483 F. 
2d, at 788. Accordingly, a district court of three judgrs was not 
required for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 
U. S. 603, 606-608 (1960). 
1.o The major difference between the District Court's order and 
that of the Court of Appeals centered on the question whether a 
probable cause hearing is required for all arrested persons charged 
by information or only for those ronfined pending trial. Tlw District 
Court's original decree required preliminary hearings for all arrested 
persons. 332 F. Supp., at-. On remand, the District Court madE' 
an exception for persons charged with misdemeanors who neither 
suffered pretrial detention nor faced imprisonment upon conviction. 
3'55 F. Supp., at -. The Court of Apprals explicitly limited the 
hearing right for misdemeanor defendants to those who are jailed 
pending trial. 483 F. 2d, at 789. Its opinion also suggests, without 
stating explicitly, that the h0aring right is similar!~' limited to felony 
defendants who are confined pending trial. !d., at 787, 7R9. _.1 los.c p~(.-\s of The Court of Appeals vacated 6oth the ~he District 
Court's order that prescribed time periods different ft.'om those in 
the amendf'd ruiE'~~sanctions for failurE' to compl~r with the 
hearing requirf'ments. .,It..:Mfu·mffi tl ~r~t Geurt~ hmd1ng- ona 
~--tftat the- tHnended rules' extended time periods for oapiteb, 
!Mt!i life ~flmeflt offenses was a violation of equal proteetion 
Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to address the spe-
cific terms of the District Court's decree. 
Ill\ ~s---
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Gerstein petitioned for review, and we granted certiorari 
because of the importance of the issue.11 We affirm in 
part and reverse in part. 
II 
As frar{d by the proceedings below, this case presents 
t'wo issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial 
11 At oral argument counsel informed us that the named respond-
ents have been convicted. Their pretrial detention ~aersfs11~ has 
ended, but this case belongs to that narrow class of cases in which 
the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot the 
cl&ims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa, No. 
73-762. Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most, 
u11;likcly that any given individual could have his constitutional claim 
decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted. The 
individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is 
certain that other persons similarly situated will be detained under 
the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, in short, is 
one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were 
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable 
cause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any 
of them «~l"Jo!'ld:er;jl. were still in~~~:~ awaiting trial when the 
District Court certified the class · :Elespite the absence ufJ... 
Such a showingi. ~9Jordinarif~be required to avoid moot- _ 13tJ:""fb CJ)./).L 
ness under Sosnl1€) tB:is Bfll98 is . ;aet JB8~ The length of pretrial • • lo( 
custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended IS a S~a e 
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or ~f~ ~6 ;t 
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is hA~~ • 
by no means certain that any given individual would be in pretrial ~ $;a~ ) 
custody long enough for a district judge to certify a class action. ~ a i _ 
Moreover~ i~ tas kililel-4 case iH wfiien the constant existence of l , ~ 
a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney 11\.. .1 l ~ 
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we may "R 1' '1/Vti!J 1/ • 
safely assume that he has other clients with a continuing live interest f ree#I\'(!JrV...) 
in the case. 'F'kie eel'l'ti!'ocmJ, th~efme,··is a S'Uita.ble exception to 4 &,'f F' 2-,l i15Cj 
1!fte Bosna tr:rle-tha iJamO'Otrreee of""!.'~~~~ "c8:p'8bl:e..of ' 
Fiii'itiii9~s''olit inra.diug ,1'/W~W" {)f~ • governed by ·d&-emrining { e A q I ~ '7 ~) • 
'll'he~her Mw memed reptesellNltives ~ernbe!il of t+le ~ at 
the tim of ~tioo. See &mMJ, 8M1'.M, t- "':"'"ef. Ri~I'(J«"11. 
F.:reeman,-469 F. 2d 1159 (CA91972) 1 
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on an information is entitled to a judicial determination 
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the 
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and 
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the 
Constitution. 
A 
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and 
'detention have been derived from the Fourth Amend-
ment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp \T. 
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294_:295 (1973); Ex parte 
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Bur-
·.ford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 447 (1806). The standard fot 
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and 
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
'believing that the [suspect] had committed or was com• 
mitting an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 479 U. S. 89, 91 
(1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175~176 
. (1949); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.:._ S. 10 (1948) . .. '1\tUSSa~ . 
This standar~ epresents a ~etween the indi- ac(\ ~d.?.'tc-v\.. 
1v~~ual's right . o _Ebert_y and the e_9{lllfmni~r~oo-s~ ~·h?:J:;s'~llilo!; ...-. ~ 11 ~-t. 's J.v t_ to 
/..--.- ·· ~.he long-prevailing standards seek to safe- ~~ L 
guard citiz~ns . from rash and unreasonable inter-
/[ ferences with privacy and from unfounded charges 
~ . of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for 
enforcing the law in the community's protection. 
Because many situations which confront officers in 
~the course of executing their duties are more or less 
·ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes 
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of 
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to 
their conclusions of probability. The rule of prob-
able cause is a practical, nontechnical conception 
affording the best compromise that has been found 
for accommodating these often opposing interests. 
11u.u.:., 
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Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforce-
ment. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding 
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." 
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176. 
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection 
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the 
Court has required that the existence of probable cause 
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate when-
ever possible. The classic statement of this principle 
appears in Johnson v. United States, supra, at 13-14: 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often 
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies 
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its pro-
tection consists in requiring that those inferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead 
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968). 
Maximum protection of individual rights could be 
assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual 
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement 
would1t:r,'eie~ handicapflegitimate law enforcement. ~ 
-z,J ~ le.. ~£1rbalanee between -these opposing interest~ the 
Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest 
warrants when~ Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96 
·(1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-
482 (1963), ~it has never invalidated an arrest sup-
ported by probable cause solely because the officers ~ 
failed to secure a warrant. See Ker v. California, 374 
U. S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 
. (1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 705 
' (1948).12 
!1 2 Another aspect of Trupiano was overruled in United States v. 
h~) ---
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Under this practical compromise, a ~eman's on-the-
scene ass~ssment of probable cause J;~l~~al justifica~ion ~ ~-r 
for arrestmg a person suspected of .cnme.> .q'~fiee 
m.:ui'l!l jydgmsn& alee justi~ a brief period of detention ~ ~-<--~ 4 fc, 
to take tM administrative steps HQQ8ilSaFr fe~est. ~ 
,gnce the suspect is in custod~}(he reaSons that justify 
ilispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evapo-
rate. There@no longe~ny danger that the suspect will~ 1 
escape or commit further crimes while the police submit Awl._.) wlu!P. ~st~tes 
their evidence to a magistrate. Afid;-from th~suspeot!~ feasor.S to"" ~a~g 
~is:~,ihe consequences of prolonged detention \ sv..ww111.~ ad:.t.fN.· 
may be more seFious than the interference occasioned by S u_b ~ 1cl....o; .) +kt..d. 
arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's r.Su.Spet! s ;1'\.eel , 
· b · h' f · d · · h' f ·1 "0 '~' a n e.u.. 1 JO , mterrupt 1s source o mcome, an 1mpa1r 1s am1 y diA.u . . 
1 . h' E . 1 1 b · d f'l t W...vv\<'1 ~ reatwns 1ps. <venpretna reeasemay eaccompame "\- rolo.?.olo(e 
by ?urdenso:ne conditions that effect a significant re- ) ! ~-tts,e 1 Y\e.Jr.Q.., s.c.s 
stramt on liberty. See R. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91 ~V\A he~~ . 
(1965); L. Katz, Justice Is the Crime 51-62 (1972). 
When the stakes are this high, the detached judgment 
of a neutral magistrate js essential if the Fourth Amend-
ment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded 
interference with liberty. Acco:rdingly, we hold that the 
Fourth Amendment requires . a judicial determination of 
probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint on 
liberty following arrest. 
This result has historical support in the common law 
that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 
:'Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1~50), which was overruled in turn by 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752. 
The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most con-
troversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what 
.circumstances an offlcer may enter a suspect's home to make a war-
t rentless arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474 
(1971); id., at 510--512 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Jones v. United 
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(1925). At common law it was customary, if not obliga-
tory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice 
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 77, 81, 95 (1736); 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 
116-117 (4th ed. 1762). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 
U. S. 478, 498-499 (1885). 1 ~ The justice of the peace 
would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to deter-
mine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner 
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would 
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he 
wpuld be discharged from custody. 1 Hale, supra, at 
583-585; 2 Hawkins, supra, at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen, 
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 (1883).14 
;u The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have 
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact 
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment, 
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of 
cpmmitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief 
detention. 
"When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected 
of a felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dis-
miss himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can, 
he may do either of these things. e1ac I 
"1. He may carry him to the common P., ... but that is now 
r'arely done. 
' "2. He may deliver him to the constable of the vill, who may either 
carry him to the common gaol, ... or~ to a justice of the peace to 
be examined, and farther proceeded against as case shall require .... 
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to :my justice of peace of the 
county where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail, 
or commit him, as the case shall require. 
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private 
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler 
will expect a Mittimus for his warrant of detaining." 
1 id., at 589-590. 
H The examination of the prisoner __ was inquisitorial, and the ~ _ 
afftisatisQ sf U., witnesses was ~·~outside the prisoner's pres-
ence. q'he ptoee~ was considered quite harsh)lmti:l: B~tttor) refer~ 
H 4-ll' ~ , cf r.>"('Oc'CI(t ;_ t 
~ I 0/ 
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The initial determination of probable cause also could be 
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus. 
2' Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen; supra, at 
243; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 75, 97-
101 ( 1807). This practice furnished the model for 
criminal procedure in America immediately following the 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Boll-
man, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 (1807); H Ex parte Burford, 
7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 447 (1806); Ex parte Hamilton, 3 
U. R (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and there are indications that 
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model 
for a "reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States, 
358 U.S. 307, 317-320 (1959) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting).16 
wtt!! fll888Hlf!liehe!i ;n ~1 J. Stephen, at 225, ~twas well estab- . 
lished that}.,if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of ~ h 1 S 
fH'~SHer!l guil@l~e wae eH*'i-tled-te be-disehMged"" St. 
15 In Ex parte Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr -t~s~ 
were committed following an examination in the circuit court of 
the District of Columbia. They filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief 
Justice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to 
p'ersons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following 
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause, 
the Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that 
it did not establish probable cause that they were guilty of treason. 
The prisoners were discharged. 
16 A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery 
of stolen goods , is said to have furnished the model for a "reason-
able" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was re-
quired to appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath 
of probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular place. 
After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim 
and the alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace 
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods 
and detention of the thief. 2 Hale, supra, at 149-152; T. Taylor, 
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969); 
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-629 (1886). 
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Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a per-
son arrested without a warrant and charged by informa-
tion may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending 
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause deter-
mination.17 rhere is no provision for a test of probable 
.e8J't:I:Be at the Erst appearance before a magistrate or a 
.the hearing to set bai~Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130; se 
Pugh v. Rainwater, t~U· 2d 778, 781 n. 8 (CA5 1973 • 
~The suspect ca~T-~emand a preliminary hearing 
Fla. Rule Crim. P oc. 3.131 ~)4t 'WiFlorida Suprem 
Court has held that habeas corpus cannot be used to tes 
the probable cause for detention under an information 
Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory.~ 49 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 
~arraigiJ:rn~n may be delayed as much as a 
month, and it is not':Clear that the issue of probij,ble cause 
~be raised then.18 .J 
· 17 A person arrested under a warrant would have received a prior 
judicial determination of probable cause. Under Fla. Rule Crim. 
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that 
states facts showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The 
magistrate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there 
is reasonable ground to believe the complaint is true. 
-i-'*:'Ph...-'Fm:'h'i1<r"~o,uff"10Uncrtl1at the procedures used..{ri filin 
'nforma · ns allow a delay of a month or more between arrest an 
/Jrocessing of the inf rmiJ,tion does not- b · 
n officer appears before n assistant state at rn 
davit of..iacts. This app arance is delayed a whe 
urs to two week after ' rest. If the state ' ttorn 
apers are prepare and th 
· nment. The av rage dela 
om t e time the ~sting officer appea: nd ihe-time of arraign 
J&-Wto~~. I' 
The Court of Appeals as~umed, for purposes of · · case, that th 
efendan1 would have an opportunity to challenge e probabl 
ause underlying the information at his arruignmen~ ffi'I'E:-f**<i!Qh 
ii-Jhc P<oiin~as-~rotmdlese, a person charged by info 
t't . 
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\~ ~ Petitioner defends this practice on the ground that the 
prosecutor's decision to file an information is itself a 
determination of probable cause and that furnishes suffi-
cient reason to detain a defendant elJ..di.ng trial. Al-
though a conscientious decision at the evidence war-
rants affords a measure of prot ction against unfounded 
deten ion, we do not think prosecutorial judgment 
standing alone meets the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. Indeed, we think the Court's previous 
decisions compel disapproval of the Florida procedure. 
In Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5 (1927), the 
Court held that an arrest warrant issued solely upon a 
United States Attorney's information was invalid because 
the accompanying affidavits were defective. Although 
the Court's opinion did not explicitly state that the 
prosecutor's official oath could not furnish probable cause, 
that conclusion was implicit in the judgment that the 
-arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment.10 More 
recently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
449-453 (1971), the Court held that a prosecutor's 
1.o By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon 
its face," and returned ·by a "properly constituted grand jury" con-
clusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires 
issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parte 
United States, 2 7 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v. 
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a 
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached 
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the 
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust 
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346 
'(1974). 
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responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the 
constitutional role of a neutral and detached magistrate. 
We reaffirmed that principle in Shadwick v. City of 
Tarnpa, 407 U. S. 345 (1972), and held that probable 
cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant must be 
determined by someone independent of police and prose-
cution.2Q The reason for this separation of functions was 
expressed by Justice Frankfurter in a similar context: 
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dig-
nity of all men is central, naturally guards against 
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal 
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance 
@f soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law 
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cher-
ished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled 
that safeguards must be provided against the dan-
gers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The 
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be 
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated 
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into 
different parts, responsibility for which is separately 
vested in the various participants upon whom the 
criminal law relies for its vindication." MeN abb v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943). 
20 The Court had earlier reached a different result in Ocampo v. 
United States ... 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the 
Philippine Islan~ a statutory guarantee substantially iden-
tical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5, 
32 Stat. 693-694, the Court held that an arrest warrant could issue 
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court has since held 
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philip-
pines is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision in 
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 
194-198 (1957). Even if it were, the result reached in Ocampo 
is incompatible with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, and 
Shadwick. 
73-477-0PINION 
16 GERSTEIN v. PUGH 
In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable 
cause is not sufficient ~to justify restraint on liberty 
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is en-
titled to judicial oversight or review of a prosecutor's de-
cision to prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's 
prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite 
to prosecution by information. Lem W oon v. Oregon, 
229 U.S. 586 (1913). 21 Nor do we retreat from the estab-
lished rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void 
a subsequent conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 
519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119· U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, 
as the Court of Appeals noted below,[a'?uspect who is 
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for 
that confinement, ~a conviction will not be vacated 
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending 
trial without) probable cause. 483 F. 2d, at 786-787. 
Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 F. 2d 6 (CA5 1968), 
with Brown v. Fauntleroy, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 442 
F. 2d 838 (1971) , and Cooley v. Stone,- U. S. App. 
D. C. -, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969). 
III 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
held that the determination of probable cause must be 
accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safe-
guards- counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and 
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary 
hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in 
21 See also B eck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541 (1962). The 
opinion in B eck cites Ocampo v. United States, 234 U. S. 91 (19l4) , 
for the same proposition, but the validity of prosecution by infor-
mation without a preliminary hearing was not at issue in that case. 
The only issues were whether grand juries were required in the 
Philippines and , as discussed in n. 20, supra, whether the prosecutor's 
decision to file an information furnished sufficient probable cause for 
an arrest warrant. 
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many States to determine whether the evidence justifies 
going to trial under an information or presenting the 
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 
1 (1970); Y Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern 
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974). 
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is 
usually referred to as "probable cause," but/Jt may ap-
proach a prima facie case of guilt. A. L. I. Model Code 
of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Commentary on Article 
330, at 90--91 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972). When the 
hearing takes this form, adversary procedures are custo-
marily employed. The importance of the issue to both 
the State an!_the accused justifies the presentation of wit-
nesses and full exploration of their testimony on cross-
examination. This kind of hearing also requires appoint-
ment of counsel for indigent defendants. Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970). And, as the hearing as-
sumes increased importanc a~d the procedures become 
more complex, the 1eJi l1k~y: it i~ that it can be held 
promptly after arrest See A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-
arraingment Procedure, supra, at 33-34. 
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the 
probable cause determination required by the Fourth 
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable 
cause for detaining the arrested person pending ~ 
further proceedingil . ~may be afforded by law This 
issue can be determined reliably without a full adversary 
hearing. The standard is the same as that for arrest. 22 
r vJ.J.n.-OJ-J -lM 
22 Because the standards are identical,[there is no need for further ,.) 
investigation before the probable cause determination can be made~ ' 
"Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must arrest on 'prob-
able cause.' It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were, 
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters 
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing 
magistrate on 'probable cause.'" Mallory v. United States, 354 
u.s. 449, 456 (1957). 
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That standard- probable cause to believe the suspect has 
committed a crime-traditionally has been decided in 
nonadversary proceedings on hearsay and written testi-
mony, and the Court has approved these informal modes 
of proof. 
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt and by evidence connned to that 
which long experience in the common-law tradition, 
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has 
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with 
that standard. These rules are historically grounded 
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men 
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting 
forfeitures of life, liberty and property. 
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the 
very name implies, we deal with probabilities. 
These are not technical; they are the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correla-
tive to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949). 
Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). 
The use of these informal procedures is justified not 
only by the lesser consequences of a probable cause de-
termination but also by the nature of the determination 
itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflict-
ing evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a prepond-
erance standard demands, and credibility determinations 
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence sup-
ports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, The De-
cision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64-109 (1969). 
J . ,.. /.This is not to say thatfonfrontation and cross-examina-/\Jv../ ~ tion might not enhanc the reliability of probable cause 
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~eterminations in some case~~ in most cases.> their 
value would be too slight to justify hOlding, as a matter of 
cop.stitutional principle, that these formalities and safe-
guards designed for trial must also be employed in mak-
ing the Fourth Amendment determination of probable 
pause.23j Our system of criminal justice is already over 
burdened, and~'t · subject to .. ..valid criticism when over-
emphasis .J»t oc~ural ~a evidentiary fo ru.alities re-
sults.-rn'delaye justice, repetitive trials, and burdensome 
expe.ns.e for both the State and the accused. l 
Because of its limited function and its nonadversary 
character, the probable cause determination is not a 
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require 
appointed counsel. We H.~ identified as "critical 
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair de-
fense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed 
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 
23Jn Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 ( 1973), we held that a parolee or proba-
tioner arrested prior to revocation is entitled to an informal pre-
liminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live 
testimony. 408 U.S., at 487; 411 U.S. , at 786. That preliminary 
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by 
the Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and pre-
serving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently 
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred. 
408 U. S., at 485; 4H U. S., at 872-873 n. 5. Moreover, revocation 
proceedings may offer less protection from initial error than the 
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute 
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect 
with crime unless he is satisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code 
of Professional Responsibility, D. R. 7-103 (A) (the prosecutor has 
a professional responsibility "not [to] institute or cause to be insti-
tuted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the 
charges are not supported by probable cause") ; ABA Standards 
Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution 
Funct#, §§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); American College of Trial Lawyers, 
Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4 (c). 
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(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967). 
Jn Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held that a pre-
iiminary hearing was a critical stage of an Alabama prose-
cution, the majority and concurring opinions identified 
.two critical factors that distinguish the Alabama prelim-
,inary hearing fro~ the prol;>able cause determination re-
.quired by the Fourth Amendment. First, under Alabama 
law the function of the hearing was to determine whether 
the evidence justified charging the suspect with an of-
. fense. A finding of no probable cause could mean that 
he would not be tried at all. The Fourth Amendment 
probable cause determination is addressed only to pre-
trial custody. To be sure, pretrial custody may affect to 
some extent the defendant's ability to assist in prepara-
.. tion of his defense, but this is not the kind of substantial 
harm identified as controlling in Wade and Coleman. 
Second, Alabama allowed the suspect to confront and 
cross-examine prosecution witnesses at the p_reliminary 
hearing. The Court noted that the suspect's defense on 
the merits could be compromised if he had no legal as-
sistance for exploring or pJ;eserving the w!tnesses' testi-
mony. This consideration does no~ apply to the informal, 
nonadversary procedure required under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The reasons that make ~ nonadversary proceeding ap-
propriate, however, do not justify denying the suspect an 
opportunity to be present. and participate in the deter-
mination.24 Our system of justice operates on the premise 
24 The procedures suggested in the Uniform Rules of Criminal 
.Procedl}.re (Proposed Final Draft 1974) and the A. L. I. Model Code 
of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972, and Tent. 
Draft No. 5A, 1973) are inst ructive. Under the Uniform Rules, a 
· person arrested without a warrant is entitled, "without unnecessary 
delay," to a first appearance before a magistrate and a determination 
. that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest warrant. The determi-
nation may be made on affidavits or testimony, in the presence of 
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that the subject of a judicial proceeding is entitled to 
participate unless there is good reason to exclude him. 
See Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U. S. (19 Wall.) 107, 
122-123 ( 1873). .!fhe Fe.ttrth Amendment is not- inoon-
~ncep The procedures normally fol-
lowed in applying for warrants are ex parte proceedings 
by necessity, as notifying the suspect would often frus-
trate the purpose of the warrant. See T. Taylor, Two 
Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 81-82 (1969). 
But when the suspect is already in custody, and the only 
issue is probable cause for detention, he should be allowed 
to participate in the determination. Allowing him to ap-
pear before the magistrate and giving him an opportunity 
the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remain in custody for inability 
to qualify for pretrial release are offered another opportunity for a 
probable cause determination at the detention hearing, held no more 
than 5 days after arrest. This is an adversary hearing, and the 'd.t,¥teC... 
parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay Jillay be con- e "' 
sidered. Rule 344. 
The Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure also provides a 
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported 
by a reasonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. The 
magistrate may make a determination of probable cause to hold the 
accused, but he is not required to do so and the accused may request 
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be 
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes 
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written 
and live testimony: 
"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence 
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present addi-
tional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of 
which he is accused. The state's submission may be made by means 
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the 
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the 
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appear-
ance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks 
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause." 
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973). 
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to speak or to submit written evidence for consideration , 
along with the State's presentation could enhance ~,tl/-- ll-u ~v.£ Fe! s 
the reliability and the fairness of the proceeding.1)"~ r r e..<;.~ ~ 
bttr6en tm-tfte...SW w~4- Virtually all paJ-t"tt ~~ tt ""~ 
jurisdictions require that arrested persons be presented -w-~ 1 Tfos.t 
to a judicial officer within a short time after arrest, see· (< .J .J " .s '.!6k 
A. L. I., Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure 230- •Jt. t-....._ o-,.... 
231 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966), and every jurisdiction 'f/:.c... ,;)'\<! • 
makes some provision for setting bail or determining other . 
conditions of pretrial release. See L. Katz, Justice Is ·~ ~ 
the Crime, Appendix B, at 247-365 (1972). Since the 
defendant is already in the courtroom, the issue of prob-
able cause may be decided at that time with little or no 
inconvenience to the State. In fact, the suspect's first 
appearance before a magistrate traditionally has been 
considered the proper time for determining whether there 
is probable cause for detention. 1 Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 589-590 (1736); 2 id., at 77-95; 2 Hawkins, Pleas 
of the Crown 116-117 (4th ed. 1762); see McNabb v. 
United States, 318 U. S. 332, 342-344 (1943); Amster-
dam, Perspective on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. 
Rev. 349, 391 & n. 408 (1974). Although the Federal 
11ules of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly acknowl-
edge this function of the first appearance, this Court has 
interpreted them to require a determination of probable 
cause at that stage. Jaben v. United States, 381 U. S. 
214 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 
(1957).25 
.25 In an amicus brief filed on behalf of the United States, the 
Solicitor General suggested that McNabb v. Mallory had mistaken 
the purpose of the first appearance, and that actual practice is other-
wise. Cf. Note, Probable Cause at the Initial Appe..uance in War-
rantless Arrests, 45 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1128 (1972); McNabb, of course, 
was decided before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. It interpreted a statutory requirement that an arrested 
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There is no single proper method for making the prob-
able cause determination required by the Fourth Amend-
ment. The States have many different patterns of crimi-
nal procedure, and each may adapt its own to provide a 
swift and reliable probable cause determination with the 
least burden to its system. Like many jurisdictions, 
Florida requires every arrested person to be brought 
before a magistrate within 24 hours, unless sooner 
released. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.310 (b). At that 
appearance the defendant is told of the charges against 
him, furnished a copy of the complaint, advised of his 
constitutional rights, and provided counsel if he is indi-
gent. The magistrate then sets bail or prescribes other 
conditions of pretrial release. One of the factors typi-
cally relied upon in making this decision is the weight of 
evidence against the accused. ABA Standards Relating 
to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Pretrial 
Release § 5.1 (1974); see 18 U. S. C. § 3146 (b). Ex-
panding that determination to a test of probable cause 
would be a natural way of integrating the probable cause 
decision with existing procedures. 
In other States, existing procedures may satisfy the 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Some States 
already authorize a hearing on probable cause at or 
immediately following the suspect's first appearance. 
person be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay. 
318 U. S., at 342. Mallory was decided after the federal rules were 
adopted, and although the interpretation of the federal rules was 
dictum, it clearly outlined the Court's view: 
"The scheme for initiating a federal prosecution is plainly defined. 
The police may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only on 'probable 
cause.' The next step in the proceeding is to arraign the arrested 
person before a judicial officer as quickly as possible so that he may 
be advised of his rights and so that the issue of probable cause may 
be promptly determined." 354 U. S., at 454. 
The use of the word "arraign" was in error, as arraignment occurs 
later in the process. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 10. 
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.E. g., Colo. l}ev .. Stat. § 39-2-7; Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708-
709. Others may choose simply to accelerate their exist-
ing preliminary hearings. What the Fourth Amendment 
requires for pretrial restraint on liberty 26 is a reliable 
determination of probable cause made either before or 
-v4 promptly after arrest., and preferably no later than the 
first appearance .b_efore a j~~~i;l officer. If made after _ c.v¥\0.. 1, L 
- arrest, the suspect must be ~to be presentA Each 
State may choose the procedure that best accommodates 
this determination to its existing practice.z7 ' 
IV 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth 
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of 
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we 
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we 
,do not ag.ree that the Fourth Amendment requires the 
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree, 
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
26 Because the probable rause determination is not a constitutional 
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those 
suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition 
that they appear for trial. There are many kinds of pretrial release 
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146; 
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, 
Pretrial Reelase § 5.2 (1974): Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Rule 331 (Proposed Final Draft 1974) . We cannot define spe-
cifically those that would require a prior probable cause determina-
tion, but the key factor is ignifi.cant restraint on liberty. 
27 Of course, if the State incorporates the probable cause determi-
nation into a multipurpose hearing, the necessity for appointed coun-
sel at the combined proceeding must be governed by the principles 
Dr}foleman v. Alabama, srupra. 
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The issue in this case is whether a person arrested 
under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally en-
titled to a judicial determination of probable cause for 
pretrial restraint of liberty. 
I 
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were 
arrested in })ade County, Florida. Each was charged 
with several offenses under a prosecutor's information.1 
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against , d 
h . . d . ll"f d H d u.~eMatYir! 1m carne a potentia 1 e sentence, an en erson ~ 
~in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500 
bond. 
1 Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971. On March 16 
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a con-
cealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a 
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrested_,(March 2, and charged 
by information on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and 
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate 
whether \4ther WM 1trreeted under a-warrant~ 
i.. ~etV Wt~• >>~'~ u 
w"v-" :t i t..\_ <.: se . 
INSERT A, p. 2 
In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecution 
of capital offenses . Prosecutors may charge all other crimes 
by information, without a prior preliminary hearing and 
without obtaining leave of court. Fla. Rule Grim. Proc. 
3.140(a); State v. Bernandez, 217 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1968); 
DiBona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960). At 
the t ime respondents were arrested, a Florida rule seemed 
to authorize adversary preliminary hearings to test 
probable cause for detention in all cases. Fla. Rule Grim. 
Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the Florida courts had held 
that the filing of an information foreclosed the suspect's 
right to a preliminary hearing. See State ex rel. Hardx 
? 
v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972). They ·,had also held 
that habeas corpus could not be used, except perhaps in 
exceptional circumstances, to test the probable cause for 
detention under an information. See Sullivan v. State 
ex rel. McCrory, 29 So. 2d 794, 797 (Fla. 1951). The only 
possible methods for obtaining a judicial determination 
of probable cause were a special statute allowing a 
3 
preliminary hearing after thir~y days, Fla. Stat. Ann. 
3 
§ 907.045 (1973 ) ~ and arraignment, which the District Court 
found was often delayed a month or more after arrest. 
~ 'l. 'R_~\rwJa~~ 3 3;t r:. Supp. 110'l11lO ( 1> F/a. 1Cf7/), t/ 
AAs a result, a person charged by nformation could be 
detained for a substantial period solely on the decision 
of a prosecutor. 
3 This statute may have been construed to make the 
hearing permissive instead of mandatory. See Evans v. 
State, 197 So. 2d 323 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Fla. Op. Atty 
Gen. 067-29 (1967). But cf. Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 
763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971). It may also have been 
superseded by the subsequent amendments to the rules of 
criminal procedure. In re Florida Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65 (1972). 
The Florida rules do not suggest that the issue 
of probable cause can be raised at arraignment, Fla. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 3.160, but counsel for Petitioner represented 
at oral argument that arraignment affords the suspect an 
opportunity to "attack the sufficiency of the evidence 
to hold ~him." Tr. Oral ArglzlHliiM, Mar. 25, 1974, at 17. 
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that this 
17~, 
was true. 483 F.2d A: 781 n.8. 
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1 
In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu-1 
~ion f offenses punishable by death. All other criminal 
offenses"-nlay be prosecuted by information, and viola-
~ions of m~icipal ordinances may be prosecuted by a 
simple affidavit or docket entry. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 
3.140 (Supp. 197~). At the time respondents were ar-
rested, Florida's rules of criminal procedure authorized 
'only one method for de rmining the existence of probable. 
\cause to hold a suspect ~jail pending trial. Fla. Rule 
1Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended J972). This proceeding, an 
ladversary preliminary hearing, was not available to a~ 
suspect who had already been charged by information. 
!See Bradley v. State, 265 So. 2d 533 (Fla.), cert. denied, 
,411 U. S. 916 (1973); State ex rel. Hqrdy v. Blount, 261 
So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972).2 In those inst~ces when a pre-
liminary hearing was held and the suspect discharged, the 
!prosecutor could reinstate the charge and return him to· 
custody by filing an information. See Mont(Jomery v. 
!I3tate, 176 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1965); Baugus v. St«:_te, 141 
So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1962). As a result, a person char'ged by 
lin rmation could be detained pending trial solely on the 
ecision of a prosecutor. 
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action 
against Dade County officials in the Federal District 
CourtJ claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hear-
ing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declara-
tory and injunctive relief.~ Respondents Turner and 
2 Florida law also denies preliminary hearings to persons confined 
under indictment, Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970), G ) 
Ia. Rule Crim. roc. 3.131J:but that procedurels not challenged in a > 
his case. 
a The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and juris-
diction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). 
I Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as 
--1 • • ~ ---, ... _ an alternate remedy. They~ askedithat the state authorities be '-
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was 
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1 Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently 
intervened.~ Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for 
Dade County, was one of several defendants .~ 
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature con-
sidered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hear-
ings to persons charged by information, the District Court 
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, ~~h. 
Stipp. 1107 (SD Fla. 19-71)~ l.rfteF eeF~~tlie case 
awt as a class action under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b )(2), 
~j~he GouP~ held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments give all arrested persons charged by information a 
right to a judicial hearing on the question of probable 
cause. The District Court ordered the Dade County 
defendants to give the named plaintiffs an immediate 
preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for 
s.~a. 
- Tha.. c.cWtt c.vt"t,\~G( 
further detention." It also ordered them to submit a~----------
also the only relief that the District Court ordered for the named ~ at 1115-111,. 
respondents. * F. Supp. ~Because release was neither aske ) 
nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class of cases for 
which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ot. 2968, 99?3? 1-\-1'1 U.$, --) -
2~(1974). 
f Turner waR heing held on a rharge of auto theft, following arrest 
on March 11 , 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges 
of soliciting a ride and posse~sion of marihuana . 
- The named defendant included justices of the peace and judges 
of small-claims courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary 
hearmgs in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officers 
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only 
one who petitioned for certiorar~ellewiHg tee Ceurtr-m-Apf'e!lltt'J.,. 
aeeisie'R . .II • 
1 A The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for 
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal inter-
vention in state prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, 
but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hear- ~ 
ing, an issue that could not be raised in defense _.t(the criminal - 0 
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not 
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plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases instituted. 
by information. 
OH:ly efl:e suoh plan wa~bmitt~ and the District 
Court adopted it with modifications. The final order 
prescribed a detailed post-arrest procedure. 336 F. 
Supp. 490. Upon arrest the accused would be taken be-
fore a magistrate for a "first appearance hearing." The 
magistrate would explain the charges. advise the ac-
cused of his rights, appoint counsel if he was indigent, 
and proceed with a probable cause determination unless 
either the prosecutor or the accused was unprepared. If 
e~ more time, the magistrate would set the . t ~ 
date for fl. "preliminary hearing ," to be held 'R-9 :R'l9FQ tll.~ w 1 n 
four days ~if the accused was in custody and HOmo~ w;t~V\ 
r l \.._ o~d..C2.f' t.ha.i-t 10 days ~if he had been released pPnding trial. 
pcol/ id-A.~ (------~~~~re~tM''l'M!I the accused would be entitled to counsel, 
SO\'"'c-~  ... ~ fa~ and he would be allowed to confront and cross-examine 
J { ai lv.xe to hold adverse witnesses. to ~ummon favorable witne:::ses, and to 
1 l ~c.>. he.;\t'i Yl.o.s have a transcript made on request. If the magistrate 
\ ot p«<e<i ~d found no probable cause, the accused would be discharged. 
:e ~;,_~a~ He then could not be charged with the same offense by 
1 • " ~ ..J complaint or information, but only by indictment re-
B't"tVI~ 
turned within 30 davs. ~e plan alro ~rovirlef:l Ba41c-,r. 
~ailure 1i6 hold hearings at the preseriboo times. ----· The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed t e 
District Court's orrler pending appeal, but while the case 
was awaiting decision . the Dade County judiciary volun-
tarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon 
learning of this development. the Court of Appeals re-
manded the case for specific findings on the constitu-
tionality of the new Dade County svstem. Before the 
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida 
prejudice the conduct of trial o'n the merits. See Conover v. Monte-
muro, 477 F. 2d 1073, 1082 (CA3 1973); cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 
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Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing 
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed 
that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the 
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures. 
Under the amended rules every arrested person must 
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130A This "first appearance" is simi-
lar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the Dis-
trict Court in all respects but the crucial one: the magis-
trate docs not make a determination of probable cause. 
The rule amendments also changed the procedure or 
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges 
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to 
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule 
3.131; see In re Rule 3.181 (b), Florida Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, 28 So. 2d.f*- (Fla. 197~) ."---·-· 
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held 
that the amended rules had not answered the basic con-
stitutional objection, since a defendant charged by in-
formation still could be detained pending trial without 
a judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp. __ 
1286. Reaffirming m, original ruling, the District Court 
declared that the continuation of this practice was uncon-
stitutionai.f'' The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d 
-1'JO. 
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778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor par~ 
ticulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hear~ 
ing provided by the amended Florida rules would be ac- \ 
ceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in 
1 
I10CI 
custody pending trial. !d., at ~~State Attorney- gg ... ro 1• 
bodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had 
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appeals 
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the conRtitutionality 
of a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when 
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental 
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the 
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never 
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court 
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District 
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rttle. Sec 483 F. 
---2d,- at 788). Accordingly, a district court of three judgrs was not 
required for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. M endoza-
II 
Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1963); Flemming v. N estor, 363 ~ 
U.S. 603, 606-608 (1960). ~ 
';)10 The major difference between the District Court's order and 
that of the Court of Appeals centered on the question whether a 
probable cause hearing is rC'quired for all arrested persons charged 
by information or only for those ronfined pendin~~: trial. The District 
Court's original decree required preliminary hearings for all arrested 
persons. ~F. Supp., at~ On r~mand , the Distri ct Court made 
an exception for persons charged with misdemeanors who neither 
JMI 
11'10 -
suffered pretrial detention nor faced imprisonment upon ronviction. 
355 F . Supp., at:t\-. The Court of Appeals explicitly limited the 
hearing right for misdemeanor defendants to those who are jniled 
pending trial. 483 F. 2d, at 789. Its opinion also suggest;;, without,....-
stating explicitly, that the hearing right is similarly limited to felony 
defendants who are confined pending trial. Id. , at 787, 789. -t1illse. p.rvttS 
The Court of Appeals vacated eete te~tie~ of the DistriCt") 
Court's order that prescribed time periods different from those in j 
the amended rules.t, an~ samtions for failure to comply with the 
hearing requirements . ...ft -t~ffit·med t:he- Distriet- urt '.s. holding ~ 
J:emL'cnd tmt+-the- tmteruled ntl:es~ extendffi t~me periods for CfttHtttl 
aJJa life im}'lriS6flm~wat!- s,..~J.atigu. c» equal protc_cl.ion. 
Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to address the spe-
cific terms of the District Court's decree. 
- 1 
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- 1./ vf u. . s'. ' o ro 2 . erstein petitioned for review, and we granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue.n t("We affirm in 
part and reverse in part. 'L-----
II --
As fr~ by the proceedings below, this case presents 
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial 
n At oral argument counsel informed us that the named respond-
ehts have been convicted. Their pretrial detention therefore has 
ehded<e)~ !_his case belongs,{totnat narrow class of cases in whicli 
the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot the 
(\ll'l$) claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa,~ - L{, S, _ 
~Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most 
unlikely that any given individual could have his constitutional claim 
decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted. The 
individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is 
certain that other persons similarly situated will be detained under 
the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, in short, is 
one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were 
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable 
cause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any 
of them PeBfleHfiest"were still in custody awaiting trial when e class . 
District Court certified the gl~eat'ie~ e pite the abseil%-~ 
such a showing ~would or inarifY\ be required to avoid moot-
~ess under , osnC!€) · · fllOO\,. The length of pretrial 
custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended 
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or 
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is 
by no m"n' oo<t•in that •ny givon individuo!.(Wou!d bo in ""::£\ 
i'f'l _custody l~g enough for a district judge to certify (Clas10!Mltie 
Moreover, this · ki~ case iii "'Mi81)._ the constant existenc 
a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney 
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we~ ca VI. 
safely assume that he has other clients with a continuing live interest 
in the case. Cfflis ee!ltrovCISJ, taepefeFe, · ~;table- exception- 1i6 
t81! ~88~ul6. hat mootness of a elsss action that is "capable of 
Jiifl91i+;err,-yet nding Teview" ordinarily i go rned by determining 
~-t.Re named representatives were members of th cia s at 
th ti ~ ~tifir..a.tion. ~ee Sosna, supra, at -; cf. Rivera . 
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on an information is entitled to a judicial determination 
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the 
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and 
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the 
Constitution. 
A 
Both the stand.ards and procedures for arrest and 
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amend-
ment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v. 
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Ex parte 
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Bur-
ford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 44( (1806). -The stanaard for 
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and 
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was com-
mitting an offense." Beck v. Ohio, A79 u. s. 89, 91 
{1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 
(1959); Brineg.ar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175~176 
(1949)1, tlohnMn v. United States, BmHY.-S.--tp--(!9'48 . 
This standa~epresents a comp~i between the in i-
vidual's right to liberty and the ~~tyls-r.es · 
'Qi:tit;¥ fef' e(mtreHi:t:rg-erim~ 
"These long-prevailing 
guard citizens from rash and unreasonable inter~ 
ferences with privacy and from unfounded charges 
of crime. They also ·seek to ·give fair leeway for 
enforcing the law in the community's protection. 
Because many situations which confront officers in 
the course of exec.uting theirr duties are more or less 
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes 
-3 
on their part. But the mistakes must be those vf 
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to 
, their conclusions ·of probability. The rule of pro -
· able cause is a practical, nontechnical conception 
affording the best compromise that has been found 
. for accommodating these often opposing interests. 
c~ditu-le. <>Y\ 
IV'Itnl~ab\e -
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Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforce. 
ment. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding 
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." 
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176. 
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection 
ag'ainst unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the 
Court has required that the existence of probable cause 
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate when· 
ever possible. The classic statement of this principle 
333 
U S l 0 
appears in Johnson v. United States, s~F~ 13-14~ ·.' J 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often ( lq~g), 
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies 
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its pro-
tection consists in requiring that those inferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead 
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 
~ 
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20- 22 (1968). 
Maximum protection of individual rights could be 
assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual / 
justification pr;ior to any arrest1 but such a requirement ~ 
woul~handicap~legitimate law enforcement. ~ O'(' 
· · ba.lan~e-betweea-these opposing inter~sts~ the 
ourt has expressed a preference for the use of arrest r ·'I ..W: T~SIIO e.> 
warrants when ~o~ Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96 
(1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-
482 (1963), ~it has never invalidated an arrest sup-
ported by probable cause solely because the officers h..,..,.--...... 
failed to secure a warrant. See Ker v. California, 374 
U. S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 
(1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 705 
(1948).1~ , 
l f Another aspect of Trupiano was overruled in United S~ates v. 
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Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the-
scene assessment of probable cause ~gal justification 
~ .f.o V" for arresting a person suspected of crim8)' ~
~mas's jHtlgmeHt.-also jHstifie~a brief period of detention 
~ howt.l/~'f'-1' _ to take the administrative steps .Aeeessap~:k)~ arres , 
) once the suspect is in custodJA.the reasons that justify 
aispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evapo-
provi d.es 
T;,... rate. There~no longerkany danger that the suspect will 
escape or commit further crimes while the police subm.;;.it;....-_ 
their evidence to a magistrate. AHd, fFofl'l the s 
~ ef vie jJJ.e consequences of prolonged detention 
may be more s~ious than the interference occasioned by 
arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's 
job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his famil 
_ relationships. A., Even pretrial release may be accompanied 
-- bY burdensome conditions that effect a significant re-
f See)~.> I g straint on liberty. See R. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91 
I U, ', C, § 3J4(,(a)('l) \ (1965); L. Katz, Justice Is the Crime 51-62 (1972). l 
\ (5) .> J When the stakes are this high, the detached judgment 
\... · - __.../ of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth Amend-
ment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded 
interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold that the 
Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of 
probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint on 
liberty following arrest. 
This result has historical support in the common law 
that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 
aabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950) I which was overruled in turn by 'Ia/ a). 
Chimel v. Clilijornia, 395 U.S. 752r--- 1.... 1•.:n 
The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most con-
troversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what 
circumstances an officer may enter a suspect's home to make a war-
a~ntless arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474 481 
~ U971); id., at 510-512)_ (WHITE, J., dissenting); Jones v. United 
~ States, 357 U.S. 493,499-500 (1958). 
Ws 
We reiterated ~principle in United States v. United 
~es ~ixzx District Cour~, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). In ) 
~RBXKIUIXIIX:imBiJEBiHKHBHH*HJH£1Ai&iium:E~ terms that apply 
equally to arrests, we described the "very heart of the 
Fourth Amendment directive" as a requirement that "where 
practical, a governmental search and seizure should represent 
both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence of wrongful 
acts and the judgment of the magistrate that the collected 
evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a citizen's 
private premises or conversation." Id.1 at 316. iiiK*Mil 
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(1925). At common law 'it was customary, if not obliga-
tory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice M 
of the peace shortly after arrest. ,Wfale Pleas of th~ · 
Crown 77, 81, 95~(1736); 2AHawkins, Pleas of the Crown W. 
116- 117 (4th ed. 1762). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 
1 
U. S. 4\!fi, 498-499 (1885). ltii The justice of the peace 
would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to deter-- --
mine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner 
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would 
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he 
would be discharged from custody. 1JHale, supra, at · "'· 
583-58FZ'AHawkins, supra, at 116-119; 1 J . Stephen, 
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 (1883).w ' 
I ..,.l.'!! The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have 
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact 
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment, 
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of 
commitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief 
detention. 
~When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected 
/ of A felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dis-
miss himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can, 
he may do either of these things. 
"1. He may carry him to the common ~~ ... but that is now __.l./l... 
rarely done. 
"2. He may deliver him to the constable of the vill, who may either -( 
carry him to the common gaol, ... orJ,_ to a justice of~ to 
be examined, and farther proceeded against as case shall require;") .... 
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to :my justice of peace 'Of the 
county where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail, 
or commit him, as the case shall require. 
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or priva~ 
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler 
M, 4J.-a\ t,~Kill expect a Mittimus for his warrant of detaining." 
~ 1 · at 589-590. 
> lo4' he examination of the prisoner was inquisitorial, and the --. • _ J 
~ -·- tr w&e.. aiA.es..t1oW'Ie.q 
• , ·~ t-l~ witnesses WAA a~:tetej_ outside the prisoner's pres- 'L 
'M~ ~-4 k~{ \Ms :ence. 'fh:e pwec"-was considered quite harsh1'aatil: s~att~t.6i¥· r~f{)l~ 
~oc ~ · c:> 
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The initial determination of probable cause also could be 
W reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus. 
'~Hawkins, supra, at 112- 115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at 
2,43; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75, 97-
~01 ( 1807). This practice furnished the model for 
criminal procedure in America immediately following the 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Boll- I '1 
7 U. S. (3 Cranch~ t4J\ (1806); E~ rfiti.Hamilton, 3 . nl ~ ~ 
~ _ rr~,an. , 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 ( 1807) ; ~ Ex parte !}urfor~ _ U 'ted. ('~ f V, 
U. 'S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and there are indications that 
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a mod~ 
for a "reasonable" s~izure . See Draper v. United States, 
358 U.S. 307, 317-320 (1959) (DouGLAS, J. , dissenting). l<l' 
c-; --~lq-
+k rr-•'so·;-~ WIOilliiQQ8Hloptish8a i_n i8~1 J. Stephen, at,\225, ~it was well estab-
wa~ e.v";nte/;( lished thail.if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of ~ 
to loe.. cU:_~ Vt. ~ /' ~iBen~Yrl,guiltJ~ed t~isGllii~ ease. Lt. at 233, 
h\~ ~ l-li'Jn Ex parte Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr~ 
ere committed following an examination in the circuit court of 
t'he District of Columbia. They filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief 
~ustice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to 
persons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following 
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause, 
the ,Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that 
_ it did not establish probable cause that they were guilty of treason. ----
\ N L~ s~oV\ J .. Toe prisoners were discharged. .. , _.--
( 
2Qe a c;~ ' d ) '\- lf<-;;n)A similar procedure at common law, the wa'rrant for recoverJl 
I 1-)a LJ.l,s-tDr-4 ._.,..f 11 ) ~f -aolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reasor:.:J 
l)t.ve. O'fV'VIeMt' 0 t II\ C. able" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was re-
Fou.d'h J!r.M.'WI.rJ.IM~v quired to appear before a. justice of the peace and make an oath 
U+o tR,_ l.AM.A'U J Sta~.S of probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular place. ~sh'·h.dioll\ IS-I b After the warraiJ.t was executed, aiJ.d the goods seized, the victim ( l'i 3 7), _,.,.. and the alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace • for a prompt determination of the cause _for seizure of the gC?_ods M 
lJ,nd detention of the thief. 2 Hale, supra, at 149-152; T. Taylor, ' 
Two Studies ,in , Constitutional nterpretation 24-25, 39-40 ( 1969) ; 
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 026-{)29 (1886). 
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B 
Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a per-
son arrested without a warrant and charged by informa-
tion may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending 
ftrlal without any opportunity for a probable cause deter-
~nation.l'f - · · · o a 
rause at-t rst a pearance before a magistrat~ or a 
the he ing to t ba"l, Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130; see 
ugh v. '{_lainwater, 4 3 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8 (CAS 1973 , 
nd the ~uspect canot demand a preliminary hearl g. __R_ 
}'la. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a). The Florida Supreme r 
Court has heJd that habeas corpus cannot be used to test 
he probable cause for detention under an information. 
Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 49 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 
~951). The arraignment may be delayed as much as a 
:Jnonth, and it is not clear that the issue of probable cause 
bay be raiaed then.18 
~ A person arrested under a warrant would have received a prior 
jtidicial determination of probable cause. Under Fla. Rule Crim. 
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that 
states facts showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The 
magistrate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there 
is reasonable ground to believe the complaint is true. 
, ~found the 4 procedures- med in filin~/ 
nfoliil..@;tions allow a delay of a month or ore between arrest andj 
rraignment. First, proce;>eing of the informo,tion does not begin 
ntil the arresting oifJ.rer appears before an assistant state attorney 
nd files an affidavit of facts. This appearance is dl'4!:ycd anywher 
rom 24 hours to two weeks after arrest. If the state attorney 
erides to file an information, the papers arc prepared flnd th~ J2__ 
nf&mation is filed and set for arr.ai~nment. The average dela~ 
'rom t l time thl' arresting officer appears and the time of arraign 
ent is 1 tp 15 days. 
The Court of Appeals assumed, for purposes of this case, that th 
defendant would have an opportunity to challenge the probabl 
cause underlying the information at his arraignment, but not.e 
that.ii. the a · umption was groundlesS', a person charged by informa 
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Petitioner defends this practice on the ground that the 
rosecutor's decision to file an information is itself a 
determination of probable cause ~that furnishes suffi-
. cient reason to detain a defendant pending trial. Al-
-~.~ though a conscientious decision that the evidence war-
:c-oS~Voo""' 
f ~--....-:r~a:-:::n:rr:"ls affords a measure of protection against unfounded 
1.' 
detention, we do not think prosecutorial judgment 
standing alone meets the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. Indeed, we think the Court's previous 
decisions compel disapproval of the Florida procedure. 
In Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 5 (1927), the 
Court held that an arrest warrant issued solely upon a 
United States Attorney's information was invalid because 
the accompanying affidavits were defective. Although 
the Court's opinion did not explicitly state that the 
prosecutor's official oath could not furnish probable cause, 
that conclusion was implicit in the judgment that the '2 
arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment.;.o More 
recently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
449-453 (1971), the Court held that a prosecutor's 
E
'on would ~ave no opportunity to challenge prob, ble cause beforfl 
ial. 483 4'. 2d, at "t{li1 n. 2. The 'Florida rule go erning arraign;-
ent e,i not suggest ~at the procedwe contemplat a challenge 
o prob le cause or an~ considerf!tio of pretria c $ody. TY'd-
erely, provides tha . the a raignm~bt sh ~ consist of re ding th~ 
ndic ent or infor,rnation to the defendant and tailing up hi~ 
-t&-ffit'11!1t:-. -i"±rr:-. Rnte Grim. Proc. 3.166. 
By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon 
Its face,), and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" con-
clusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires 
issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parte 
Unit ed States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 ( 1932). See also Giordenello v. 
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a 
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached 
magist rate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the 
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust 
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346 
(1974). 
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responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the 
constitutional role of a neutral and detached magistrate. 
We reaffirmed that principle in Shadwick v. City of 
Tarnpa, 407 U. S. 345 (1972), and held that probable 
cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant must be 
determined by someone independent of police and prose-
cu~ The reason for this separation of functions was 
expressed by Justice Frankfurter in a similar context: 
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dig-
nity of all men is central, naturally guards against 
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal 
i.n tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance 
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law 
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cher-
ished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled 
that safeguards must be provided against the dan-
gers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The 
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be 
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated 
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into 
different parts, responsibility for which is separately 
vested in the various participants upon whom the 
criminal law relies for its vindication." MeN abb v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 332,343 (1943). 
30 The Court had earlier reached a different result in Ocampo v. 
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the 
Philippine IS!an~a statutory guarantee substantially iden~ 
tical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5, 
32 Stat. 693~, the Court held that an arrest warrant could issue 
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court ha since he 
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philip-
pines is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision in 
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 
194--198 (1957). Even if it were, the result reached in Ocampo/ 
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In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable 
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty 
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is en-
titled to judicial oversight or review of a prosecutor's de-
cision to prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's 
Prior holding that a judicial hering is not prerequisite t:;, __ l --1 
lJ.&s~ V• ' to prosecution by information. Lem Woon v. Oregon, 1 W-as.L. ,.__, ... f-o,..J 1 
229 U.S. 586 (191~ . Nor do we retreat from the estab- !!::"'~~ 1 
lished rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void 3 ~'1 U. 'S' 1 
a subsequent conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 1 511~ 51/5 ' 
519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, ( 1'7h2.) • __ J 
as the Court of Appeals noted below,[a suspect who is q\t\.u, ~ 
presently detained may challenge the probable cause fo,:.__ lA-o 
that confinement, ~a conviction will not be vacated 
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending 
trial withoutJ.yrobable cause. 483 F. 2d, at 786-78 . 
Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 F. 2d 6 (CA5 1968) , 
with Brown v. Fauntleroy, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 442 
F. 2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone,- U. S. App. 
D. C. -, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969). 
----------------
III 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
held that the determination of probable cause must be 
accmppanied by the full panoply of adversary safe-
guards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and 
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary 
hearin·g of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in 
1 See also Beck v. Was ·ngton, 369 T.J· S. 54 (1962). "The 
opim in Beck cite/ Ocampo . nited Spates, 234 . S. 91 (1914), 
for the me prorJlsition, but the lidity of prosecuti by infor-
'mation wi ut preliminary hearing as not at issue in at case. L 
The only isst were whether gra jur.·es were required ·n the 
Philippines d, discussed inn. 2 , supra, ~ther t~~ prosecu or's 
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many States to determine whether the evidence justifies 
going to trial under an information or presenting the 
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 
1 (1970); wKamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern 
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974). 
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is 
usually referred to as "probable cause," buiJ:it may ap-
proach a prima facie case of guilt. A. L. I. Model Code 
of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Commentary on Article 
330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972). When the 
hearing takes this form, adversary procedures are custo-
marily employed. The importance of the issue to both 
the State ~the accused justifies the presentation of wit-
nesses and full exploration of their testimony on cross-
examination. This kind of hearing also requires appoint-
ment of counsel for indigent defendants. Coleman v. 
Alabama, .U. 8. l {1970) And, as the hearing as-
sumes increased importance and the procedures become 
more complex, the less lil~t i~ that it can be held 
promptly after arrest See A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-
I ike.l I ~ooG\ 
arra~ent Procedure, supra, at 33-3~4~·--~~-:-~~--
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the 
probable cause determination required by the Fourth 
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable 
cause for detaining the arrested person pending 
further proceeding~ m.a,r be afforded by lftW 
issue can be determined reliably without a full adversary 
hearing. The standard is the same as that for arrest.22 
22 Because the standards are identical,fthere is no need for furthef'1 
investigation before the probable cause determination can be marW 
"Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must arrest on 'prob-
able cause.' It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were, 
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters 
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing 
magistrate on 'probable cause.'" Mallory v. United States, 354 
U. S. 449, 456 (1957). 
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at standard-probable cause to believe the suspect has 
committed a crime-traditionally has been decided in 
nonadversary proceedings on hearsay and written testi-
mony, and the Court has approved these informal modes 
of proof. 
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt and' by evidence confined to that 
which long experience in the common-law tradition, 
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has 
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with 
that standard. These rules are historically grounded' 
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men 
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting 
forfeitures of life, liberty and property. 
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the 
very name implies, we deal with probabilities. 
These are not technical; they are the factual an -
practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correla-
tive to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949). 
Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). 
The use of these informal procedures is justified not 
only by the lesser consequences of a probable cause de-
termination but also by the nature of the determination 
itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflict-
ing evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a prepond-
erance standard demands, and credibility determinations 
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence su - seeu~~ : 
ports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, The De- , ro 
cision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64-109 (1969). • V 
This is not to say that }tonfrontation and cross-examina-
tion might not enhance the reliability of probable cause 
73-477-0PINION 
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> hov.lellef'> 
determinations in some caseflD~ in most cases.l\their 
value would be too slight to justify h~ding, as a matter of 
constitutional principle, that these formalities and safe-
guards designed for trial must also be employed in mak-
ing the Fourth Amendment determination of probable 
cause:f' ptt{-system orcriminal justice ·s already over-
----n-nr- denJ.d) and it i 1 subject to valid criMc.tsm when over- ....{_ 
emph,sis on pr edural and evidentiary f~malities rer 
l< s'oa \) 
sults in delayed ju · ce, repetitive trials, and rdensom 
expense for both the ate and the accused. 
Because of its limited function and its nonadversary 
character, the probable cause determination is not a 
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require -n. rt t 1 
.~ lVI~ LO~~ ~as appointed counsel. We~identified as "critical 
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair de-
fense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed 
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 
23ln Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) , and Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee or proba-
tioner arrested prior to revocation is entitled to an informal pre-
liminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live 
testimony. 408 U.S., at 487; 411 U.S., at 786 . That preliminary 
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by 
t.he Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and pre-
serving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently 
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred. 181-'783 
408 U. S., at 485; 411 U.S., at~ n. 5. Moreover, revocation 
proceedings may offer less proterti~n from initial error than the 
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute 
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect 
with crime unless he is satisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code DR 
o Professional Responsibility, .f)~ 7-103 (A) ~rosecutor ~ 
a. profuisional esponsibili-ty-"not ~institute or cause to be insti- - 0\ 
tuted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the 
charges are not supported by probable cause"); ABA Standards ~ / 
Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution 
FunctiP&, §§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); American College of Trial Lawyers, 
C<i'deOT'Trial Conduct, rule 4 (c~ {\q72). 
Criminal justice is already overburdened by the 
volume of cases and the complexities of our system. The 
processing of misdemeanors and the early stages 
prosecution generally are marked by delays that 
of 
can 
seriously affect the quality of justice. A constitutional 
doctrine requiring full adversary hearings for all persons 
detained pending trial could exacerbate the problem of 
73-477-0PINION 
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· (1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226)0.967). 
In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held that a pre-
liminary hearing was a critical stage of an Alabama prose-
cution, the majority and concurring opinions identified 
two critical factors that distinguish the Alabama prelim-
inary hearing from the probable cause determination re-
'q_uired b.Y the 'Fourth Amendment. First, under Alabama 
law the function of th~hearing was to determine whether 
.the evidence justified charging the suspect with an of-
fense. A finding of no probable cause could mean that 
he would not be tried at all. 1'he Fourth Amendment 
probable cause determination is addressed only to pre-
trial custody. To be sure, pretrial custody may affect to 
some extent the defendant's ability to assist in prepara-
tion of his defense, but this is not the kind of substantial · 
harm identified as controlling in Wade and Coleman. 
Second, Alabama allowed the suspect to confront and 
cross-examine prosecution witnesses at the preliminary 
· hearing. The Court noted that the suspect's defense on 
the merits could be compromised if he had no legal as-
sistance for exploring or preserving the witnesses' testi-
mony. This consideration does not apply to the informal, 
nonadversary procedure required under the Fourth 
mendment. 
The reasons that make a nonadversary proceeding ap-
propriate, however, do not justify denying the suspect an 
opportunity to be present and participate in the deter-
mination.a-4 Our system of justice operates on the premise 
Jt4 The procedures suggested in the Uniform Rules of Criminal 
.Procedure (Proposed Final Draft 1974) and the A. L. I. Model Code 
of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972, and Tent. 
Draft No. 5A, 1973) are instructive. Under the Uniform Rules, a 
person arrested without a warrant is entitled, "without unnecessary 
delay," to a first appearance before a magistrate and a determination 
that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest warrant. The determi-
nation may be made on affidavits or testimony, in the presence of 
_- 227 
\ 
(Q1'or.ri :. ~e_s:;~e..) 
Lto4 [).S. 1-f'fto) 
501. ( ,q 7'l).) 
---
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that the subject of a judicial proceeding is entitled to 
participate unless there is good reason to exclude him. 
seqRees v. City of Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 1rl'r--. 
122-123 (1873). 4'he Fourth Amendment is not incon-~ 
~th that concept. The procedures normally fol-
lowed in applying for warrants are ex parte proceedings 
by necessity, as notifying the suspect would often frus-___.. 
trate the purpose of the warrant. See T. Taylor, Two 
Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 81-82 ( 1969). 
But when the suspect is already in custody, and the only 
issue is probable cause for detention, he should be allowed 
to participate in the determination. Allowing him to ap-
pear before the magistrate and giving him an opportunity 
the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remnin in custody for inability 
to qualify for pretrial release are offered another opportunity for a 
probable cause determination at the detention hearing, held no more 
than 5 days after arrest. This is an adversary hearing, and the 
ties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsayJffiay be con-
ered. Rule 344. 
he Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure also provides a 
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported 
by a r&'lsonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. The 
magistrate may make a determination of probable cause to hold the 
accused, but he is not required to do so and the accused may request 
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be 
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes 
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written 
and live testimony: 
"The arrested person may presmt written and testimonial evidence 
and arguments for his discharge and the state may pre ent addi-
tional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of 
which he_ is accused. The state's submission may be made by mean~ 
of affidavits, and no witnesEes shall be required to appear unless the 
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the 
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appear-
ance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks 
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause." 
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973). 
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issue is probable cause for detention, he should be allowed 
to participate in the determination. Allowing him to ap-
pear before the magistrate and giving him an opportunity 
the accused. Rule 311. Persons who rem1.1in in custody for inability 
to qualify for pretrial release are offered another opportunity for a 
probable cause determination at the detention hearing, held no more 
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an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be 
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes 
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written 
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"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence 
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present addi-
tional written and testimonial evidC:'nce and arguments that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of 
which he is accused. The state's submission may be made by mean~ 
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the 
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submit ted by the 
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appear-
ance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks 
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause." 
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to speak or to submit written evidence for consideration 
along with the State's presentation could enhance both 
the reliability and the fairness of the proceeding. "'tt~t..:R<,....._ 
b1:1:FdeH en tl:l.Q State v;ould - be-ffii.tt.imah.,. Virtually all 
jurisdictions require that arrested persons be presen e. 
to a judicial officer within a short time after arrest, see 
A. L. I., Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure 230-
231 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966), and every jurisdiction 
makes some provision for setting bail or determining other 
conditions of pretrial release. See L. Katz, Justice Is 
the Crime, Appendix B, at 247-365 (1972). Since the 
defendant is already in the courtroom, the issue of prob-
- TI-le sv~r~cis 
r res<amce. CV\1\d.. 





ik ("" t G\"te.., 
able cause may be decided at that time with little or no 
inconvenience to the State. 1n fact, the suspect's first 
appearance before a magistrate traditionally has been _/ 
considered the proper time for determining whether there./" M 
'is probable cause for detention. 1[ Hale, Pleas of the. ' 
CroW'ilJ.589-590 (1736); 2 id., at 77-95; 2kffawkins, Pleas W, 
of the grown 116-1~(4th ed. 1762); see McNabb v . 
United States, 318 U. S. 332, 342-344 (1943); Amster-
dam, Perspectiv~on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. 1 .. 
Rev. 349, 391 & n. 408 (1974). Although the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly acknowl-
edge this function of the first appearance, ~Court ha · i~~ 
interpreted them to require a determination of probabl 
cause at that stage. Jaben v. United States, 381 U. S. 
T214}.(1965); Mallory v. Tlnited States, 354 U. S. 449, 454 
(1957).ad' 
-'fin an · amicus brief filed on behalf of the United States, the 
Solicitor General suggested that McNabb f\J!.allory had mistaken 
the purpose of the first appearance, and that actual practice is other-
wise. Cf. Note, Probable Cause at the Initial Appearance in War-
rantless Arrests, 45 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1128 (1972),( McNabb, of course, 
was decided before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
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There is no single proper method for making the prob-
able cause determination required by the Fourth Amend~ 
inent. The States have many different patterns of crimi-
nal procedure, and each may adapt its own to provide a 
~wift and reliable probable cause determination with the 
least burden to its system. Like many jurisdictions~ 
Florida requires every arrested person to be brought 
before a magistrate within 24 hours, unless sooner 
released. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.310 (b). At that 
~ppearance the defendant is told of the charges against 
him, furnished a copy of the complaint, advised of his 
constitutional rights, and provided counsel if he is indi-
gent. The magistrate then sets bail or prescribes other 
conditions of pretrial release. One of the factors typi-
cally relied upon in making this decision is the weight of 
evidence against the accused. ABA Standards Relating 
to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Pretrial 
lease § 5JA (1974); see 18 U. S. C. § 3146 (b). Ex-
nding that determination to.(a test of probable cause · e.M.c..o-~ass 
uld be a natural way of integrating the probable cause 
ision with existing procedures. 
-with. cw..~ ~or-
-adj ~.otst~e.;tA..ts . 
In other States, existing procedures may satisfy the 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment{' Some States 
already authorize a ~&Ping o probable cause at or 
immediately following the suspect's first appearance. 
person be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary dela~y~.--------
318 U. S., at 342. Mallory was decided after the federal ruies were 
adopted, and although the interpretation of the federal rules was 
dictum, it clearly outlined the Court's view: 
"The scheme for initiating a federal prosecution is plainly defined. 
The police may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only on 'probable 
cause.' The next step in the proceeding is to arraign the arrested 
person before a judicial officer as quickly as possible so that he may 
be advised of his rights and so that the issue of probable cause may 
be promptly determined." 354 U. S., at 454. 
The use of the word "arraign" was ~error, as arraignment occ~rs 
later in the process. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 10. 
, n 
f/"eM Y'. 
o~r o ~tu..."'\tlj 
73-4 77 -OPINION 
GERSTEIN v. PUGH 
E. g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-2- ; Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708- 't (5) ( l'tiDil); Vt · ~~~c: 
Others may choose simply to accelerate their exist- <:!.riM."Proc. 3 (b) J 
ing preliminary hearings. What the Fourth Amendment 
2
,., S(e) { 1q'7~ ) . 
requires for pretrial restraint on liberty ~ is a reliable 
determination of probable cause made either before or 
promptly after arrest, and preferably no later than the 
first appearance before a judicial ()fficer. If made after _ a~ +v \:le.. l-teMd, 
arrest, the suspect must ~to be present;-Each 
tate may choose the procedure that best accommodates 
this determination to its existing practice~ 
IV 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth 
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of 
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we 
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we 
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the 
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree, 
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion . 
.,. :.116 Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional 
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those 
suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition 
tl1at they appear for trial. There are many kinds of pretrial release 
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146; 
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, 
f )I.. Pretrial Reji'ase § 5.2 (1974); Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
,/ Rule 3 1 (Proposed Final Draft 1974). We cannot define spe-
.,. cifically those that would require a prior probable cause determina-
tion, but the key factor is significant restraint on liberty. 
w1 Of course, if the State incorporates lhe probable cause determi- --nation into a multipurpose hearing, the necessity for appointed coun-
~~\t~d i l-~t~~ r sel at the combined proceeding must be governed by the principles ,__ __ o';I\Coleman v. Alabama, supra. v. w~cte. CW\.cJ... 
'--= 
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Court of Appeals for 
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[December -, 1974] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opmwn of the 
Court. 
The issue in this case is whether a person arrested 
under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally en-
titled to a judicial determination of probable cause for 
pretrial restraint of liberty. 
I 
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were 
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged 
with several offenses under a prosecutor's information.1 
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against 
him carried a potential life sentence, and Henderson re-
mained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500 
bond. 
1 Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971. On March 16 
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a con-
cealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a 
felony . Respondent Henden;on was arrested on March 2, and charged 
by information on -March 19 with the offenses of breaking and 
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate 
whether there was an arrest warrant in either ca~:<e . 
.. 
73-477-0PINION 
GERSTEIN v. PUGH 
In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu~ 
tion of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all other 
crimes by information, without a prior preliminary hear.~ 
ing and without obtaining leave of court. F la. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 3.140 (a); State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109 
(Fla. 1968); Di Bona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1960). At the time respondents were arrested, a 
Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary 
hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases. 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the 
Florida courts had held that the filing of an information 
foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing,. 
See State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 
1972).~ They had also held that habeas corpus could not 
be used, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances, to 
test the probable cause for detention under an informa~ 
tion. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 29 So. 2d 
794, 797 (Fla. 1951). The only possible methods for ob-
taining a judicial determination of probable cause were a 
special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30 
days, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 ( 1973) ," and arraignment, 
which the District Court found was often delayed a month 
or more after arrest. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 
1107, 1110 (SD Fla. 1971).4 As a result, a person charged 
2 Florida law also, denies preliminary hearings to persons confined 
under indictment, ~ee Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970), 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a), but that procedure is not challenged 
in this case. 
"This statute may have been eonstrued to make the hearing per-
missive instead of mandatory. See Evans v. State , 197 So. 2d 323 
(Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 067-29 (1967). But cf. 
Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla . Ct. App. 1971). It may also 
have been superseded by the subsequent amendments t o the rule~ of 
criminal procedure. In -re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
272 So. 2d 65 (1972) . 
4 The .Florida rules do not suggest that the issue of probable 
cause can be raised at arraignment., .Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.160, but 
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by information could be detained for a substantial period 
solely on the decision of a prosecutor. 
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action 
against Dade County officials in the Federal District 
Court," claiming a constitutional right to a judiuial hear-
ing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declara-
tory and injunctive relief.G Respondents Turner and 
Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently 
intervened. 7 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for 
Dade County, was one of several defendants.8 
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature con-
sidered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hear-
ings to persons charged by information, the District Court 
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, supra. 
The Court certified the case as a class action under Fed. 
counsel for Petitioner represented at oral argument that arraign-
ment aft'ords the suspect an opportunity to "attack the sufficiency of 
the evidence to hold tim." Tr. of Oral Arg., Mar. 25, 1974, at 17. 
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that this was true. 
483 F. 2d 778, 781 n . 8. 
~The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and juris-
diction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). 
6 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as 
an alternate remedy. They asked only that the state authorities be 
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was 
also the only relief that the District Court ordered for the named 
respEmdents. 332 F. Supp., at 1115-1116. Because release was 
neither asked nor ordered, the lawsmt d1d not come within the class 
of cases for which habea~ corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 417 U. S. 
-,- (1974) . 
7 Turner was being ht.>ld on a charge of auto theft, following arrest 
on March 11, 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges 
of solicitmg n ride and posHe~mon of marihuana. 
8 The named defendant::; included justict>s of the peace and judges 
of small-claims court1:>, who were authorized to hold preliminary 
hearmgs m crimmal ca::;es, and a group of law enforcement officers 
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only 
QUI' who pPtJtionl:'d for <'('rtiorari. 
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Rule Civ. Proc. 23 ( b )(2), and held that the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged 
by information a right to a judicial hearing on the ques-
tion of probable cause. The District Court ordered the 
Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an 
immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable 
cause for further detention.0 It also ordered them to 
submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases 
instituted by information. 
The defendants submitted a plan authored by Sheriff 
E. Wilson Purdy, and the District Court adopted it with 
modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed post-
arrest procedure. 336 F. Supp. 490. Upon arrest the 
accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first 
appearance hearing." The magistrate would explain the 
charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel 
if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause 
determination unless either the prosecutor or the accused 
was unprepared. If either requested more time, the 
magistrate would set the date for a "preliminary hearing," 
to be held within four days if the accused was in custody 
and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial. 
The order provided sanctions for failure to hold the hear-
ings at prescribed times. At the "preliminary hearing" 
the accused would be entitled to counsel, and he would be 
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, 
u The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for 
relief was not barred by tlw rquitahle ret;trictions on federal inter-
vention in ;;:tate prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) . 
The injunction was not direrted at the state prosecutions as such, 
but only at the lrgality of pretrial dctrntion without a judicial hear .. 
mg, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal 
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not 
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. Monte-
muro, 477 F. 2d 1073, 1082 (CA3 1973); cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 
U. S. 82 (1971); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (1951). 
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to summon favorable witnesses, and to have a transcript 
made on request. If the magistrate found no probable 
cause, the accused would be discharged. He then could 
not be charged with the same offense by complaint or in-
formation, but only by indictment returned within 30 
days. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the 
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case 
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary volun-
tarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon 
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals re-
manded the case for specific findings on the constitu-
tionality of the new Dade County system. Before the 
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida 
Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing 
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed 
that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the 
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures. 
Under the amended rules every arrested person must 
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130 (b). This "first appearance" is 
similar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the 
District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the mag-
istrate does not make a determination of probable cause. 
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for 
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges 
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to 
persons charged by mformation or indictment. Rule 
3.131; see In re Rule 3.181 (b), Florida Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, 289 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974). 
fn a supplemental opinion the District Court held 
that the amended rules had not answered the basic con-
stitutional objection, since a defendant charged by in-
formation still could be detained pending trial without 
a judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp. 
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1286. Reaffirming its original ruling, the District Court 
declared that the continuation of this practice was uncon-
stitutionaP() The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d 
778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor par-
ticulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hear-
ing provided by the amended Florida rules would be ac-
ceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in 
custody pending trial. 1 d., at 788-789.11 
10 Although this ruling hE-ld a statewidE' "legislative rule" unconsti-
tutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by vir-
tue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for 
an injunction against enforcement of any state statute or legislative 
rule of statewide application, since the practice of denying prelim-
inary hearings to persons charged by information was then em-
bodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had 
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appeals 
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the constitutionality 
(!)f a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when 
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental 
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the 
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never 
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court 
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District 
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. See 483 F. 
2d, at 788-790. Accordingly, a district court of three judges wa~ not 
req•.1ired for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 
U.S. 603,606- 608 (1960) . 
11 The major difference betweE-n Hw District Court's order and 
that of the Court of Appeals centered on the question whether a 
probable cause hearing is required for all arrested persons charged 
by information or only for those confined pending trial. The District 
Court's original decree required preliminary hearings for all arrested 
persons. 336 F. Supp., at 491. On rE-mand, the District Court made 
an exception for persons charged with misdemeanors who neither 
suffered pretrial detention nor faced imprisonment upon conviction. 
355 F . Supp., at 1290. ThE' Court of Appeals explicitly limited the 
hearing right for misdemeanor defendants to those who are jailed 
pending trial. 483 F . 2d, at 789, Its OJ)inion also suggests, without, 
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State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review, and we 
granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue.12 
414 U. S. 1062. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
stating explicitly, that the hearing right is similarly limited to felony 
defendants who are confined pending trial. !d., at 787, 789. 
The Court of Appeal~ vacated those parts of the District Court's 
order that prescribed time periods different from those in the 
amended rules and imposed sanctions for failure to comply with the 
hearing requirements. Our disposition of the case makes it un-
necessary to address the specific terms of the District Court's decree. 
12 At oral argument counsel informed us that the named respond-
ents have been convicted. Their pretrial detention therefore has 
ended. This case belongs, however, to that narrow class of cases in 
which the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot 
the claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa, 
~ U. S.- (1975). Pretrial detentions is by nature temporary, 
and it is most unlikely that any given individual could have his 
constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or 
convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated depriva-
tions, and it is certain that other persons similarly situated will be 
detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, 
ih short, is one that iS distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review." 
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were 
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable 
oause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any 
of them were still in custody awaiting trial when the District Court 
cenified the class. Such a showing ordinarily would be required to 
avord mootness under Sosna. But this case is a suitable exception 
to that requirement. See Sosna, supra, at -- n. 11; cf. Rivera v. 
Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159, 1162-1163 (CA9 1972). The length of pre-
irial custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended 
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or 
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is 
by no means certain · that any given individual, named as plaintiff, 
would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to 
certify the class. Moreover, in this ca~f' the constant existence of 
a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney 
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we can 
·safely assume that he has other clients with a continuing live interest 
in the casr. 
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II 
As framed by the proceedings below, this case presents 
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial 
on an information is entitled to a judicial determination 
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the 
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and 
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the 
Constitution. 
A 
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and 
detention have been derived from the · Fourth Amend-
ment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v. 
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Ex parte 
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Bur-
ford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 448 ( 1806). The standard for 
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and 
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was com-
mitting an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91 
(1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S.160, 175-176 
(1949). This standard, like those for searches and seiz-
ures, represents a necessary accommodation between the 
individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to con-
trol crime. 
"These long-prevailing standards seek to safe-
guard citizens from rash and unreasonable inter-
ferences with privacy and from unfounded charges 
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for 
enforcing the law in the community's protection. 
Because many situations which confront officers in 
the course of executing their duties are more or less 
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes 
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of 
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to· 
r 
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' 
their conclusions of probability. The rule of prob-
able cause is a practical, nontechnical conception 
affording the best compromise that has been found 
for accommodating these often opposing interests. 
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforce-
ment. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding 
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." 
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176. 
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection 
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the 
Court has required that the existence of probable cause 
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate when-
ever possible. The classic statement of this principle 
appears in Johnsan v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14 
(1948): 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often 
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies 
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its pro-
tection consists in requiring that those inferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead 
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-22 (1968).13 
Maximum protection of individual rights could be 
assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual 
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement 
n We reitPrated this princ1ple in United States v. United State~ 
District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972). In terms that apply equally 
to arrests, we described the "very heart of the Fourth Amendment 
directive" as a reqmremr>nt that "where practical, a governmental 
search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer 
to gather evidence of wrongfnl act~ and the judgment of the mag-
istrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a 
Citizen's private premise<> or convrrslltion." Id., at 316. See also. 
Terry v. Ohio, :392 U. S 1, 20...-22 ( 1968) . 
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would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate 
law enforcement. Thus, while the Court has expressed a 
preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible, 
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-482 (1963), it has never invali-
dated an arrest supported by probable cause solely be-
cause the officers failed to seeure a warrant. See Ker v. 
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United. States, 
358 U.S. 307 (1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 
699, 705 (1948).14 
Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the-
scene assessment of probable cause provides legal j ustifi-
cation for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for 
a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps 
jncident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, how-
ever, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magis-
trate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is 
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further 
crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magis-
trate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary 
action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determina-
tion of probable cause increases significantly. The con-
sequences of prolonged detention may be more serious 
than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial con-
finement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his 
source of income, and impair his family relationships. 
SeeR. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91 (1965); L. Katz, Justice 
14 Another aspect of Trupiano was overruled in United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), which was overruled in turn by 
Chimel v. Califm·nia, 395 U. S. 752 (1969) . 
The issue of 'warrantless arrest that has generated the most con-
troversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what 
circumstances an officer may enter a suspect's home to make a war-. 
rantless arrest . See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,474-
481 (1971); id., at 510-512 n. 1 (WHml, J ., diHsenting) ; Jones v. 
l!mted .States, 357 U. S. 49:~ , 499- 500 (1958). 
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Is the Crime 51-62 ( 1972). Even pretrial release may be 
accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a sig-
nificant restraint on liberty. See, e. g., 18 U.S. C. § 3146 
(a) ( 2), ( 5). When the stakes are this high, the detached 
judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth 
Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from un-
founded interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold 
that the l<..,ourth Amendment requires a judicial deter-
mination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended 
restraint on liberty following arrest. 
This result has historical support in the common law 
that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 
(1925). At common law it was customary, if not obliga-
tory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice 
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2M. Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the 
Crown 116-117 (4th ed. 1792). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 
115 U.S. 487, 498-499 (1885).15 The justice of the peace 
15 The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have 
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact 
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment, 
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of 
commitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief 
detention. 
"When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected 
of felony, he may detain him in cu;:;tody till he can rea~onably dis-
miss himself of him ; but with as much speed as conveniently he can, 
he may do either of these things. 
"1. -He may carry lnm to the common gaol, . . . but that is now 
rarely done. 
"2. He may deliver him to the constable of the vill, who may either 
carry him to the common gaol, .. . or to a justice of peace to 
be examined, and farthrr procet>d agamst as case shall require . .. . 
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to any justice of peace of the 
county where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail, 
or commit h1rn, as the case shall require. 
'r.And the bringi'ng the offender eithrr by the constable or private 
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would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to deter~ 
mine whether there was reason to believe the prisone1• 
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would 
be committed to Jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he 
would be discharged from custody. 1 M. Hale, supra, at 
583-586; 2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 116-119; 1 J . Stephen, 
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 ( 1883) .16 
The initil;tl determination of probable cause also could be 
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus. 
2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at 
243; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75, 97-
101 ( 1807). This practice furnished the model for 
criminal procedure in America immediately following the 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Boll-
man, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 ( 1807); 17 Ex parte Burford, 
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795). and there are indications that 
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model 
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler 
will expect n, Mittimus for his warrant of detaining." 
1M. Hale, supra, at 58!}-590. 
16 The exammation of the prisoner was inquisitorial, and the 
witnesHes were questioned outside the prisoner's presence. Although 
this method of proceeding was considered quite harsh, 1 J. Stephen, 
at 21!}-225, it waH well e~tabli~hed that the pnsoner was mt itled to be 
d1scharged if tlw investigat10n turned up insufficient evidence of his 
gmlt !d., at 288. 
17 In Ex parte Bollman , two men charged m the Aaron Burr case 
were cmrumtted following an examination in the circuit court of 
the District of Columbut. They filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corp\lS in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief 
.JustiCe Marshall, affirmed 1ts jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to 
persons in custody by order of federal tnal courts. Then, following 
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause, 
the Court surveyed the cv1dence against the prisoners and held that 
it chd not establi::h probable cause that they were guilty of treason_ 
The pmoners were discharged 
.. 
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for a "reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States, 
358 U. 8. 307, 317-320 (1959) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting).18 
B 
Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a per-
son arrested without a warrant and charged by informa-
tion may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending 
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause 
determination.19 Petitioner defends this practice on the 
ground that the prosecutor's decision to file an informa-. 
tion is itself a determination of probable cause that fur-
nishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending 
trial. Although a conscientious decision that the evi-
dence warrants prosecution affords a measure of protec-
tion against unfounded detention, we do not think 
prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, we think the 
Court's previous decisions compel disapproval of the 
Florida procedure. In Albrecht v. United States, 273' 
18 See also N. Lasson, The History and Development of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 15-16 (1937). 
A :;imilar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery of 
stolen goods, 1s said to have furnished the model for a "reason-
able" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was re-
quired to appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath 
of probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular place. 
After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim 
and i.he alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace· 
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods 
and deteution of the thief. 2 M. Hale, supra, at 149-152; T. Taylor, 
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969); 
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626-629 (1886). 
111 A per~on arrested under a warrant would have received a prior 
judicial detf'fmination of probable cause. Under Fla. Rule Crim. 
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that 
states facti:! ~howing that the suspect has committed a crime. The· 
magistrate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there-
m reasonable· ground to l~lieve the complaint is true . 
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U. S. 1, 5 (1927), the Court held that an arrest warrant 
issued solely upon a United States Attorney's information 
was invalid because the accompanying affidavits were de-
fective. Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly 
state that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish 
probable cause, that conclusion was implicit in the judg-
ment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amend-
ment.20 More recently, in Caolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U. S. 443, 449'--453 ( 1971), the Court held that a 
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is incon-
sistent with the constitutional role of a neutral and de-
tached magistrate. We reaffirmed that principle in Shad-
'Wick v. City of Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 ( 1972), and held 
that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant 
must be determined by someone independent of police 
and prosecution. See also United States v. United States 
District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 317 (1972). 2 ' The reason 
20 By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon 
its face," and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" con-
clusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires 
issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parte 
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v. 
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a 
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached 
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury'~ relationship to the 
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust 
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346 
(1974) . ' 
~ 1 The Court had earlier reached a different result in Ocampo v. 
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the 
Philippinr Islands. Interpreting a statutory guarantee substantially 
identical to the Fourth Amendment , Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5, 
:32 Stat . 693 , the Court held that an an·est warrant could issue 
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court has since held 
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philip--
pmes is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision in 
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184,. 
194-198 (1957) . Even if it were, the result reached in OcampO' 
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for this separation of functions was expressed by Justice 
Frankfurter in a similar context: 
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dig-
nity of all men is central, naturally guards against 
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal 
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance 
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law 
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cher-
ished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled 
that safeguards must be provided against the dan-
gers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The 
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be 
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated 
process of criminal justice is therefore divided i~1to 
different parts, responsibility for which is separately 
vested in the various participants upon whom the 
criminal law relies for its vindication." MeN abb v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943). 
In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable 
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty 
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is en-
titled to judicial oversight or review of a prosecutor's de-
cision to prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's 
prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite 
to prosecution by information. Beck v. Washington, 369 
U. S. 541, 545 (1962). Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 
586 (1913). Nor do we retreat from the established rule 
that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent 
conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952); 
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, as the Court 
of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is 
presently detained may challenge the probable cause fo:r 
is incompatible with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, an<t. 
Shadwick, 
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that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated 
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending 
trial without a determination of probable cause. 483 
F. 2d, at 786-787. Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 
:F. 2d 6 (CAS 1968), w1th Brown v. Fauntleroy,- U.S. 
App. D. C.-, 442 F. 2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone, 
- U. S. App. D. C. - ·, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969). 
III 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
held that the determination of probable cause must be 
accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safe-
guards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and 
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary 
hearing of this sort is modeled .after the procedure used in 
many States to determine whether the evidence justifies 
going to trial under an information or presenting the 
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 
1 (1970); Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern 
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996--1000 (4th ed. 1974). 
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is 
usually referred to as "probable cause," but in some juris-
dictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt. 
A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Com-
mentary on Article 330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 
1972). When the hearing takes this form, adversary pro-
cedures are customarily employed. The importance of 
the issue to both the State and the accused justifies the 
presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their 
testimony on cross-examination. This kind of hearing 
also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defend-
ants. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. And, as the hearing 
assumes increased importance and the procedures become 
more complex, the likelihood that it can be held promptly 
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after arrest diminishes. See A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-
arraignment Procedure, supra, at 33-34. 
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the 
probable cause determination required by the Fourth 
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable 
cause for detaining the arrested person pending further 
proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably with-
out a full adversary hearing. The standard is the same 
as that for arrest. 22 That standard-probable cause to 
believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditionally 
has been decided in nonadversary proceedings on hearsay 
and written testimony, and the Court has approved these 
informal modes of proof. 
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that 
which long experience in the common-law tradition, 
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has 
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with 
that standard. These rules are historically grounded 
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men 
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting 
forfeitures of life, liberty and property. 
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the 
very name implies, we deal with probabilities. 
These are not technical; they are the factual and 
22 Because the st<mdards are identical, ordinanly there is no need 
for further mvestigation before the probable cause determination can 
be made. 
"Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must arrest on 'prob. 
able catise.' It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were, 
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters 
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing 
magistrate on 'probable cause'" Mallory v. United States, 354 
u.s. 449, 456 (1957), 
is 
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practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correla-
tive to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949). 
Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). 
The use of these informal procedures is justified not 
only by the lesser consequences of a probable ca.use de-
termination but also by the nature of the determination 
itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflict-
ing evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a prepond-
erance standard demands, and credibility determinations 
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence sup-
ports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, Prosecu-
tion: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64-
109 (1969).2 :J This is not to say that confrontation and 
cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of 
2H In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee or proba-
tioner arrested prior to revocation is entitled to an informal pre-
liminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live 
testimony. 408 U. S., at 487; 411 U. S., at 786. That preliminary 
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by 
the Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and pre-
serving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently 
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred. 
408 U.S., at 485; 411 U.S., at 782-783 n. 5. Moreover, revocation 
proceedingtl may offer less protection from initial error than the 
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute 
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect 
with crime unless he is oatisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code 
of Profe::;~wnal ResponsibilitY, DR 7-103 (A) (a prosecutor "shall 
not m;;titnte or cause to b<:> m::;tituted criminal charges when he knows 
or It is obvwus that the charges are not supported by probable 
cause"); ABA Standards Relating to the AdministratiOn of Crim-
inal .Jm;tice, The Proseeutwn Function,§§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); Amer-
ican Col!Pge of Trial Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4 (c) 
(1072). 
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probable cause determinations in some cases. In most 
cases, however, their value would be too slight to justify 
holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these 
formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be 
employed in making the Fourth Amendment determina-
tion of probable cause. 24 
Because of its limited function and its nonadversary 
character, the probable cause determination is not a 
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require 
appointed counsel. The Court has identified as "critical 
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair de-
fense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed 
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 
(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 226-227 
(1967). In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held 
that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of an Ala-
bama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions 
identified two critical factors that distinguish the Ala-
bama preliminary hearing from the probable cause deter-
mination required by the Fourth Amendment. First 
under Alabama law the function of the preliminary hear-
ing was to determine whether the evidence justified charg-
ing the suspect with an offense. A finding of no probable 
cause could mean that he would not be tried at all. The 
Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is ad-
dressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure, pretrial 
custody may affect to some extent the defendant's ability 
to assist in preparation of his defense, but this is not the 
kind of substantial harm identified as con trolling in Wade 
and Coleman. Second, Alabama allowed the suspect to 
24 Criminal justice is already overburdened by the volume of ca:;es 
and the complexities of our system. The processing of misdemeanors 
and the early :;tages of prosecution generally are marked by delays 
·that can seriously affect the quality of justice. A constitutional doc-
trine requirmg full adversary hearings for all persons detained 
pending trial could exacerbate the problem of pretnal delay. 
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confront and cross-examine prosecution witnesses at the 
preliminary hearing. The Court noted that the suspect's 
defense on the merits could be compromised if he had no 
legal assistance for exploring or preserving the witnesses' 
testimony. This consideration does not apply to the in-
formal, nonadversary procedure required under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
The reasons that make a nonadversary proceeding ap~, 
propriate, however, do not justify denying the suspect an 
opportunity to be present and participate in the deter- . 
mination. 25 Our system of justice operates on the premise 
25 The procedures suggested in the Uniform Rules of Crimina'! 
Procedure (Proposed Final Draft 1974) and the A. L. L Model Code 
of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972, and Tent. 
Draft No. 5A, 1973) are instructive. Under the Uniform Rules, a 
person arrested without a warrant is entitled, "without unnecessary 
delay," to a first appearance before a magistrate and a determination 
that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest warrant. The determi-
nation may be made on affidavits or testimony, in the presence of 
the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remain in custody for inability 
to qualify for pretrial release are offered another opportunity for a 
probable cause determination at the detention hearing, held no mote 
than 5 days after arrest. This is an adversary hearing, and the· 
parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay evidence may be 
considered. Rule 344. 
The Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure also provides a 
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported' 
by a reasonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. The 
magistrate may make a determination of probable cause to hold the 
accused, but he is not required to do so and the accused may request 
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be 
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes 
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written 
and live testimony : 
"The arrr~sted person may present written and testimonial evidence· 
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present addi-
tional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of 
which he is a.ccuscct The. state's submission may be made by mean& 
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that the subject of a judicial proceeding is entitled to 
participate unless there is good reason to exclude him. 
See Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U. S. 496, 502 (1972); Rees v. 
City of Watertown, 86 U. S. (19 Wall.) 107, 122-123 
( 1873). The procedures normally followed in apply-
ing for warrants are ex parte proceedings by 
necessity, as notifying the suspect would often frus-
trate the purpose of the warrant. See T. Taylor, Two 
Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 81-82 (1969). 
But when the suspect is already in custody, and the only 
issue is probable cause for detention, he should be allowed 
to participate in the determination. Allowing him to ap-
pear before the magistrate and giving him an opportunity 
to speak or to submit written evidence for consideration 
along with the State's presentation could enhance both 
the reliability 'and the fairness of the proceeding. 
The suspect's presence and participation would im-
pose no significant burden on the State. Virtually all 
jurisdictions require that arrested persons be presented 
to a judicial officer within a short time after arrest, see 
A. L. I., Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure 230-
231 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966), and every jurisdiction 
makes some provision for setting bail or determining other 
conditions of pretrial release. See L. Katz, Justice Is 
the Crime, Appendix B, at 247-365 (1972). Since the 
defendant is already in the courtroom, the issue of prob-
able cause may be decided at that time with little or no 
inconvenience to the State. In fact. the suspect's first 
appearance before a magistrate traditionally has been 
considered the proper time for determining whether there 
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the 
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the 
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appear-
ance of one or more w1tnesses for whom the arrested person seeks 
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cam;e.'• 
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973) . 
73-477-0PINJON 
22 GERSTEIN v. PUGH 
is probable cause for detention. 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 585-586. 589 590 ( 1736); 2 id., at 77-95; 2 W. 
Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 116-119 (4th ed. 1762) ; see 
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 342-344 (1943); 
Amsterdam. Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 
Minn. L. Rev. 349, 391 & u. 408 (1974). Although the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly 
acknowledge this function of the first appearance, the 
Court has interpreted them to require a determination of 
probable cause at that stage. Jaben v. United States, 381 
U.S. 214, 218 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 
449, 454 ( 1957) ,26 
There is no single proper method for making the prob-
able cause determination required by the Fourth Amend-
ment. The States have many different patterns of crimi-
nal procedure, and each may adapt its own to provide a 
swift and reliable probable cause determination with the 
least burden to its system. Like many jurisdictions, 
26 In an amicus brief filed on behalf of the United States, the 
Solicitor General suggested that McNabb and Mallory had mistaken 
the purpose of the first appearance, and that actual practice is other-
wise. Cf. Note, Probable Cause at the Initial Appearance in War-
ranties:; Arrests, 45 So. Cal. L. Rev.ll28 (1972). McNabb , of course, 
was decided before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. It interpreted a statutory requirement that an arrested 
person be brought before a mag1strate without unnecessary delay. 
818 U. S., at 342. Mallory wa:; decided after the federal rules were 
adopted, and although the interpretation of the federal rules was 
dictum, 1t clearly outlined the Court's view: 
"The scheme for initiating a federal prosecution is plainly defined. 
The police may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only on 'probable 
cnuse.' The next step in the proceeding is to arraign the arrested' 
person before a judicial officer as quickly as possible so that he may 
be advised of his rights and so that the issue of probable cause may 
be promptly determined." 354 U. S., at 454. 
The u~e of the word "arnugn" was an error, as arraignment occur:5. 
later in the process. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 10. 
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Florida requires every arrested person to be brought 
before a magistrate within 24 hours, unless sooner 
released. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.310 (b). At that 
appearance the defendant is told of the charges against 
him, furnished a copy of the complaint, advised of his 
constitutional rights, and provided counsel if he is indi-
gent. The magistrate then sets bail or prescribes other 
conditions of pretrial release. One of the factors typi-
cally relied upon in making this decision is the weight of 
evidence against the accused. ABA Standards Relating 
to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Pretrial 
Release§ 5.1 (b) (1974); see 18 U.S. C.§ 3146 (b). Ex-
panding that determination to encompass a test of prob-
able cause would be a natural way of integrating the prob-
able cause decision with existing procedures. 
In other States, existing procedures may satisfy the 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment with only minor 
adjustments. Some States already authorize a determina-
tion of probable cause at or immediately following the sus-
pect's first appearance. E. g., Colo. Rev. Stat. s 39-2-3 
(1965 Supp.); Hawaii Rev. Stat. ~ 708-9 (5) (1968); Vt. 
Rules Crim. Proc. 3 (b), 5 (c) (1974). Others may choose 
simply to accelerate their existing preliminary hearings. 
What the Fourth Amendment requires for pretrial re-
straint on liberty 27 is a reliable determination of probable 
cause made either before or promptly after arrest, and 
preferably no later than the first appearance before a ju-
27 Becamw thf.' probable <'aU~P dC'termmation is not a constitutional 
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those 
susr1ects who suffer restraints on librrty other than the condition 
that they appear for trial. There arP many kinds of pretrial release 
and many degree:; of conditwnal liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146; 
ABA Standnrd~ Relatmg to the Administration of Criminal Justice, 
Pretnal Release § 5.2 (1974); Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Rule 341 (Proposed Fmal Drnft 1974). We cannot define spe-
cifi<'ally those that would require a prior probable cause determina-
tion, but the key facto:r JS significant rf.'~traint on liberty. 
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dicial officer. If made after arrest, the suspect must be 
given an opportunity to be present and to be heard. Each 
State may choose the procedure that best accommodates 
this determination to its existing practice.28 
IV 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth 
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of 
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we 
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we 
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the 
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree, 
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
28 Of Cour:;r, if the State mcorporate~ the probable cau~e determi-
nation mto a multipurpo~e hearing, the necessity for appointed coun-
Hcl at thr combined proceeding mu~t bP governed by the principle1;. 
of United States v. Wade and Coleman v. ALabama, o'Upra. 
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The issue in this case is whether a person arrested ·· 
under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally en-
titled to a judicial determination of probable cause for 
pretrial restraint of liberty. 
I 
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were 
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged 
with several offenses under a prosecutor's information.1 
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against 
him ca.rried a potential life sentence, and Henderson re-
mained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500 
bond. 
1 Respondent Pugh was anested on March 3, 1971. On March 16 
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a con-
cealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a 
ft•lony . Respondent Henderson was arrested on March 2, and charged 
by information on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and 
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate 
whethf)r them wus an arrest warrant m either case. 
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu~" 
tion of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all other 
crimes by information, without a prior preliminary hear.~ 
ing and without obtaining leave of court. Fla. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 3.140 (a); State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109 
(Fla. 1968); Di Bona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1960). At the time respondents were arrested, a 
Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary 
hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases. 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the 
Florida courts had held that the filing of an information 
foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing. 
See State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 
1972). 2 They had also held that habeas corpus could not 
be used, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances, to 
test the probable cause for detention under an informa~ 
tion. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 29 So. 2d 
794, 797 (Fla. 1951). The only possible methods for ob-
taining a judicial determination of probable cause were a 
special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30 
days, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 ( 1973) ,~ and arraignment, 
which the District Court found was often delayed a month 
or more after arrest. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 
1107, 1110 (SD Fla. 1971). 1 As a result, a person charged 
2 Florida law also, .denies preliminary hcal'ings to persons confined 
under indictment, see Sangar6e v. Hcmlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970), 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a), but that procedure is not challenged 
· in this case. 
~ This statute may have been construed to make the hearing per-
missive instead of mandatory . See Evans v. State, 197 So. 2d 323 
(Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 067-29 (1967). But cf. 
Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla . Ct. App. 1971). It may also 
have been superseded by the subsequent amendments to the rules of 
criminal procedure. In re Florida Rules of Cnminal Procedure, 
272 So. 2d 65 (1972) . 
~The Florida rules· do not suggest that the issue of probable 
-cause can be ra1sed at arrai~nment, Fla . Rule Crirn. Proc. 3.160, but 
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by informatiOn could be detained for a substantial period 
solely on the decision of a prosecutor. 
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action 
against Dade County officials in the Federal District 
Court,n claiming a constitutional right to a judi~ial hear-
ing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declara-
tory and injunctive relief.G Respondents Turner and 
Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently 
intervened.7 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for 
Dade County, was one of several defendants.8 
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature con-
sidered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hear-
ings to persons charged by information, the District Court 
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, supra . 
.Qc_ The ¢ourt certified the case as a class action under Fed. 
counsel for Petitioner represented at oral argument that arraign-
\ -~~ffor<!_s the suspect an opportunity to "attack the sufficiency of 
V\ the evidence to hold Nm." Tr. of Oral Arg., Mar. 25, 1974, at 17. 
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that this was true. 
483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8. 
~The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and juris-
diction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). 
6 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as 
an alternate remedy. They asked only that the state authorities be 
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was 
also the only relief that the District Court ordered for the named 
respondents. 332 F. Supp., at 1115-1116. Because release was 
ne1ther asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class 
of rases for which habeas corpu;; i;; the exclusive remedy. Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (197:3); sec Wolff v. McDonnell, 417 U.S. 
-,- (1974) 
7 Turner was bemg held on a charge of auto theft, following arrest 
on March 11, 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges 
of soliCJtmg a ndr and po~~e-swn of marihuana. 
8 The named drfendant~ mcluded jus1ices of the peace and Judges 
of small-clmms courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary 
hearmgs in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officers 
with power to make arrests in Dade County Gerstem was the only 
Olle who petitioned for ct>rtwrarJ 
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Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (2), and held that the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged 
by information a right to a judicial hearing, on the ques-
tion of probable cause. The District Court ordered the 
Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an 
immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable 
cause for further detention. 0 It also ordered them to 
submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in aU cases 
instituted by information. 
The defendants submitted a plan authored by Sheriff 
E. Wilson Purdy, and the District Court adopted it with 
modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed post-
arrest procedure. 336 F. Supp. 490. Upon arrest the 
accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first 
appearance hearing." The magistrate would explain the 
charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel 
if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause 
determination unless either the prosecutor or the accused 
was unprepared. If either requested more time, the 
magistrate would set the date for a "preliminary hearing," 
to be held within four days if the accused was in custody 
and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial. 
The order provided sanctions for failure to hold the hear-
ings at prescribed times. At the "preliminary hearing" 
thP. accused would be entitled to counsel, and he would be 
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, 
iJ The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for 
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal inter-
vention in !'tate prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, 
but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hear-
mg, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal 
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not 
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. Monte-
muro, 477 F . 2d 1073, 1082 (CA3 1978); cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 
U. S .. 82 (1971); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (1951). 
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to summon favorable witne~ses, and to have a transcript 
made on request. If the magistrate found no probable 
cause, the accused would be discharged. He then could 
not be charged with the same offense by complaint or in-
formation, but only by indictment returned within 30 
days. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the 
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case 
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary volun-
tarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon 
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals re-
manded the case for specific findings on the constitu-
tionality of the new Dade County system. Before the 
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida 
Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing 
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed 
that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the 
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures. 
Under the amended rules every arrested person must 
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130 (b). This "first appearance" is 
similar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the 
District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the mag-
istrate does not make a determination of probable cause. 
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for 
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges 
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to 
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule 
3.131; ~ee In re Rule 3.181 (b), Florida Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, 289 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974). 
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held 
that the amended rules had not answered the basic con-
stitutional objection , since a defendant charged by in-
formation still could be detained pending trial without 
a judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp. 
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1286. Reaffirmmg its origmal ruling, the District Court 
declared that the con tin uatwn of this practice was uncon-
stitutional.lQ The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d 
778, modifying the Distnct Court's decree in minor par-
ticulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hear-
ing provided by the amended Florida rules would be ac-
ceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in 
custody pending trial. /d., at 788-789.11 
10 Although tlus rulmg held a statewide "legislative rule" unconsti-
tutional, 1t was not outside the jurisdictwn of a single judge by vir-
tue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for 
an injunction against enforcement of any state statute or legislative 
rule of statewide application, since the practice of denying prelim-
inary hearings to persons charged by information was then em-
bodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had 
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appeals 
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the constitutionality 
of a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when 
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental 
opimon can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the 
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never 
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court 
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District 
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. See 483 F. 
2d, at 788-790. Accordingly, a distmt court of thr!:'e judges was not 
req•Jired for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 
U.S. 603,606-608 (1960) . 
11 The major diff0renre brtween the Distnct Court's order and 
that of th<.> Court of Appeals rentered on the question whether a 
probable cause hearing is required for all arrested persons charged 
by informahon or only for tho~e ronfined pending trial. The District 
Court's origmal decree reqmred prelimmary hearings for all arrested 
person~. 3:36 F. 8upp., at 491 On rema;ld, the District Court made 
an exceptwn for person:-; charged with miSdemeanors who neither 
suffered pretrial detentiOn nor faced 1mpnsorunent upon conviction. 
355 F. Supp., at 1290. The Court of Appeals explicitly limitPd the 
hearing right for m18dm1eano1 defendant~ to those who are jailed 
pending tr1al. 48a F 2d, at 789 Its opinion also suggests, without 
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State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review, and we 
granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue. 1 ~ 
414 U. S. 1062. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
stating explicitly, that the hearing right is similarly limited to felony 
defendants who are confined pending trial. Id., at 787, 789. 
The Court of Appeals vacated those parts of the District Court's 
order that prescribed time periods different from those in the 
amended rules and imposed sanctions for failure to comply with the 
hearing requirements. Our disposition of the case makes it un-
necessary to address the specific terms of the District Court's decree. 
12 At oral argument counsel informed us that the named respond-
ents have been convicted. Their pretrial' detention therefore has 
ended. This case belongs, however, to that narrow class of cases in 
which the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot 
the claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa.J. ~ 
~ U. S.- (1975). Pretrial detentio~ah1re temporary, 
and it is most unlikely that any given individual could have his 
constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or 
convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated depriva-
tions, and it is certain that other persons similarly situated will be 
detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, 
in short, is one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review.'' 
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were 
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable 
oause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any 
of them were still in Cll::>tody awaiting tnal when the District Court 
cerl ified the class. Such a showing ordinarily would be required to 
avoid mootness under Sosna. But th1s case i::; a suitable exception 
to that requirement. See Sosna, supra, at -- n. 11; cf. Rivem v. 
F'reema'n, 469 F. 2d 11.59, 1162--1163 (CA9 1972). The length of pre-
trial custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended 
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or 
a guilty plea , as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is 
by no means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff, 
would be m pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to 
certify the class. Moreover, in this case the constant existence of 
a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney 
repre::;entlng the named re~pondents IS a public defender, and we can 
"Safely assume that he hall other clients with a continuing live interest 
in the case. 
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II 
As framed by the proceedings below, this case presents 
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial 
on an information is entitled to a judicial determination 
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the 
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and 
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the 
Constitution. 
A 
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and 
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amend-
ment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v. 
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Ex parte 
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Bur-
ford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 448 ( 1806). The standard for 
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and 
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
believing that the [suspect 1 had committed or was com-
mitting an offense/' Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91 
(1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 17&--176 
( 1949) . This standard, like those for searches and seiz-
ures, represents a necessary accommodation between the 
individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to con-
trol crime. 
"These long-prevailing standards seek to safe-
guard citizens from rash and unreasonable inter-
ferences with privacy and from unfounded charges 
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for 
enforcing the law in the community's protection. 
Because many situations which confront officers in 
the course of executing their duties are more or less 
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes 
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of 
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to· 
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their conclusions of probability. The rule of prob-
able cause is a practical, nontechnical conception 
affording the best compromise that has been found 
for accommodating these often opposing interests. 
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforce-
ment. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding 
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." 
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176. 
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection 
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the 
Court has required that the existence of 'probable cause 
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate when-
ever possible. The classic statement of this principle 
appears in Johnsan v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14 
(1948): 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often 
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies 
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its pro-
tection consists in requiring that those inferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead 
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-22 (1968)?3 
Maximum protection of individual rights could be 
assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual 
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement 
13 We reiterated thi::; principle in United States v. United States 
D1strict Court, 407 U. S. 297 ( 1972). In terms that apply equally 
to arrest::;, we de~cribed the "very heart of the Fourth Amendment 
rlirective" as a requirement that "where practical, a governmental 
search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer 
to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the mag-
istrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a 
Citizen's privati' prem1ses or conversation.'' ld., ·at 316. See also. 
Ten"!/ v. Ohio, i~92ll. S. 1,20--22 (1968). 
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would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate 
law enforcement. Thus, while the Court has expressed a 
StAp-r~ -at qc,. _preference for the use ot arrest warrants when feasible, 
-> ) Beck v.-Ghio~ U 8. 89,96 (!~Wong Sun v. Unite 
States, 371 U. S. 471, 479-482 (1963), it has never invali-
dated an arrest supported by probable cause solely be-
cause the officers failed to seeure a warrant. See Ker v. 
Californ·ia, 374 U. S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States, 
358 U.S. 307 (1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 
699, 705 ( 1948) .14 
Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the-
scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justifi-
cation for arresting a person suspected of crime. and for 
a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps 
incident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, how ... 
ever, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magis-
trate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is 
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further 
crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magis-
trate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary 
action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determina-
tion of probable cause increases significantly. The con-
sequences of prolonged detention may be more serious 
than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial con-: 
finement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his 
source of income. and impair his family relationships. 
SeeR. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91 (1965); L. Katz, Justice 
11 Another a»pect of Tntpiano was overruled in United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 5t> (1950), which was overruled in turn by 
C'hirnel v Caltfornia, 395 0 . S. 752 (1969) 
The issue of warrantle~s arrest that has generated the most con-
troverlly, and which remains unsettled, is whether · and under what 
circumstances an officer· may e11ter a suspect's home to make a war-. 
rantJess arrest See Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,474-
481 (1971); id., at 510-512 n. 1 (WHITE, J., diHsrnting), Jones v. 
Umted States, 857 U. S. 493,499-500 (1958). 
p'f'oceeded. 
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Is the Crime 51-62 (1972). Even pretrial release may be 
accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a sig-
nificant restraint on liberty. See, e. g., 18 U.S. C. § 3146 
(a) (2), (5). When the stakes are this high, the detached 
judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth 
Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from un-
founded interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold 
that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial deter-
mination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended 
restraint on liberty following arrest. 
This result has historical support in the common law 
that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 
(1925) . At common law it was customary, if not obliga-
tory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice 
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the 
Crown 116--117 (4th ed. 1792). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 
115 U.S. 487, 498--499 (1885)."i The justice of the peace 
15 The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have 
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact 
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment, 
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of 
commitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief 
dete!ltion. 
" When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected 
of felony, he may detain him in cu~tody till he can reasonably dis-
mills himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can, 
he may do either of these thmgs. 
''1. He may carry him to the common gaol, .. . but that is now 
rarely done. 
··2. He may deliver him to the <'• , able of the vill, who may either 
carry him to the common gaol, , .. or to a justice of peace to 
'lJe ·cxamnwd, and ~ gainst as case shall require . ... 
"3 Or he may carry him in· ,,, uately to any justice of peace of the 
county where he is taken , who .lJ>on exammation may discharge, bail, 
or commit hun, as the case shall require. 
'':And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private-
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would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to deter~ 
mine whether there was reason to believe the prisonet 
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would 
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he 
would be discharged from custody. 1 M. Hale, supra, at 
583-586; 2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen, 
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 (1883).16 
The initi~tl determination of probable cause also could be 
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus. 
2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at. 
243; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75, 97-
101 ( 1807). This practice furnished the model for 
criminal procedure in America immediately following the 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Boll~ 
man, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 (1807); 17 Ex parte Burford, 
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton,. 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795). and there are indications that. 
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model 
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler 
will expect a M·ittimus for his warrant of detaining." · 
1M. Hale, supra, at 589~590. 
LB The examination of the prisoner was inquisitorial, and the 
witnesses were questioned outside the prisoner's presence. Although 
this method of proceeding was considered quite harsh, 1 J. Stephen, 
at 219-225, it was wrll e~tablished that the prisoner was entitled to be 
ch:scharged if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of hi~ 
guilt !d. , at 23a 
17 In .Ex parte Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr case 
were cornniitted following an examination in the circuit court of 
the District of Columbia. They filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief 
.Justice Marshall, affirmed its JUrisdiction to issue habeas corpus to 
persons i.n custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following 
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause, 
the Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that 
it d1d not establish probable cause that they were guilty of treason~, 
'fhe prisoners were discharged. 
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for a "reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States, 
358 U.S. 307, 317--320 (1959) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting).18 
B 
Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a per-
son arrested without a warrant and charged by informa-
tion may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending 
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause 
determination.19 Petitioner defends this practice on the 
ground th11t the prosecutor's decision to file an informa-
tion is itself a determination of probable cause that fur-
nishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending 
trial. Although a conscientious decision that the evi-
dence warrants prosecution affords a measure of protec-
tion against unfounded detention, we do not think 
prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, we think the 
Court's previous decisions compel disapproval of the 
Florida procedure. In Albrecht v. United States, 273' 
18 See also N. Lasson, The History and Development of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 15-16 ( 1937). 
A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery of 
::>tolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reason-
able" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was re-. 
quired to appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath 
ef probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular place. 
After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim 
and the alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace· 
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods 
and detentwn of tlw thief. 2M. Hale, supra, at 149-152; T. Taylor, 
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969); 
see Boyd v United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-629 (1886). 
lu A person arre,ted nuder a warrant would have received a prior 
judwial determinatiOn of probable cause Under Fla. Rule Crim. 
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that 
states fads showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The· 
magistrate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there• 
.t~ rPaRonabJle grounrl to believe the complaint iH true. 
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U.S. 1, 5 (1927), the Court held that an arrest warrant 
issued solely upon a United States Attorney's information 
was invalid because the accompanying affidavits were de-
fective. Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly 
state that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish 
probable cause, that conclusion was implicit in the judg-
ment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amend-
ment.20 More recently, in C:Jolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U. S. 443, 449'-453 (1971), the Court held that a 
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is incon-
sistent with the constitutional role of a neutral and de-
tached magistrate. We reaffirmed that principle in Shad-
wick v. City of Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 (1972), and held 
that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant 
must be determined by someone independent of police 
and prosecution. See also United States v. United States 
District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 317 (1972). 21 The reason 
20 By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon 
its face," and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" con-
clusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires 
issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parte 
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v. 
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a 
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached 
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the 
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust 
prosecutwn. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346 
(1974)' 
21 The Court had earhE'r reached a different result in Ocampo v. 
United States, 234 U. S 91 (1914), a crimmal appeal from the 
Philippme Islands. lnterpretmg a statutory guarantee substantially 
identical to the Fourth Amendment, Aet of Jnly 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5, 
32 Stat. 69:3, the Court held that an arrest warrant could Issue 
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court has since held 
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philip-
pmes is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision in 
the Federal Constitutwn, Green v United States, 355 U. S. 184,. 
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for this separation of functions was expressed by Justice 
Frankfurter in a similar context: 
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dig~ 
nity of all men is central, naturally guards against 
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal 
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance · 
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law 
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cher-
ished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled · 
that safeguards must be provided against the dan-
gers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The 
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be 
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated 
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into 
different parts, responsibility for which is separately 
vested in the various participants upon whom the 
criminal law relies for its vindication." .MeN abb v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943). 
In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable 
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty 
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is n-
titled to judicial oversight or review of iier ~ e- . 
cision to prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's 
pri.:>r holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite 
to prosecution by information. Beck v. Wa,shington, 369 
U. S. 541, 545 ( 1962); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 
586 (1913). Nor do we retreat from the established r 
that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent 
conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 ( 1952); 
.Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, as the Court 
of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is 
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for 
is incompatible ·with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, and 
Shadwick, 
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that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated 
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending 
trial without a determination of probable cause. 483 
F. 2d, at 786-787. Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 
F. 2d 6 (CA5 1968), with Brown v. Fauntleroy,- U.S. 
A pp. D. C. -, 442 F. 2d 838 ( 1971), and Cooley v. Stone, 
- U. S. App. D. C. --·, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969). 
III 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
held that the determination of probable cause must be 
accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safe-
guards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and 
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary 
hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in 
many States to determine whether the evidence justifies 
going to trial under an information or presenting the 
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 
1 (1970); Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern 
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996--1000 (4th ed. 1974). 
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is 
usually referred to as "probable cause," but in some juris-
dictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt. 
A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Com-
mentary on Article 330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 
1972). When the hearing takes this form, adversary pro-
cedures are customarily employed. The importance of 
thf' issue to both the State a11d the accused justifies the 
presentation of witne:?ses and full exploration of their 
testimony on cross-examination. This kind of hearing 
also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defend-
ants. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. And, as the hearing 
assumes increased importance and the procedures become 
more complex, the likelihood that it can be held promptly 
'1:3- 477-0PINION 
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after arrest diminishes. Ree A. L. I. .Model Code of Pre-
arraignment Procedure, supra, at 33-34. 
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the 
probable cause determination required by the Fourth 
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable 
cause for detaining the arrested person pending further 
proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably with-
()~ adversary hearing. The standard is the same 
as that for arrest. 22 That standard-probable cause to 
believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditi. onal~ 
has been decided -5f10nadversary proceedingt on hearsay 
and written testimony, and the Court has approved these 
informal modes of proof. 
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that 
which long experience in the common-law tradition, 
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has 
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with 
that standard. These rules are historically grounded 
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men 
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting 
forfeitures of life, liberty and property. 
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the 
very name implies, we deal with probabilities. 
These are not technicnl; they are the factual and 
22 Because the standards are identical, ordinanly there is no need 
fot· further investigation before the probable cause determination can 
be madE'. 
"Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must arrest on 'prob. 
able cause' It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were, 
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquartel'8 
m order to determine whom they should charge before a committing 
magistrate on 'probable cause.'" Mallory v. United States, 3.5{ 
u.s. 449, 4.56 (1957), 
is 
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practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correla-
tive to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949). 
Cf. McCray V. Illinois, 386 U.S, 300 (1967). . an 
The use of ~informal procedure! is justified no~ 
only by the lesser consequences of a probable cause de-
termination but also by the nature of the determinatio 
itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflict-
ing evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a prepond-
erance standard demands, and credibility determinations 
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence sup-
ports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, Prosecu-
tion: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64-
109 (1969). 23 This is not to say that confrontation and 
cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of 
23ln Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. 
Scm·pelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee or proba-
tioner arrested prior to revocation is entitled to an informal pre-
liminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live 
testimony. 408 U.S., at 487; 411 U.S., at 786. That preliminary 
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by 
the Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and pre-
serving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently 
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred. 
408 U. S., at 485; 411 U. S., at 782-783 n. 5. Moreover, revocation 
proceedings may ofi'er less protection from initial error than the 
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute 
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect 
with crime unless he is satisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code 
of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-103 (A) (a prosecutor "shall 
not mstJtute or cause to be mst1tuted cnminal charges when he knows 
or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable 
cause"); ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Crim-
inal .JustJCe, The ProsecutiOn Function, §§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); Amer-· 
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probable cause determinations in some cases. In most 
cases, however, their value would be too slight to justify 
holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these 
formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be 
employed in making the Fourth Amendment d~termina­
tion of probable cause.24 
Because of its limited function and its nonadversary 
character, the probable cause determination is not a 
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require 
appointed counsel. The Court has identified as "critical 
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair de-
fense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed 
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 
(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-227 
(1967). In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held 
that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of an Ala-
bama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions 
identified two critical factors that distinguish the Ala-
bama preliminary hearing from the probable cause deter-
mination required by the Fourth Amendment. First~ 
under Alabama law the function of the preliminary hear-J 
ing was to determine whether the evidence justified charg-
ing the suspect with an offense. A finding of no probable 
cause could mean that he would not be tried at all. The 
Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is ad-
dressed only to pretnal custody. To be sure, pretrial 
custody may affect to some extent the defendant's abilit 
to assist in preparation of his defense, but this if. ~'*tVI'H~ 
~of substantial harm identified as controlling in Wade 
and Coleman. Second, Alabama allowed the suspect to 
24 Crimmal justice is already overburdened by the volume of cal:les 
and the complexities of our sy~tem. The processmg of misdemeanorvs.l .Y\ p...,_-h'cv..IOI'f'~ 
and the early stages of prosecution generally are marked by delays 
that can seriously affect the quality of justice. A constitutional doc-
trine reqmrln~ adversary hearings for all persons d{'taine<l 
pending trial could exacerbatp the problem of pretrial delay. 
L 
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confront and cross-examine G"osecution witnesses at the 
preliminary hearing. Thet~~urt noted that the suspect's 
defense on the merits could be compromised if he had no 
legal assistance for exploring or preserving the witnesses' 
testimony. This consideration does not apply ~nQ ~~ 





The re ons hat make a nonadversary proceeding ap-, \ 
f\/St.r<. I-> propriate, H ever, do not justify denying the suspect an 
T'l f> f:D ~_./ opportunity, be present and participate in the deter- ) 
C,,P'/ mination.2 Ou system of justice operates on the premise 
'• 
A.L.I. 
~ll.~UP'F~t@~~ll the Uniform Rules of Crimina:! 
Procedure (Proposed Final Draft-i974~theA. I.r. T:·Model Coder, 
ef Pte ana1gmnent Pro~l'e (.:fent., Draft. No. 5.;. 1~72, 4tnd T&n~ 
-Brnft-No. 5A:, '1:973}' me instructive. Under the Bnifoun Rttl~ a 
person arrested withoRt a warrant is entitled, "without unnecessary 
delay," to a first app~rance before a magistrate,and a determination 
that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest warrant. The determi-
nation may be made ~n affidavits or testimony, in the presence of 
the accused. Rule 31L Persons who remain in custody for inability 
to qualify for pretrial release are offered another opportunity for a 
probable cause determination at the detention hearing, held no mote 
than ,j7 days after arrest. This is au adversary hearing, and the· 
parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay evidence may be 
considered. Rule 344. . . · 
Thei{Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure{aiso provides a 
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported' 
by a reasonably detailed written statement of facts, § 310. The 
magistrate may make a detrrmination of probable cause to hold the 
accused, but he is not required to do so and the accused may requeSt 
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of 1he first appearance to be 
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate :makes· 
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written 
and live testimony : 
"The aw')sted person may present written and testimonial evidence 
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present addi· 
tiona! written and testJmomal evidence and 'arguments that there is 
reasonable cause ~o believe that he has committed the crime of 
which he is accused.. The. state'r-; s_ubm1ssion may be made by means: 
· w~e-v- i·t. ~ror~c.vt~ 
i ~ 1\-0t '<'e~ I y-ed., it> 
ero"-uce. witvlessc:s 
{Ur e'l'oSS •E.'IC~Y\'\lV\Stl&~. 
(T~t.1)r·aft No. SJ 
lq72.) CAAd. l~t-. 
J)y-nft No. SA, rq73) 
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\~ the subject of a judicial proceeding is entitle?}o 
\ ~articipate unless there is good reason to excludel!~· 
See Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U. S. 496, 502 ( 1972); ljees v. 
\ City of Watertown, 86 U. S. (19 Wall.) 107, ,122- 123 
( 1873). The procedures normally followed 1n apply-
ing for warrants are ex parte proceedings by 
necessity, as notifying the ·suspect would often frus-
trate t.he purpose of the warrant. See /1'. Taylor, Two 
Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 81.,...82 (1969) . , 
But when the suspect is already in custody, and the only 
1 issue is probable cause for detention, he should be allowed 
to participate in the determination. Allowing him to ap-
pear before the magistrate artd giving him an opportunity 
I to speak or to submit written evidence for consideration 
along with the State's presentation could enhance both 
· the reliability 'and the fairness of the proceeding. , Q 
The suspect's presence and participation would im- /-.. -· 
pose no significant bu{den on the State. Virtually all 
jurisdictions require that arrested persons be presented 
to a judicial office:r within a short time after arrest, see 
' A. L. I., Model Qode of Pre-arraignment Procedure 230--
, 231 (Tent. Dr;:tft No. 1, 1966), and every jurisdiction 
1 makes some provision for setting bail or determining other 
1
1 conditions of pretrial release. See L. Katz, Justice Is 
the Crirr~; Appendix B, at 247-365 (1972). Sirtce the , 
! 
defendapt is already in the courtroom, the issue of prob-
able cause may be decided at that time with little or no ~ 
inc9nvenience to the State. In fact, the suspect's first 
appearance before a magistrate traditionally has been 
considered the proper time for determining whether there 
of affidavits, and no WitnesseR shall be required to appear unless the 
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the 
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appear-
ance of one or more w1tnesses for whom the arrested person seeks 
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause.'" 
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft N(). 5Al 1973) . 
I 
LFP/gg 1-3-75 Gerstein - Revision of 1st Draft 
(S~gested substitute conunencing 
wit first paragraph on p. 20 
and extending to Part IV on p. 24). 
~ Although we conclude that the Constitution does 
not require an adversary determination of probable cause, 
we recognize that state systems of criminal procedure 
vary widely. 
~ 
There is no single preferred pre- rial v 
procedure, and the nature of the probable cause 
determination usually will be shaped to accord with a state's , , , 
C'\ .1 d . d hl pre+-trl.a proce ure v1.ewe as a w o e. While we limit 
'-"' 
our holding to the precise requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility 
and experimentation by the states. It may be found 
..-,.. 
;" 
desirable, for example, to make the probable cause 
determination at the suspect's first appearance before 
5 
a judicial officer, see McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 
332, 342-344 (1943) or the determination may be 
25. Several ~tates already authorize a determination 
of probable cause~at this stage or immediately t~7reafter. 
See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-2-3 (1965 Supp.); Hawa1.1. Rev. 
Stat. § 708-9(5) (1968); Vt. Rules Crim. Proc. 3(b), 
5(c) (1974). This Court has interpreted the Federal Rules 




incorporated into the procedure for setting bail or 
fixing other conditions of pretrial release. In some 
states, existing procedures may satisfy the requirement 
r 
Several states a determination of 
probable cause at following the suspect's 
first appearance. See Colo. ev. Stat. § 39-2-3 (1965 
&u~)· Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 7 8-9(5) (1968); Vt- Rule~ 
"f •1 a-&-~ 
~ G1:i!IT · Proc. 3(b), 5(c) (1974 ) . Others may_Js imp±y 
e , ~ u e • .I ....-: • I' .,. .. ,r; lt , 
- their exi ting preliminary hearings. Current 
) 
/\. 
proposals for criminal procedure reform suggest other ----
ways of testing probable cause for detention.~ Whatever 
procedure a state may adopt, it must provide a fair and 
reliable determination of probable cause as a condition 
f . . f. . 1 . 1" b \
2 7/ d or any s1gn1 1cant pretr1a restra1nt on 1 erty,~ an 
this determination must be made by a judicial officer 
either before or promptly after arre st. 
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1-s.._probable cause for detention. 1 M. Hale, Pleas ofi{he 
Cro'\'n 585-586, 58n-590 (1736); 2 id., at 77-95; 2 W. 
Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 116-119 (4th ed. 1762); see 
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 342-344 (1943); 
Amsterdam. Perspectives on the Fourth Ame,ndment, 58 
Minn. L. Rev. 349, :3~)1 & n. 408 ( 1974). Although the 
Federal Rul€\s of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly 
acknowledge this function of the first appearance, the 
Court has interpreted them to require a determination of 
probable cause at that stage. Jaben v. United States, 381 
U.S. 214, 218 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 
449, 454 (1957). 20 
There is no single proper method for making the prob-
able cause determination required by the Fourth Amend-
ment. The States have many different patterns of crimi-
nal procedure, and each may adapt its own to provide a 
swift and reliable probable cause determination with the 
least burden to its system. Like many jurisdictions, 
26 In an amicus brief filed on behalf of the United States, the 
Sohcitor General suggest<'d that McNabb and Mallory had mistaken 
the purpose of the first appearance, and that actual practice is other-
wise. Cf. Note, Probable Cause at the Initial Appearance in War-
rantlE:>ss ArrE:>sts, 45 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1128 (1972). McNabb, of course, 
was decided before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. It interpretE'd a statutory requirement that an arrested 
person be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay. 
318 U. 8., at 342. Mallory was decided after the federal rules were 
adopted, and although the interpretation of the federal rules was 
dictum, it clearly outlined the Court's view: 
"The scheme for initiating a federal prosecution is plainly defined. 
The police may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only on 'probable 
cause.' The next step in the proceeding is to arraign the arrested 
person before a judicial oilicer as qmckly ll.S possible so that he may 
be a.dvised of his rights and so that the is<me of probable cause may 
be promptly determined." 354 U. S., at 454. 
l The nse of the word "cura1gn" was an error, as arraignment occurs. later in the process. Fed Rule Crim. Proc. 10. 
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tFlori4ar reqmres every arrested person to be brought before a magistrate within 24 hours, unless sooner released. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.310 (b). At that , appearance the defendant is told of the charges against 
him, furnished a copy of the complaint, advised of his 
1 
constitutional rights, and provided counsel if he is indi-
gent. The magistrate then sets bail or prescribes other 
conditions of pretrial release. One of the factors typi-
1 
cally relied upon in making this decision is the weight of 
evidence against the accused. ABA Standards Relating 
to the Administration Qf Criminal Justice, Pretrial 
Release§ 5.1 (b) (1974); see 18 U.S. C.§ 3146 (b). Ex-
panding that determination ~o encompass a test of prob-
able cause would be a natural: way of integrating the prob- 0 
able cause decision with exi'sting procedures. /'-
In other States, exiyting procedures may satisfy the 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment with only minor 
adjustments. Som~ States already authorize a determina-
tioJJ of probable cause at or immediately following the sus-
pect's first appearance. E. g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-2-3 
(1965 Supp.); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708-9 (5) (1968); Vt. 
Rules Crim. Proc. 3 (b), 5 (c) (1974). Others may choose 
simply to accelerate their existing preliminary hearings. 
What the Fourth Amendment requires for pretrial re-
straint on liberty 27 is a reliable determination of probable, 
cause made either before or promptly after arrest, a}ld 
I preferably no later than the first appearance before a ju 
27 Because the probable cause determmation is not a constitutional 
prerequisite t.o the charging decision, it is required only for those 
suspects who suffer restramts on liberty other than the condition 
that they appear for tnal. There are many kinds of pretrial release.........--
and many degrees of conditi:mal hberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146; 
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, 
Prrtrial Release § 5.2 (1974) , Uniform Rules of Crimmal Procedure, 
Rule 341 (Proposed Final Draft 1074). We cannot define spe-
mfically those that would require a prior probable cause determina-
tion, bt~t the key {actor is significant Jt>.-:;traint on liberty. 
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\ dicial officer. If made after arrest, the suspect must 1;' 
given an opport~o be present and to be heard. Each 1 ,(_ 
tate may choose_ the proce_d];J-re that best accommodates\ 
his ®.tm>mtnation to its exiStmg practice.28 
IV 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth 
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of 
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we 
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we 
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the 
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree, 
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion . 
. l-.· 28.-0.1·.·"¢o. ur.se,if .the·· State Jncorp)¢' .ates the probable cause determi: ' () 
nation mto a multipurpose hear1r(g, the necessity for appointed coun- _..-><..-
sel at the combined proceeding must be governed by the principles. 
Qf United __ $ tat!}§ v, W (lde 4-rfd (/ol(1man v. Alabama, 13"Upra. 1 
11 !'i. ~ y ff I f 
JAM l () ~~H4 
2nd DRAFT 
FlLE c ·op'f 
PLEASE RETURN 
TO FILE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATFB 
No. 73-477 
Richard E. Gerstein, State At~ 
torney for Eleventh Judicial 
Circuit of Florida, 
Petitioner1 
v. 
Robert Pugh et aL 
On Writ of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit. 
[December -, 1974] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
pourt. 
The issue in this case is whether a person arresteq 
under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally en• 
titled to a judicial determinAtion of probable cause for 
pretrial restraint of liberty. 
I 
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson wer~ 
arrested in Dade Countr, Florida. Each was charged 
with several offenses tinder a prosecutorjs information.1 
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against 
him carried a potential life sentence, and Henderson re.:. 
mained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,,500 
bond. 
1 Respondent Pugh waa anested on March 3, 1971. On March 16 
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a con-
cealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a 
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrested on March 2, and charged 
by informati~n on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and 
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicat~ ' . 
'whetMr there was an arre~t warrant in either case. 
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu-
tion of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all other 
crimes by information, without a prior preliminary hear-
ing and without obtaining leave of court. Fla. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 3.140 (a); State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109 
(Fla. 1968); Di Bona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1960). At the time respondents were arrested, a 
Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary 
hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases. 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the 
Florida courts had held that the filing of an information 
foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing. 
See State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 
1972). 2 They had also held that habeas corpus could not 
be used, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances, to 
test the probable cause for detention under an informa-
tion. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 29 So. 2d 
794, 797 (Fla. 1951). The only possible methods for ob-
taining a judicial determination of probable cause were a 
special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30 
days, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973),3 and arraignment, 
which the District Court found was often delayed a month 
or more a.fter arrest. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 
1107, 1110 (SD Fla. 1971).4 As a result, a person charged 
2 Florida law also denies preliminary hearings to persons confined 
under indictment, see Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970), 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a) , but that procedure is not challenged 
in this case. 
8 This statute may have been construed to make the hearing per-
missive instead of mandatory. See Evans v. State, 197 So. 2d 323 
(I<1a. Ct. App. 1967); Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 067-29 (1967) . But cf. 
Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971). It may also 
have been ;:;uperseded by the subsequent amendments to the rules of 
crimmal procedure. In re Florida R~de& of Criminal Procedure,. 
272 So. 2d 65 (1972) . 
4 The Florida rules do not suggest that the issue of probable 
<l'<tUS_e can b_c rai!le<l at arraignment, Fla. Rule Crim. Proc .. 3.160, but. 
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by information could be detained for a substantial period 
solely on the decision of a prosecutor, 
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action 
against Dade County officials in the Federal District 
Court,5 claiming a constitutional right to a judicia.! hear-
ing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declara-
tory and injunctive relief.6 Respondents Turner and 
Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently 
intervened.7 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for 
Dade County, was one of severa1 defendants.8 
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature con-
sidered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hear-
ings to persons charged by information, the District Court 
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, supra. 
The court certified the case as a class action under Fed. 
counsel for Petitioner represented at oral argument that arraign-
ment affords the suspect an opportunity to "attack the sufficiency of 
the evidence to hold him." Tr. of Oral Arg., Mar. 25, 1974, at 17. 
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that this was true. 
483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8. 
5 The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and juris-
diction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). 
6 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody,. even as 
an alternate remedy. They asked only that the state authorities be 
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was 
also the only relief tht-tt the District Court ordered for the named 
respondents. 332 F. Supp., at 1115-1116. Because release was 
neither asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class 
of cases for which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 417 U.S. 
- ·, - (1974) . 
7 Turner was being held on a charge of auto theft, following arrest 
on March 11, 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges· 
of soliciting a ride and possesswn of marihuana. 
s The named defendants included justices of the peace and judges 
of small-claims courts,. who were authorized to hold preliminary 
hearings in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officers: 
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only 
-on~ who petitionefl for certiorarL 
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Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b)(2), and held that the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged 
by information a right to a judicial hearing on the ques-
tion of probable cause. The District Court ordered the 
Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an 
immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable 
cause for further detention.9 It also ordered them to 
submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases 
instituted by information. 
The defendants submitted a plan authored by Sheriff 
E. Wilson Purdy, and the District Court adopted it with 
modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed post-
arrest procedure. 336 F. Supp. 490. Upon arrest the 
accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first 
appearance hearing." The magistrate would explain the 
charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel 
if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause 
determination unless either the prosecutor or the accused 
was unprepa.red. If either requested more time, the 
magistrate would set the date for a "preliminary hearing,' 1 
to be held within four days if the accused was in custody 
and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial. 
The order provided sanctions for failure to hold the hear-
ings at prescribed times. At the "preliminary hearing'r 
the accused would be entitled to counsel, and he would be 
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnessesr 
9 The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for 
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal inter-· 
vention in state prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) .. 
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such,. 
but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hcar-
mg, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal 
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not 
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. Monte-
muro, 477 F . 2d 1073, 1082 (CA3 1973); ef. Perez v. Ledesma, 40:f 
U. S .. 82 (197.1),; StefaneUi v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (19.51). 
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to summon favorable witnesses, and to have a transcript 
made on request. If the magistmte found no probable 
cause, the accused would be discharged. He then could 
not be charged with the same offense by complaint or in-
formation, but only by indictment returned within 30 
days. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the 
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case 
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary volun-
tarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon 
l~arning of this development, the Court of Appeals re-
manded the case for specific findings on the constitu-
tionality of the new Dade County system. Before the 
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida 
Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing 
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed 
that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the 
·new rules rather than the Dade County procedures. 
Under the amended rules every arrested person must 
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130 (b). This "first appearance" is 
similar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the 
District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the mag-
istrate does not make a determination of probable cause. 
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for 
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges 
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to 
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule 
3.131; see In re Rule 3.181 (b), Florida Rules of Crim-
inalProcedure, 289 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974). 
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held 
that the amended rules had not answered the basic con-
stitutional objection, since a defendant charged by in-
formation still could be detained pending trial without 
a judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp. 
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1286. Reaffirming its original ruling, the District Court 
declared that the continuation of this practice was uncon-
stitutional.10 The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d 
778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor par• 
ticulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hear-
ing provided by the amended Florida rules would be ac• 
ceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in 
custody pending trial. I d., at 788-789.11 
10 Although this ruling held a statewide "legislative rule" unconsti-
tutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by vir-
tue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for 
an injunction against enforcement of any state statute or legislative 
rule of statewide application, since the practice of denying prelim-
inary hearings to persons charged by information was then em-
bodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had 
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appeals 
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the constitutionality 
of a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when 
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental 
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the 
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never 
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court 
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District 
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. See 483 F, 
2d, at 788-790. Accordingly, a distnct court of three judges was not 
req•1ired for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. Mendoza,. 
Martinez,' 372 U.S. 144, 152-155 (19~3); Flemming v. Neator, 363 
u.s. 603,606-608 (19~0). 
11 The major differencl' between the District Court's order and 
that of the Court of Appeals centered on the question whether a 
probable cause hearing is required for alt arrested persons charged 
by information or only for those confined pending trial. The District 
Court's original decree required preliminary hearings for all arrested· 
persons. 336 F. Supp., at 491. On remand, the District Court made 
an exce:vtion for persons charged with misdemeanors who neither-
sufferp,d pretrial detention nor faced imprisonment upon conviction, 
355 F. Supp., at 1290. The Court of Appeals explicitly limited the 
'hearing right for misdemeanor defendants to those who are jaile~ 
pending trial. 483 F, 2d, at 789. Its opinion also suggests, withO\lt 
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State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review, and we 
granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue.12 
414 U. S. 1062. We affirm in part and reverse, in part. 
stating explicitly, that the hearing right is similarly limited to felony 
defendants who are confined pending trial. Id., at 787, 789. 
The Court of Appeals vacated those parts of the District Court's 
order that prescribed time periods different from those in the 
amended rules and imposed sanctiOns for failure to comply with the 
hearing requirements. Ou;r disposition of the case makes it un-
necessary to address the specific terms of the District Court's decree. 
12 At oral argument counsel mformed us that the named respond-
ents have been convicted. Their pretrial detention therefore has 
ended. This case belongs, however, to that narrow class of cases in 
which the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot 
the claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa, 
- D. S. - (1975). Pretrial detrntion is by nature temporary, 
and it is most unlikely that any given individual could have his 
constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or 
convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated depriva-
tions, and it is certain that other persons similarly situated will be 
detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, 
in short, is one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review." 
At the time the complaint was filr,d, the named respondents were 
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable 
cause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any 
of them were still in custody awaiting trial when the District Court 
certified the class. Such a showing ordinarily would be required to 
avoid mootness under Sosrw,. But this ease is a suitable exception 
to that reqmrement. See Sosna, supra, at ·- n. 11; cf. Rivera v. 
Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159, 1162-116a (CA9 1972). The length of pre-
trial custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended 
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or 
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal ot conviction after trial. It is 
by no means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff, 
would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to 
certify the class. Moreover, m th1s case the constant existence of 
a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney 
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we can 
tutfely assume that he ha& other dients with a continuing live interes~ 
\n t.h0 case, 
,. 
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II 
As framed by the proceedings below, this case presents 
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial 
on an information is entitled to a judicial determination 
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the 
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and 
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the 
Constitution, 
A 
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and 
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amend~ 
ment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v. 
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Ex parte 
Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Bur-
ford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806). The standard for 
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and 
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was com-
mitting an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91 
(1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176 
( 1949). This standard, like those for searches and seiz-
ures, represents a necessary accommodation between the 
individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to con-
trol crime. 
"These long-prevailing standards seek to safe-
guard citizens from rash and unreasonable inter-
ferences with privacy and from unfounded charges 
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for 
enforcing the law in the community's protection. 
Because many situations which confront officers in 
the course of executing their duties are ~ore or less 
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes 
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of 
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly t01 
73-477-0PINION 
GERSTEIN v. PUGH 9 
their conclusions of probability. The rule of prob-
able cause is a practical, nontechnical conception 
affording the best compromise that has been found 
for accommodating these often opposing interests. 
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforce-
ment. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding 
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." 
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176. 
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection 
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the 
Court has required that the existence of probable cause 
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate when-
ever possible. The classic statement of this principle 
appears in Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14 
(1948): 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often 
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies 
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its pro-
tection consists in requiring that those inferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead 
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterpnse of ferreting out crime." 
See also Terry v. Ohw, 392 U. S. 1, 20-22 ( 1968) .13 
Maximum protection of individual rights could be 
assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual 
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement 
13 We mteratrd this principle in Umted States v. United States 
Distnct Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972). In terms that apply equally 
to arrestb, we described the "very heart of the Fourth Amendment 
dtrectivc'' as a reqmrement that "where practical, a governmental 
;;e'arch and seizure should represent borh the effotts of the officer 
to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the Judgment of the mag-
i:stratc that the collected evidence ts sufficient to justify mvasion of a 
citizen\.; private prerni>cs or convcr~atwn.'' ld., at 316 See also 
Terry v. Ohio 392 U. S . 1,2G-22 (1968) 
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would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate 
law enforcement. Thus, while the Court has expressed a 
preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible, 
Beck v. Ohio, :mpra, at 96; Wong 8un v. United 8tates, 
371 U. S. 471 , 479-482 (1963), it has never invalidated 
an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the 
officers failed to secure a warrant. SeeKer v. California, 
374 U. S. 23 ( 1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 
307 (1959); Tr'upiano v. United 8tates, 334 U.S. 699, 705 
(1948). 14 
Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the-
scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justifi-
cation for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for 
a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps 
incident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, how-
ever, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magis-
trate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is 
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further 
crimes while the police submit their evidence to a. magis-
trate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary 
action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determina-
tion of probable cause increases significantly. The con-
sequences of prolonged detention may be more serious 
than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial con-
finement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his 
source of income, and impair his family relationships. 
SeeR. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91 (1965); L. Ka.tz, Justice 
14 Another aspect of Trupiano was overruled in United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), which was overruled in turn by 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most con-
troversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what 
circumstances an officer may enter a suspect's home to make a war-
rantless 'arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-· 
481 (1971); id., a~ 510-.112 n. 1 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Jones v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 493, ,199-500 (1958). 
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Is the Crime 51-62 ( 1972). Even pretrial release may be 
accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a sig~ 
nificant restraint on liberty. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3146 
(a) ( 2) , ( 5). When the stakes are this high, the detached 
judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth 
Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from un~ 
founded interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold 
that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial deter~ 
mination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended 
restraint on liberty following arrest. 
This result has historical support in the common law 
that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amend~ 
ment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 
(1925). At common law it was customary, if not obliga~ 
tory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice 
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2M. Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the 
Crown 116-117 (4th ed. 1792). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 
115 U.S. 487, 498-499 (1885).15 The justice of the peace 
15 The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have 
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact 
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment, 
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of 
commitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief 
detention. 
"When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one ~uspected 
of felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dis-
miss himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can, 
he may do either of these things. 
"1. He may carry hun to the common gaol, ... but that is now 
tarely done. 
"2. He may deliver him to the constable of the vill, who may either 
carry him to the common gaol, ... or to a justice of peace to 
hr Pxammed, and farther prorPeded ag:nm8t as case shall r<:qmre . .. . 
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to any justice of peace of the 
county where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail, 
or commit him, as the case Rhnll require 
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private 
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would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to deterJ 
mine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner 
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would 
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he 
would be discharged from custody. 1 M. Hale, supra, at 
583-586; 2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen, 
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 (1883).1~ 
The initi?<l determination of probable cause also could be 
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus. 
2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at 
243; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75, 97-
101 (1807). This practice furnished the model for 
criminal procedure in America immediately following the 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Boll-
man, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 ( 1807); 17 Ex parte Burfordr 
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and there are indications that 
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model 
person t.o a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler 
will expect a Mittimus for his warrant of detaining." 
1M. Hale, supra, at 589--590. 
16 The examination .of the prisoner was inquisitorial, and the 
witnesses were questioned outside the prisoner's presence. Although 
this mrthod of proceeding was considered quite harsh, 1 J. Stephen, 
nt 219-225, it wa::; well e~tablished that the prisoner was entitled to bt· 
discharged if the mvestigation turned up insufficient evidence of his 
guilt !d., at 233. 
11 In Ex parte Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr case· 
were committed following an examination in the circuit court of 
the District of Columbia. They filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief 
.Justice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to 
persons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following-
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable causer. 
the Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that 
it did not establish probable cause that they were guilty of treason_ 
The prisoners were discharged, 
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for a "reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States, 
358 U.S. 307, 317-320 (1959) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting).18 
B 
Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a per-
son arrested without a warrant and charged by informa-
tion may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending 
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause 
determination.19 Petitioner defends this practice on the 
ground that the prosecutor's decision to file an informa-
tion is itself a determination of probable cause that fur-· 
nishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending 
trial. Although a conscientious decision that the evi-
dence warrants prosecution affords a measure of protec-
tion against unfounded detention, we do not think 
prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, we think the 
Court's previous decisions compel disapproval of the 
Florida procedure. In Albrecht v. United States, 273 
18 See al~o N. Lasson, The History and DPvelopment of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 15-16 (1937). 
A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery of 
stolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reason-
able" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was re-
quired to appear before a JUstice of the peace and make an oath 
of probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular place. 
After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim 
and the alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace 
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods 
and detention of the thief. 2M. Hale, S'Upra, at 149-152; T. Taylor, 
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969); 
seo Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-629 (1886). 
19 A prrHon arrested under a warrant would have received a prior 
,ludJcial determmat10n of probable cause. Under Fla. Rule Crim .. 
Proc. 3.120, a. warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that 
states facts showing that the ;;;uspect has committed a crime. The 
magio.trate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there 
k r;e~tsouablr ground: to bdl<>ve the complaint is true" 
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U.S. 1, 5 (1927), the Court held that an arrest warrant 
issued solely upon a United States Attorney's information 
was invalid because the accompanying affidavits were de-
fective. Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly 
state that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish 
probable cause, that conclusion was implicit in the judg-
ment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amend-
ment.20 More recently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U. S. 443, 449'----453 (1971), the Court held that a 
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is incon-
sistent with the constitutional role of a neutral and de-
tached magistrate. We reaffirmed that principle in Shad-
wick v. City of Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 ( 1972), and held 
that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant 
must be determined by someone independent of police 
and prosecution. See also United States· v. United States 
District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 317 (1972).21 The reason 
20 By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon 
its face," and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" con-
clusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires 
issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parte 
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v. 
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). 'The willingness to let a 
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached 
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the 
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust 
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346 
(1974) . 
21 The Court had earlier reached a different result in Ocampo v. 
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the 
Philippine Islands. Interpreting a statutory guarantee substantially 
identical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5, 
32 Stat. 693, the Court held that an arrest warrant could issue 
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court has since held 
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philip-
pines is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision irr 
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184,. 
19,4-198. (1957}. Even ii it were, the result reached in Ocampl)lo 
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for this separation of functions was expressed by Justice 
Frankfurter in a similar context: 
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dig-
nity of all men is central, naturally guards against 
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal 
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance 
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law 
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cher-
ished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled 
that safeguards must b~ provided against the dan-
gers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The 
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be 
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated 
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into 
different parts, responsibility for which is separately 
vested in the various participants upon whom the 
criminal law relies for its vindication." MeN abb v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943). 
In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable 
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty 
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is en-
titled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to 
prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's prior hold-
ing that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite to prosecu-
tion by information. Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 
541, 545 ( 1962); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 586 
(1913). Nor do we retreat from the established rule 
that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent 
conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952); 
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, as the Court 
of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is 
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for 
is incompatible with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, an<l 
Shad; wick, 
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that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated 
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending 
trial without a determination of probable cause. 483 
F. 2d, at 786-787. Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 
F. 2d 6 (CAS 1968), with Brown v. Fauntleroy,- U.S. 
App. D. C.-, 442 F . 2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone, 
-U.S. App. D. C.-, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969). 
III 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
held that the determination of probable cause must be 
accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safe-
guards--counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and 
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary 
hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in 
many States to determine whether the evidence justifies 
going to trial under an information or presenting the 
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 
1 (1970); Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern 
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974). 
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is 
usually referred to as "probable cause," but in some juris-
dictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt. 
A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Com-
mentary on Article 330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 
1972). When the hearing takes this form, adversary pro-
cedures are customarily employed. The importance of 
the issue to both the State and the accused justifies the 
presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their 
testimony on cross-examination. This kind of hearing 
also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defend-
ants. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. And, as the hearing: 
assumes increased importance and the procedures become 
:more complex, the likelihood that it can be held promptly-
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after arrest diminishes. See A. L. I. Model Code of Pre~ 
arraignment Procedure, supra, at 33-34. 
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the 
probable cause determination required by the Fourth 
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable 
cause for detaining the arrested person pending further 
proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably with-
out an adversary hearing. The standard is the same 
as that for arrest.22 That standard-probable cause to 
believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditionally 
has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary pro-
ceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court 
has approved these informal modes of proof. 
"Guilt in a criminal case 'must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that 
which long experience in the common-law tradition, 
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has 
erystallized into rules of evidence consistent with 
that standard. These rules are historically grounded 
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men 
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting 
forfeitures of life, liberty and property. 
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the 
very name implies, we deal with probabilities. 
These are not technical; they are the factual and 
22 Because the standards are identical, ordinarily there is no need 
for further investigation before the probable cause determination can 
be made. 
"Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must arrest on 'prob-
able cause.' It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were, 
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters 
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing 
magistrate on 'probable cause.'" Mallory v. United States, 35! 
u .. s. 449, 456 (1957)'. 
18 
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practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correla-
tive to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949). 
Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300 ( 1967). 
The use of an informal procedure is justified not only 
by the lesser conseque11ces of a probable cause deter. 
mination but also by the nature of the determination 
itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflict-
ing evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a prepond-
erance standard demands, and credibility determinations 
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence sup-
ports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, Prosecu-
tion: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64-
109 (1969).23 This is not to say that confrontation and 
cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of 
23 In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), and Gagru:Jn v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee or proba-
tioner a.rrested prior to revocation is entitled to an informal pre-
liminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live 
testimony. 408 U. S., at 487; 411 U. S., at 786. That preliminary 
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by 
the Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and pre-
serving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently 
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred. 
408 U.S., at 485; 411 U.S., at 782-783 n. 5. Moreover, revocation 
proceedings may offer less protection from initial error than the 
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute 
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect 
with crime unless he is satisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code· 
of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-103 (A) (a prosecutor "shall 
not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows 
or it is obvioue that the charges are not supported by probable 
cause") ; ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Crim-· 
ina! Justice, The Prosecution Function, §§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); Amer-· 
ican College of Trial Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4 (c) 
(1972) .. 
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probable cause determinations in some cases. In most 
cases,-however, their value would be too slight to justify 
holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these 
formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be 
employed in making the Fourth Amendment determina-
tion of probable cause.24 
Because of its limited function and its nonadversary 
character, the probable cause determination is not a 
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require 
appointed counsel. The Court has identified as "critical 
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair de-
fense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed 
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 
(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 226-227 
(1967). In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held 
that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of an Ala-
bama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions 
identified two critical factors that distinguish the Ala-
bama preliminary hearing from the probable cause deter-
mination required by the Fourth Amendment. First, 
under Alabama law the function of the preliminary hear-
ing was to determine whether the evidence justified charg-
ing the suspect with an offense. A finding of no probable 
cause could mean that he would not be tried at all. The 
Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is ad-
dressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure, pretrial 
custody may affect to some extent the defendant's ability 
to assist in preparation of his defense, but this does not\ 
present the high probability of substantial harm identi-
fied as controlling in HI ade and Coleman. Second, Ala-
24 Criminal justice is already overburdened by the volume of cases 
and the comp!Pxlties of our ~ystem. The processing of misdemeanors, 
in particular, and the early stages of prosecution generally are marked 
by delays that can senously affect the quality of justice. A consti-
tutional dor-trine requiring adversary hearings for all persons detained 
pending trial could exacerbate the problem of pretrial delay. 
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bama allowed the suspect to confront and cross-examine 
prosecution witnesses at the preliminary hearing. The 
Court noted that the suspect's defense on the merits could 
be compromised if he had no legal assistance for exploring 
of preserving the witnesses' testimony. This considera-
tion does not apply when the prosecution is not required 
to produce witnesses for cross-examination. 
Although we conclude that the Constitution does not 
requirE' an adversary determination of probable cause, we 
recognize that state systems of criminal procedure vary 
widely. There is no single preferred pretrial procedure, 
and the nature of the probable cause determination 
usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pretrial 
procedure viewed as a whole. While we limit our hold-
ing to. the precise requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility and ex-
perimentation by the States. It may be found desirable, 
for example, to make the probable cause determination at 
the suspect's first appearance before a judicial officer/~ 
see McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 342-344 
( 1943), or the determination may be incorporated in to 
the procedure for setting bail or fixing other conditions 
of pretrial release. In some States, existing procedures 
may satisfy the requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
Others may require only minor adjustment, such as accel-
eration of their existing preliminary hearings. Current 
proposals for criminal procedure reform suggest other 
20 Several State::J already authorize a determination of probable 
cause at th1s stage or immediately thereafter. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 39-2-3 (1965 Supp.) ; Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708-9 (5) (1968); Vt. 
Hules Crirn. Proc. 3 (b), 5 (c) (1974). This Court has interpreted 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require a determination 
of probable cause at the first appearance. Jaben v. United States, 
381 U. S. 214, 218 (1965); Mallory V· United States, 354 U. S. 449), 
454 (1957). 
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ways of testing probable cause for detention. 26 WhateveP ) 
procedure a State may adopt, it must provide a fair and 
reliable determination of probable cause as a condition 
for any signifieant pretrial restraint on liberty,Z7 and this 
za Under the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure (Proposed I 
Final Draft 1974), a person arrested without a warrant is entitled, 
!'without unnecessary delay," to a first appearance befo~e a magis-
trate and a determination that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest 
warrant. The determination may be made on afEdavits or testimony, 
in the presence of the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remain in 
custody for inability to qualify for pretrial release are offered another 
opportunity for a probable cause determination at the detention hear-
ing, held no more than five days after arrest. This is an adversary 
hearing, and the parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay 
evidence may be considered. Rule 344. 
The A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent. \ 
Draft No. 5, 1972, and Tent. Draft No. SA, 1973) also provides a 
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported 
by a reasonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. The 
magistrate may make a determination of probable cause to hold the 
accused, but he is not required to do so and the accused may request 
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be 
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes 
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written 
and live testimony: 
"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence 
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present addi-
tional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of 
which he is accused. The state)s submission may be made by means 
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the 
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the 
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appear-
ance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks 
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause." 
~ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973). 
27 Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional 
'prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those-
suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition 
'that they appear for ttial. There are many kinds of pretrial relea~ 
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determination must be made by a judicial officer either 
before or promptly after arrest. 
IV 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth 
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of 
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we 
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we 
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the 
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree, 
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146; 
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice,. 
Pretrial Release § 5.2 (1974) ; Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Rule 341 (Proposed Final Draft 1974) . We cannot define spe-
cifically those that would require a prior probable cause determina-
tion, but the key factor is significl;Ult restraint on liberty. 
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The issue in this case is whether a person arrested 
under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally en-
titled to a judicial determination of probable cause for 
pretrial restraint of liberty. 
I 
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were 
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged 
with several offenses under a prosecutor's information.1 
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against 
him carried a potential life sentence, and Henderson re-
mained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500 
bond. 
1 Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971. On March 16 
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a con-
cealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a 
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrested on March 2, and charged 
by information on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and 
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate 
whether there was an arrest warrant in either case. 
tt 
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu• 
tion of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all other 
crimes by information, without a prior preliminary hear-
ing and without obtaining leave of court. Fla. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 3.140 (a); State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109 
(Fla. 1968); Di Bona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1960). At the time r~spondents were arrested, a 
Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary 
hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases, 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the· 
Florida courts had held that the· filing of an information 
foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing, 
See State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 
1972) .2 They had also held that habeas corpus could not 
be used, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances, to 
test the probable cause for detention under an informa-
tion. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 29 So. 2d 
794, 797 (Fla. 1951). The only possible methods for ob-
tah1ing a judicial determination of probable cause were a 
special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30 
days, Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 907.045 (1973),3 and arraignment, 
which the District Court found was often delayed a month 
or more after a.rrest. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 
1107, 1110 (SD Fla. 1971).4 As a result, a person charged 
2 Florida law also denies preliminary hearings to persons confined 
under indictment, ~:~ee Sangar-ee v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla . 19i0); 
Fla. Rule Crim. Pro c. 3.131 (a), but that procedure is not challenged 
in this case. See n. 19, post, at 14. 
8 Thie statute may have been construed to make the hearing per-
missive instead of mandatory. See Evans v. State, 197 So. 2d 323 
(Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 067-29 (1967) . But cf. 
Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971). It may also 
have been superseded by the subsequent amendments to the rules of 
criminal procedure. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,. 
272 So. 2d 55 (1972) . 
4 The Florida rules do not suggest that the issue of probable· 
<CJJ.'I,l.&e ca:n be raised at arraignment, F1,1a. :Rule Crim. Proc. 3.160, hut 
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by information could be detained for a substantial period 
solely on the decision of a prosecutor. 
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action 
against Dade County officials in the Federal District 
Court,5 claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hear-
ing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declara-
tory and injunctive relief.0 Respondents Turner and 
Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently 
intervened.7 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for 
Dade County, was one of several defendants.8 
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature con-
sidered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hear-
ings to persons charged by information, the District Court 
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, supra. 
The court certified the case as a class action under Fed. 
counsel for Petitioner represented at oral argument that arraign-
ment affords the suspect an opportunity to "attack the sufficiency of 
the evidence to hold him." Tr. of Oral Arg., Mar. 25, 1974, at 17. 
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that this was true. 
483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8. 
5 The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and juris-
diction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). 
0 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as 
an alternate remedy. They asked only that the state authorities be 
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was 
also the only relief that the District Court ordered for the named 
respondents. 332 F. Supp., at 1115-1116. Because release was 
neither asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the dass 
of cases for which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 417 U.S. 
-,- (1974). 
1 Turner was being held on a charge of auto theft, following arrest 
on March 11, 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges 
of soliciting a ride and possession of marihuana. 
8 The named defendants included justices of the peace and judges 
of small-claims courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary 
hearings in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officers 
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only 
ooe who petitioned for certiorari. 
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Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b)(2), and held that the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged 
by information a right to a judicial hearing on the ques-
tion of probable cause. The District Court ordered the 
Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an 
immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable 
cause for further detention.9 It also ordered them to 
submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in ~11 cases 
instituted by information. 
The defendants submitted a plan authored by Sheriff 
E. Wilson Purdy, and the District Court adopted it with 
modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed post· 
arrest procedure. 336 F. Supp. 490. Upon arrest the 
accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first 
appea.rance hearing." The magistrate would explain the 
charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel 
if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause 
determination unless either t,he prosecutor or the a.ccused 
was unprepared. If either requested more time, the 
magistrate would set the date for a 11 preliminary hearing,'' 
to be held within four days if the accused was in custody 
and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial. 
The order provided sanctions for failure to hold the hear-
ings at prescribed times. At the "preliminary hearing" 
the accused would be entitled to counsel, and he would be 
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, 
9 The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for 
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal inter-
vention in state prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, 
but only at the legality of pretrial ' detention without a judicial hear-
ing, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal 
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not 
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. Monte~ 
muro, 477 F. 2d 1073, 1082 (CA3 1973); cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 
U. S. 82 {1971); Stefanelli v. Minar:d, 342 U. S. 117 (1.951). 
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to summon favorable witnesses, and to have a transcript 
made on request. If the magistrate found no probable 
cause, the accused would be discharged. He then could 
not be charged with the same offense by complaint or in-
formation, but only by indictment returned within 30 
days. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the 
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case 
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary volun-
tarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon 
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals re-
manded the case for specific findings on the constitu-
tionality of the new Dade County system. Before the 
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida 
Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing 
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed 
that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the 
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures. 
Under the amended rules every arrested person must 
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130 (b). This "first appearance" is 
similar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the 
District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the mag-
istrate does not make a determination of probable cause. 
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for 
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges 
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to 
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule 
3.131; see In re Rule 3.181 (b). Florida Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, 289 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974). 
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held 
that the amended rules had not answered the basic con-
stitutional objection, since a defendant charged by in-
formation still could be detained pending trial without 
a. judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp. 
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1286. Reaffirming its original ruling, the District Court 
declared that the continuation of this practice was uncon-
stitutionaP0 The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d 
778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor par-
ticulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hear-
ing provided by the amended Florida rules would be ac· 
ceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in 
custody pending trial. I d., at 788-789. 
State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review, and we 
granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue.11 
414 U. S. 1062. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
10 Although this ruling held a statewide "legislative rule" unconsti-
tutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by vir-
tue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for 
an injunction against enforcement of any state statute or legislative 
rule of statewide application, since the practice of denying prelim-
inary hearings to persons charged by information was then em-
bodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had 
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appeals 
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the constitutionality 
of a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when 
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental 
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the 
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never 
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court 
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District 
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. See 483 F. 
2d, at 788-790. Accordingly, a district court of three judges was not 
required for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. Mendoza,. 
Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1963}; Flemming v. Nestor, 363 
u.s. 603,606-608 (1960). 
11 At oral argument counsrl informed us that the named respond. 
ents have been convicted. Their pretrial detention therefore has 
ended. This case belongs, however, to that narrow class of cases in 
which the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot 
the claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa, 
- U. S. - (1975). Pretrial detE'ntion is by nature temporary, 
~nd it is most unlikely that any given individual could have h)$ 
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II 
As framed by the proceedings below, this case presents 
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial 
on an information is entitled to a judicial determination 
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the 
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and 
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the 
Constitution. 
A 
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and 
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amend-
ment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v. 
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Ex parte 
Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Bur-
constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or 
convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated depriva-
tions, and it is certain that other persons similarly situated will be 
detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, 
in short, is one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review." 
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were 
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable 
cause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any 
of them were still in custody awaiting trial when the District Court 
certified the class. Such a showing ordinarily would be required to 
avoid mootness under Sosna. But this case is a suitable exception 
to that requirement. See Sosna, supra, at -- n. 11; cf. Rivera v. 
Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159, 1162-1163 (CA9 1972). The length of pre-
trial custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be €0ded 
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or 
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is 
by no means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff, 
would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to 
certify the class. Moreover, in this case the constant existence of 
a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney 
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we can 
flafely assume that he has other clients with a continuing live interest 
in the case, 
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ford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 448 ( 1806). The standard for 
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and 
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was com .. 
mitting an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91 
(1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176 
(1949). This standard, like those for searches and seiz-
ures, represents a necessary accommodation between the 
individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to con-
trol crime. 
"These long-prevailing standards seek to safe-
guard citizens from rash and unreasonable inter-
ferences with privacy and from unfounded charges 
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for 
enforcing the law in the community's protection. 
Because many situations which confront officers in 
the course of executing their duties are more or less 
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes 
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of 
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to 
their conclusions of probability. The rule of prob-
able cause is a practical, nontechnical conception 
affording the best compromise that has been found 
for accommodating these often opposing interests. 
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforce-
ment. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding 
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." 
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176. 
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection 
against unfounded mvasions of liberty and privacy, the 
Court has required that the existence of probable cause 
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate when-
ever possible. The classic statement of this principle 
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appears in Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14 
(1948): 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often 
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies 
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its pro-
tection consists in requiring that those inferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead 
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-22 (1968).12 
Maximum protection of individual rights could be 
assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual 
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement 
would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate 
law enforcement. Thus, while the Court has expressed a 
preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible, 
Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 96; Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U. S. 471, 479-482 (1963), it has never invalidated 
an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the 
officers failed to secure a warrant. SeeKer v. California, 
374 U. S. 23 ( 1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 
307 (1959); 'l'rupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 
(1948).13 
12 We rE>iterated this principle in United States v. United States 
District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972) . In terms that apply equally 
to arrests, we described the "very heart of the Fourth Amendment 
directive" as a requirement that "where practical, a governmental 
search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer 
to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the mag-
istrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a 
citizen's private premises or conversation." /d ., at 316. See also 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968). 
u Another aspect of Trupiano was overruled in United States v. 
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Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the-
scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justifi ... 
cation for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for 
a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps 
incident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, how-
ever, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magis-
trate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is 
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further 
crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magis-
trate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary 
action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determina-
tion of probable cause increases significantly. The con-
sequences of prolonged detention may be more serious 
than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial con-
finement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his 
source of income, and impair his family relationships. 
SeeR. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91 (1965); L. Katz, Justice 
Is the Crime 51-62 (1972). Even pretrial release may be 
accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a sig-
nificant restraint on liberty. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3146 
(a) (2), (5). When the stakes are this high, the detached 
judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth 
Amendment is to furnish me!'Lllingful protection from un-
founded interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold 
that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial deter-
mination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended 
restraint on liberty following arrest. 
This result has historical support in the common law 
:Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), whjch was overruled in turn by 
Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969). 
The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most con-
troversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what 
cjrcumstances an officer may ,enter a suspect's home to make a war-
rantless arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-
481 (1971); id., at 510-512 n. 1 (W;arTE, J., dissenting); Jones y. 
lJ1;1titerJ States, 351 U. S. 493, 499- 500 (1958), 
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that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 
(1925). At common law it was customary, if not obliga- ' 
tory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice 
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the 
Crown 116-117 (4th ed. 1792). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 
115 U.S. 487, 498-499 (1885).14 The justice of the peace 
would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to deter-
mine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner 
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would 
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he 
would be discharged from custody. 1M. Hale, supra, at 
583-586; 2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen, 
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 (1883).15 
14 The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have 
been the penalty for allowing a!! offender to escape, if he had in fact 
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment, 
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of 
wmmitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief 
detention. 
"When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected 
of felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dis-
miss himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can, 
he may do either of these things. 
"1. He may carry him to the common gaol, ... but that is now 
rarely done. 
"2. He may deliver him to the constable of the vill, who may either 
carry him to the common gaol, . . . or to a justice of peace to 
be examined, and farther proceeded against as case shall require .... 
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to any justice of peace of the 
eounty where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail, 
or commit him, as the case shall require. 
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private 
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler 
will expect a Mittimu$ for his warrant of detaining." 
1 M. Hale, supra. at 589-590. 
15 The examination of the pri~oner wa~ inqui>utorial, and the 
witnesses were questioned outside the prisoner's presence. Although 
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The initial determination of pr6bable cause also could b~ 
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus. 
2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at 
243; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75, 97-
101 (1807). This practice furnished the model for 
criminal procedure in America immediately following the 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Boll~ 
rnan, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 ( 1807) ; 16 Ex parte Burford, 
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and there are indications that 
the Framers of the Bill of RigMs regarded it as a model 
for a "reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States, 
358 U.S.307, 317-320 (1959) (DouGLAs,J.,concurring).17 
this method of proceeding was considered quite harsh, 1 J. Stephen, 
at 219-225, it was well established that the prisoner was entitled to be 
discharged if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of his 
guilt. !d., at 233. 
16 In Ex parte Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr case 
were committed following an examination in the circuit court of 
the District of Columbia. They filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief 
Justice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to 
persons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following 
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause, 
th~ Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that 
it did not establish probable cause that they were guilty of treason, 
The prisoners were discha1·ged. 
17 See al~o N. Lasson, The History and Development of the· 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 15-16 (1937) . 
A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery of 
stolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reason-
able" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was re-
,quired to appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath 
,of probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular place. 
After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim 
·and the alleged thief would appear ·before the justice of the peace-
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods 
:and detention of the thief. 2 M. Ha:lel supra, at 149-152; T. Taylor., 
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Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a per-
son arrested without a warrant and charged by informa-
tion may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending 
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause 
determination.18 Petitioner defends this practice on the 
ground that the prosecutor's decision to file an informa-
tion is itself a determination of probable cause that fur-
nishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending 
trial. Although a conscientious decision that the evi-
dence warrants prosecution affords a measure of protec-
tion against unfounded detention, we do not think 
prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, we think the 
Court's previous decisions compel disapproval of the 
Florida procedure. In Albrecht v. United States, 273 
U. S. 1, 5 (1927), the Court held that an arrest warrant 
issued solely upon a United States Attorney's information 
was invalid because the accompanying affidavits were de-
fective. Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly 
state that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish 
probable cause, that conclusion was implicit in the judg-
ment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amend-
ment.10 More recently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969); 
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626-629 (1886). 
18 A person arrested under a warrant would have received a prior 
judicial determination of probable cause. Under Fla. Rule Crim. 
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that 
states facts showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The 
magistrate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there 
is reasonable ground to believe the complaint is true. 
10 By contrast, the> Court has held that an indictment , "fair upon 
its face," and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" con-
clusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires 
issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parte 
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403 U. S. 443, 449'--453 ( 1971), the Court held that a 
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is incon-
sistent with the constitutional role of a neutral and de-
tached magistrate. We reaffirmed that principle in Shad-
wick v. City of Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 (1972), and held 
that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant 
must be determined by someone independent of police 
and prosecution. See also United States v. United States 
District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 317 (1972).~ The reason 
for this separation of functions was expressed by Justice 
Frankfurter in a similar context: 
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dig-
nity of all men is central, naturally guards against 
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal 
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance 
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law 
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cher-
ished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled 
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v. 
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a 
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached 
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the 
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust 
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346 
(1974). 
to The Court had earh<'r reachrd a differPnt rc~ult in Ocampo v 
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the 
Philippine Islands. Interpreting a statutory guarantee substantially 
identical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5, 
32 Stat. 693, the Court held that an arrest warrant could issue 
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court has since held 
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philip-
pines is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision in 
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 
194-198 (1957). Even if it were, the result reached in Ocampo 
is incompatible with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, and 
Shadwick. 
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that safeguards must be provided against the dan· 
gers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The 
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be 
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated 
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into 
different parts, responsibility for which is separately 
vested in the various participants upon whom the 
criminal law relies for its vindication." MeN abb v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943). 
In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable 
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty 
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is en-
titled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to 
prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's prior hold-
ing that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite to prosecu-
tion by information. Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 
541, 545 ( 1962); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 586 
(1913). Nor do we retreat from the established rule 
that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent 
conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 ( 1952); 
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, as the Court 
of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is 
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for 
that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated 
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending 
trial without a determination of probable cause. 483 
F. 2d, at 786-787. Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 39:-3 
F. 2d 6 (CAS 1968), with Brown v. Fauntleroy,- U.S. 
App. D. C.-, 442 F. 2d 838 (1971), and Caoley v. Stone, 
- U. S. App. D. C.-, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969). 
III 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
held that the determination of probable cause must be 
accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safe-
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guards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and 
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary 
hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in 
many States to determine whether the evidence justifies 
going to trial under an information or presenting the 
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 
1 (1970); Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern 
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974). 
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is 
usually referred to as "probable cause," but in some juris-
dictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt. 
A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Com-
mentary on Article 330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 
1972). When the hearing takes this form, adversary pro-
cedures are customarily employed. The importance of 
the issue to both the State and the accused justifies the 
presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their 
testimony on cross-examination. This kind of hearing 
also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defend-
ants. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. And, as the hearing 
assumes increased importance and the procedures become 
more comple'X, the likelihood that it can be held promptly 
after arrest diminishes. See A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-
arraignment Procedure, supra, at 33-34. 
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the 
probable cause determination required by the Fourth 
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable 
cause for detaining the arrested person pending further 
proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably with-
out an adversary hearing. The standard is the same 
as that for arrest.21 That standard-probable cause to 
21 Because the standards nre identical, ordinnrily there is no ueed 
for further investigation before the probable cause determination can 
be made. , 
1'Presumably, whomever the police ar:rest they must arrest on 'prob-
able cause.' It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were. 
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believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditionally 
has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary pro-
ceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court 
has approved these informal modes of proof. 
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that 
which long experience in the common-law tradition, 
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has 
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with 
that standard. These rules are historically grounded 
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men 
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting 
forfeitures of life, liberty and property. 
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the 
very name implies, we deal with probabilities. 
These are not technical; they are the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correla-
tive to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949). 
Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). 
The use of an informal procedure is justified not only 
by the lesser consequences of a probable cause deter-
mination but also by the nature of the determination 
itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflict· 
ing evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a prepond-
erance standard demands, and credibility determinations 
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence sup-
ports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, Prosecu-
at large and to use an inte1 rogating process at police h~adquarters 
in order to determine whorn they should charge before a committing 
magistrate on 'probable cause.'" Mallory v. United States, 354 
u.s. 449J 456 (1957). 
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tion: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64-
109 (1969).22 This is not to say that confrontation and 
,cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of 
probable cause determinations in some cases. In most 
cases, however, their value would be too slight to justify 
holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these 
formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be 
employed in making the Fourth Amendment determina-
tion of .erobable _,efause.23 
Because of its limited function and its' nonadversary 
character, the probable cause determination is not a 
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require 
22 In Morrissey v. B1"ewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee or proba-
tioner arrested prior to revocation is entitled to an informal pre-
liminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live 
testimony. 408 U.S., at 487; 411 U. S., at 786, That preliminary 
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by 
the Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and pre-
serving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently 
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred. 
408 U.S., at 485; 411 U.S., at 782-783 n. 5. Moreover, revocation 
proceedings may offer less protection from initial error than the 
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute 
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect 
with crime unless he is satisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code 
of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-103 (A) (a prosecutor "shall 
not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows 
or it is obviou11 that the charges are not supported by probablt> 
cause") ; ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Crim-
inal Justice, The Prosecution Function, §§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); Amer-
ican College of Trial Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4 (c) 
(1972). 
2 :; Criminal justice is already overburdened by the volume of cases 
and the complexities of our ~ystem. The processing of misdemeanors, 
in particular, and the early stages of prosecution generally are marked 
by delays that can seriously affect the quality of justice. A consti-
tutional doctrine requiring adversary hearings for all persons detained 
pending trial could exacerbate the problem of pretrial delay. 
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appointed counsel. The Court has identified as "critical 
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair de-
fense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed 
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 
(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 226-227 
(1967). In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held 
that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of an Ala-
bama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions 
identified two critical factors that distinguish the Ala-
bama preliminary hearing from the probable cause deter-
mination required by the Fourth Amendment. First, 
under Alabama law the function of the preliminary hear-
ing was to determine whether the evidence justified charg-
ing the suspect with an offense. A finding of no probable 
cause could mean that he would not be tried at all. The 
Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is ad-
dressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure, pretrial 
custody may affect to some extent the defendant's ability 
to assiet in preparation of his defense, but this does not 
present the high probability of substantial harm identi-
fied as controlling in Wade and Coleman. Second, Ala-
bama allo·wed the suspect to confront and cross-examine 
prosecution witnesses at the preliminary hearing. The 
Court noted that the suspect's defense on the merits could 
be compromised if he had no legal assistance for exploring 
or preserving the witnesses' testimony. This considera-
tion does not apply when the prosecution is not required 
to produce witnesses for cross-examination. 
Although we conclude that the Constitution does not 
require an adversary determination of probable cause, we 
recognize that state systems of criminal procedure vary 
widely. There is no single preferred pretrial procedure, 
and the nature of the probable cause determination 
usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pretrial 
procedure viewed as a whole. While we limit our hold .. 
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ing to the precise requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility and ex-
perimentation by the States. It may be found desirable, 
for example, to make the probable cause determination at 
the suspect's first appearance before a judicial officer,2·i 
see McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 342-344 
(1943), or the determination may be incorporated into 
the procedure for setting bail or fixing other conditions 
of pretrial release. In some States, existing procedures 
may satisfy the requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
Others may require only minor adjustment, such as accel-
eration of existing preliminary hearings. Current 
proposals for criminal procedure reform suggest other 
ways of testing probable cause for detention.2 ~ Whatever 
24 Several States already authorize a determination of probable 
cause at this stage or irnmediatdy thereafter. See Colo. Rev . Stat. 
§ 39-2-3 (1965 Supp.); Hnwaii Rev. Stat. § 708-9 (5) (1968); Vt. 
Rules Crim. Proc. 3 (b), 5 (c) (1974). This Court has interpreted 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require a determination 
of probable cause at the first appearance. Jaben v. United States, 
381 U. S. 214, 218 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 
454 (1957). 
25 Under the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure (Proposed 
Final Draft 197 4), a. person arrested without a warrant is entitled, 
"without unnecessary delay," to a first appearance before a magis-
trate and a determination that grounds exist for issuance of an arreBt 
warrant. The determination may be made on affidavits or te~tJmony, 
in the presence of the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remain in 
custody for inability to qualify for pretrial release arc offered another 
opportunity for a probable cause determination at the detention hear-
mg, held no more than five days after arrest. This is an adversary 
hearing, and the parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay 
evidence may be comotidered. Rule 344. 
The A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent. 
Draft No. 5, 1972, and Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973) also provides a 
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be support~d 
by a reasonably detailed wntten statement of facts. § 310. The 
magistrate may make a determinat10n of probable cause to hold the 
rb j:C ts to *' e eDuct's c..1..oice.. of th<?.. ~u..fth. Aro~aVVI~t 
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procedure a State may adopt, it must provide a fair and 
reliable determination of probable cause as a condition 
for any significant pretrial restraint on liberty/6 and this 
determination must be made by a judicial officer either 
before or prompt1y after arrest.27 
accused, but he is not required to do so and the accused may request 
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be 
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes 
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written 
and live testimony: 
"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence 
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present addi-· 
tional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of 
which he is accused. The state's submission may be made by means 
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the 
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the 
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appear-
ance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks 
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause." 
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973). 
26 BecauHe the probable cause determination is not a constitutional 
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those 
suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition 
that they appear for trial. There are many kinds of pretrial release 
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146; 
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, 
Pretrial Release § 5.2 (1974); Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Rule 341 (Proposed Final Draft 1974). We cannot define spe-
cifically those that would require a 'prior probable cause determina-
tion, but the key factor is significant restraint on liberty. 
r--::--2_7 ...::,1::.:,n_h::.:ii:i concurring opinion, post, at -- n. --, MR. JusTICE 
S'I'}]WART suggests that the Court offers less procedural protection 
to a person in jaj] than it requires in certain civil cases. Here we 
deal with the complex procedures of a criminal case nnd a threshold 
right [;Uaranteed by the Fourth Ammdment. The historical basis 
of the probable cause requirement is quite different from the rela-· 
tively recent application of variable procedural due process m debtor. 
creditor dispute~ and termination of government-created benefits. 
The Fo11rth Amendme~.tt ~was tailored exp!Jcitly for the criminal 
~ I f • 
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IV 
Wr ngrrr with tlw Court of Apprnls that thr Fourth 
Amendment requ1res a timely judicial determination of 
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we 
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we 
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the 
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree, 
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
JU~:>hce ~~·~tern, and ito balance bPtwecn individual and pubhc intPre~tP 
alway~ ha,.; bem thonght to defiur thP ''proceS8 that i~ due" for 
>'<'JZUn's of pert<on or pro]wrty in criminal ca~r,.,. :\lon·over, tlH' 
Fourth -\mPndmC'nt probablr cnu~c detPrmination IS 111 fact only the 
first stagP of an elaborate ~y,tem, unique in JUrisprudencr, de~igned 
to safe ·uard the right,: of those act·uscd of criminal ·onduct. Tlw 
relHtivel~ t<impl Civil procedures (e. (]., prior mterview with ochool 
]Jrmc1pal bt>forl' ~u~:>pen::;ion) prpscntrd m the cases c1trd in the con 
currmg opnuon arr mapposite and irrelevant in tht wholh d1ffcrrnt. 
<;QntPxf of the rrimiun 1 iustJce ~ystem.. 
~ rlt would not be practicable to follow the further 
~~uggestion implicit in Mr. Justic e Stewart's concurring 
opinion that we leave for another day determination of 
the procedural safeguards that are required in making 
a probable cause determination under the Fourth I 
Amendment. The judgment under review both declares 
the right not to be _. detained without a probable 
cause determination and affirms the District Court's 
order prescribing an adversary hearing for the 
implementation of that right. The circumstances of 
the case thus require a decision on both issues. 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Ju~~ ice Douglas 
Mr. Juct'cu Bre~nan 
Mr. J-l1~~: t ·Lee :~: :;r-m·:.rt 
Mr. tJr;~3J~..-L.n .. 3 V~/~11t 1:1 
4.th DRAFT 
M'r. t"T, :.:; ··.: "l <:. :; L ·:.1 :3.~J:-.~ ll 
tLr-. J L., .. J·L or~ .. -~_ .... '-. ~-·! .. :m·;·J1 
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Richard E. Gerstein, State At-
torney for Eleventh Judicial 
Circuit of Florida, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Robert Pugh et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit. 
[December -, 1974] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The issue in this case is whether a person arrested 
under a prosecutor's infm·mation is constitutionally en-
titled to a judicial determination of probable cause for 
pretrial restraint of liberty. 
I 
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were 
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged 
with several offenses under a prosecutor's information.1 
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against 
him ca.rried a potential life sentence, and Henderson re-
mained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500 
bond, 
1 Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971. On March 16-
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a con-
cealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a 
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrested on March 2, and charged 
by infot·matio:a on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and 
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate 
whether there was lln ane&t warrant in either case .. 
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu• 
tion of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all othel' 
crimes by information, without a prior preliminary hear-
ing and without obtaining leave of court. Fla. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 3.140 (a); State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109 
(Fla. 1968) ; Di Bona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1960) . At the time respondents were arrested, a 
Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary 
hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases. 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the 
Florida courts had held that the filing of an information 
foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing. 
See State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 
1972).2 They had also held that habeas corpus could not 
be used, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances, to 
test the probable cause for detention under an informa.... 
tion. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 29 So. 2d 
794, 797 (Fla. 1951) . The only possible methods for ob-
taining a judicial determination of prohable cause were a 
special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30 
days, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973),S and arraignment, 
which the District Court found was often delayed a month 
or more after arrest. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 
1107, 1110 (SD Fla. 1971 ) .• As a result, a person charged 
2 Florida law also denies preliminary hearings to persons confined 
under indictment, see Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970) ; 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a), but that procedure is not challenged 
in this case. See n. 19, post, at 14. { 
8 This statute may haYe been construed to make t he hearing per· 
missive instead of mandatory. See Evans v. State, 197 So. 2d 323 
(Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 067- 29 ( 1967 ). But cf. 
Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (F1a. Ct . App. 1971). It may also 
have been superseded by the subsequent amendments to the rules of 
criminal procedure. In re Florida Rule& of Criminal Procedure, 
272 So. 2d 65 (1972). 
• The Florida rules do not suggest that the issue of probable 
.cause can be raised at arraignment, F1a. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.160, but 
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by information could be detained for a substantial period 
!olely on the decision of a prosecutor. 
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action 
against Dade County officials in the Federal District 
Court,u claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hear-
ing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declara-
tory and injunctive relief.6 Respondents Turner and 
Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently 
intervened.7 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for 
Dade County, was one of several defendants.8 
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature con-
sidered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hear~ 
ings to persons charged by information, the District Court 
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, supra. 
The court certified the case as a class action under Fed. 
counsel for Petitioner represented at oral argument that arraign-
ment affords the suspect an opportunity to "attack the sufficiency of 
the evidence to hold him." Tr. of Oral Arg., Mar. 25, 1974, at 17. 
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that this was true. 
483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8. 
6 The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and juris-
diction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). 
6 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as 
an alternate remedy. They asked only that the state authorities be 
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was 
also the only relief that the District Court ordered for the named 
respondents. 332 F. Supp., at 1115-1116. Because release was 
neither asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class 
of cases for which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 417 U.S. 
-,- (1974). 
1 Turner was being held on a charge of auto theft, following arrest 
on March 11, 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges 
of soliciting a ride and possession of marihuana. 
8 The named defendants included justict>,s of the peace and judges 
of small-claims courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary 
bearings in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officer~ 
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only 
.om~ who petitioned for certiorari. 
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Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (2), and held that the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged 
by information a right to a JUdicial hearing on the ques .. 
tion of probable cause. The District Court ordered the 
Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an 
immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable 
cause for further detention.9 It also ordered them to 
submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases 
instituted by information. 
The defendants submitted a plan authored by Sheriff 
E. Wilson Purdy, and the District Court adopted it with 
modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed post--
arrest procedure. 336 F. Supp. 490. Upon arrest the 
accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first 
appearance hearing." The magistrate would explain the 
charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel 
if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause 
determination unless either the prosecutor or the accused 
was unprepared. If either requested more time, the 
magistrate would set the date for a "preliminary hearing," 
to be held within four days if the accused was in custody 
and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial. 
The order provided sanctions for failure to hold the hear-
ings at prescribed times. At the "preliminary hearing" 
the accused would be entitled to counsel, and he would be 
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, 
9 The District Court correctly held that rei:ipondents' claim for 
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal inter-
vention in state prosecutions, Younger v.!Iarris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, 
but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hear-
mg, an is~ue that could not be r'lised in defensr of the criminal 
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearmgs could not 
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. Monte,.. 
muro, 477 F. 2d 1073 lOE\2 (CA3 1973); cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 40' 
U S. 82 (1971); Stefanelli v Minard, 342 U. S 111 (1951), 
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to summon favorable witnesses, and to have a transcript 
made on req uest. If the magistrate found no probable 
cause, the accused would be discharged. He then could 
not be charged with the same offense by complaint or in-
formation, but only by indictment returned within 30 
days. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the 
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case 
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary volun-
tarily adopted a similar procedure of its own, Upon 
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals re-
manded the case for specific findings on the constitu-
tionality of the new Dade County system. Before the 
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida 
Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing 
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed 
that the Di-strict Court should direct its inquiry to the 
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures. 
Under the amended rules every arrested person must 
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130 (b). This "first appearance" is 
similar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the 
District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the mag-
istrate does not make a determination of probable cause. 
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for 
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges 
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to 
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule 
3.131; see In re Rule 3.181 (b), Florida Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, 289 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974). 
In a suppiemental opinion the District Court held 
that the amended rules had not answered the basic con-
stitutional objection, since a defendant charged by in-
formation still could be detained pending trial without 
~judicial detertnination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp. 
I 
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1286. Reaffirming its original ruling, the District Court 
declared that the continuation of thls practice was uncon .. 
stitutional,lQ The Court of Appeafs affirmed, 483 F. 2d 
778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor par .. 
ticulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hear• 
ing provided by the amended Florida rules would be ac• 
ceptable, as long as it was provideq to all defendants in 
custody pending trial. !d., at 788-789. 
State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review, and we 
granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue.11 
414 U. S. 1062. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
tQ Although this ruling held a statewide 'flegislative rule" unconsti-
tutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by vir-
tue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for 
an injunction against enforcement of any ~tate statute or legislative 
rule of statewide application, since the prrctice of denying prelim-
inary hearings to persons charged by information was then em-
bodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had 
jurisdiction to issue the initial mjunction, and the Coui't of Appeals 
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the constitutionality 
of a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when 
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental 
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the 
amended rules were uneonstitutionat; the injunctive decree was never 
amended to incorporate that holding; an!f the opinion in the Court 
of Appeals is not inconsistent w1th the conclusion that the District 
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. See 483 F, 
2d, at 788-790. Accordingly, a district court of three judges was not 
required for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1903); l~'lemming v. Nestor, 363 
u.s. 603,605---608 (1960). 
11 At oral argument counsel informed us that the named respond-
ents have been convicted. Their pretrial detention therefore hM 
ended. This case belongs, however, to that narrow class of cases in 
which the termination of a rlas,; represent!'.tive's claim does not moot 
the claims of the unnanwd members of the class. See Sosna v. lowa, 
..- U. S - (1975). Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, 
.and it is most unlikely that any gjven indivi4ual could bave h~ 
I 
I . ,, 
i•lli ' 
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II 
As framed by the proceedings below, this case presents 
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial 
on an information is entitled to a judicial determination 
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the 
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and 
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the 
Constitution. 
A 
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and 
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amendm 
ment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v. 
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Ex parte 
Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Bur-
constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or 
convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated depriva-
tions, and it is certain that other persons similarly situated will be 
detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, 
in Short, is one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading 
.review." 
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were 
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable 
cau~e determination, but the record does not indicate whether any 
of them were still in custody awaiting trial when the District Court 
certified the class. Such a showing ordinarily would be required to 
avoid mootness under Sosna. But this case is a suitable exception 
to that requirement. See Sosna, supra, at - n. 11; cf. Rivera v. 
Freeman, 469 F. Zd 1159, 1162-1163 (CA9 1972). The length of pre-
trial custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended 
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or 
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is 
by no means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff, 
wo4ld be in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to 
cert.ify the class. Moreover, in this case the constant existence of 
a cl~ss of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney 
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we can 
safely assume that. he haflj other clients with a continuing live iRterel!$ 
in the case. 
\ 
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ford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806). The standard for 
a.rrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and 
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was com-
mitting an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91 
(1964) . See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175---176 
(1949). This standard, like those for searches and seiz~ 
ures, represents a necessary accommodation between the 
individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to con-
trol crime. 
"These long-prevailing standards seek to safe-
guard citizens from rash and unreasonable inter-
ferences with privacy and from unfounded charges 
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for 
enforcing the law in the community's protection. 
Because many situations which confront officers in 
the course of executing their duties are more or less 
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes 
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of 
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to 
their conclusions of probability. ·The rule of prob-
able cause is a prac~ical, nontechnical conception 
affording the best c01npromise that has been found 
for accommodating these often opposing interests. 
Requiring more would unquly hamper law enforce-
lnent. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding 
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." 
Btinegar v. United States, supra, at 176. 
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection 
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the 
Court has required that the existence of probable cause 
be decided by a neutra1 and detached magistrate when-
ever possible, The classic statement of this principle 
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appears in Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14 
(1948): 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often 
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies 
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its pro-
tection consists in requiring that those inferepces be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead 
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-22 (1968).12 
Maximum protection of individual rights could be 
assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual 
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement 
would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate 
law enforcement. Thus, while the Court has expressed a 
preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible, 
Beck v. Ohio, supra, at .96; Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U. S. 471, 479'-482 ( 1963), it has never invalidated 
an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the 
officers failed to secure a warrant. SeeKer v. California, 
374 U. S. 23 ( 1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 
307 (1959); 1'rupiano v. United Stq,tes, 334 U.S. 699, 705 
(1948),13 
l 2 We reiterated this principle in United State$ v. United States 
District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972) . In terms that apply equally 
to arrests, we described the "very heart of the Fourth Amendment 
directive" as a requirement that "where practical, a governmental 
search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer 
to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the mag-
istrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a 
citizen's private premises or conversation." !d., at 316. See also 
Terry v .. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968). 
1a Another (lSl)ect of Trupiano waK overruled in United States v. 
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Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the .. 
scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justin• 
cation for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for 
a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps 
incident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, how-
ever, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magis-
trate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is 
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit fu~ther 
crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magis .. 
trate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary 
action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determina-
tion of probable cause increases significantly. The con-
sequences of prolonged detention may be more serious 
than the interference o~ce.sioned by arrest. Pretrial con-
finement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his 
source of income, and impair his family relationships. 
SeeR. Goldfarb, Ransom !32-91 (1965); L. Katz, Justice 
Is the Crime 51-62 (1972). Even pretrial release may be 
accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a sig-
nificant restraint on liberty. See, e. g., 18 U, S. C. § 3146 
(a) (2), (5) . When the stakes are this high, the detached 
judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth 
Amendment is to furnieh meaningful protection from un ... 
founded interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold 
that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial deter-
mination of probable cause as a. prerequisite to extended 
restramt on liberty following arrest. 
This result has historical support in the common law 
Rabinowitz, 33() U, S. 56 (1950), which WaJ! overruled in turn by 
Chimel v. Coltforr:w, 305 U.S. 752 (1969) . 
The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most con• 
troversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what 
cjrcumstance3 an offic:?r may enter a suspect's home to make a war-
rantless arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-
481 (1971); id., at 510-512 n. 1 (W~ITE, J., dissenting); Jone8 ¥. 
United States~ 357 U S, 493, 499-·500 (1958}" 
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that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. See Carroll v, United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 
(1925). At common law it was customary, if not obliga-
tory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice 
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the 
Crown 116-117 (4th ed. 1792). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 
115 U.S. 487, 498-499 (1885).H The justice of the peace 
would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to deter-
mine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner 
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would 
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he 
would be discharged from custody. 1M. Hale, supra, at 
583-586; 2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen, 
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 (1883).u 
14 The primary motivation for the requirement seems to ha.ve 
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact 
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment, 
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of 
commitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief 
detention. 
"When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected 
of felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dis-
miss himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can, 
he may do either of these things. 
"1. He may carry him to the common gaol, ... but that is now 
rarely done. 
"2. He may deliver him to the constable of the vill, who may either 
carry him to the common gaol, . . . or to a justice of peace to 
be examined, and farther pror:eeded against as case shall require .... 
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to any justice of peace of the 
county where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail, 
or commit him, as the case shall require. 
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private 
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler 
will expect a Mittimus for his warrant of detaining." 
1M. Hale, supra, at 589--590. 
10 The examination of the prisoner was inq\tisitorial, and the 
witnesses were questioned outside the prisoner's presence. Although 
.. 
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The initi!tl determination or probable cause also could b~ 
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus. 
2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at 
243; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75, 97-
101 (1807). This practice furnished the model for 
criminal procedure in America immediately following the 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Boll-
man, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 ( 1807) ; 16 Ex parte Burford, 
7 U.S. (3 Cra.nch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and there are indications that 
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model 
for a (/reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States, 
358 U.S. 307,317-320 (1959) (DouGLAS, J., concurring).17 
this method of proceeding was considered quite harsh, 1 J. Stephen, 
at 219-225, it was well established that the prisoner was entitled to be 
discharged if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of hiff 
guilt. !d., at 233. 
16 In Ex pm·te Bollrnan, two men charged in the Aaron Burr case 
were committed following an e,.;aminatlon in the circuit court of 
the District of Columbia, They tiled a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief 
·Justice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to 
persons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following 
arguments on the Fourth Amendment .requirement of probable cause, 
the Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that 
it did not establish probable cause that they were guilty of treason, 
The prisoners were discharged. 
"17 See also N. Lasson, The History and Development of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 15-16 (1937). 
A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery of 
stolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reason-
.able" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was re-
quired to appear before a justice of th\l peace and make an oath 
of probuble cause thafhis goods could be found in a particular place. 
,After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim 
and the alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace 
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods 
and detention of the thief. 2M. Hale, supra, at 14~-152; T. Taylor~ 
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B 
Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a per-
son arrested without a warrant and charged by informa-
tion may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending 
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause 
determination.1 ~ Petitioner defends this practice on the 
ground that the prosecutor's decision to file an informa-. 
tion is itself a determination of probable cause that fur-
nishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending 
trial. Although a conscientious decision that the evi-
dence warrants prosecution .affords a measure of protec-
tion against unfounded detention, we do not think 
prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, we think the 
Court's previous decisions compel disapproval of the 
Florida procedure. In Albrecht v. United States, 273 
U.S. 1, 5 (1927), the Court held that an arrest warrant 
issued solely upon a United States Attorney's information 
was invalid because the accompanying affidavits were de-
fective. Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly 
state that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish 
probable cause, that conclusion was implicit in the judg-
ment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amend-
ment.10 More recently, in Coolidge v. 'A·ew Hampshire, 
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969); 
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626-629 (1886). 
18 A per::;on arrested under a wanant would have received a prior 
judicial determination of probable cause. Under Fla. Rule Crim. 
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issuro upon a sworn complaint that 
states facts showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The 
magistrate may also take testimony undet oath to determine if there 
is reasonable ground to believe the complaint is true. 
19 By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon 
its face," and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" con-
clusively determines the existence of probable cause and requirea 
i~uance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parie 
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403 U. S. 443, 449-453 (1971), the Court held that a 
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is incon .. 
sistent with the constitutional role of a neutral a.nd de· 
tached magistrate. We reaffirmed that principle in Shad-
wick v. City of Ta'mpa, 407 U. S. 345 ( 1972), and held 
that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant 
must be determined by someone independent of police 
and prosecution. See also United States v. United States 
Di.r;trict Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (19·72). 210 The reason 
for this separation of functions was expressed by Justice 
Frankfurter in a similar context: 
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dig-
nity of all men is central, naturally guards against 
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal 
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance 
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law 
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cher .. 
ished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled 
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v. 
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a 
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached 
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the 
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust 
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346 
(1974) . 
20 The Court had earlier reached a d1fferrnt result in Ocampo v. 
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the 
Philippine Islands. Interpreting a statutory guarantee substantially 
identical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5, 
32 Stat. 693, the Court held that an arrest warrant could issue 
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court has since held 
that mterpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philip., 
pines is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision in 
the Federal ConstitutiOn, Green v. Ur~ited States, 355 U. S. 184, 
194-198 (1957) . Even if it were, the result reached in Ocampo 
is incompatible with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, .anc;l 
.Bhadwtek. 
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that safeguards must be provided against the dan• 
gers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The 
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be 
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated 
proc~ss of criminal justice is therefore divided into 
different parts, responsibility for which is separately 
vested in the various participants upon whom the 
criminal law relies for its vindication." McNabb v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 332,343 (1943). 
In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable 
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty 
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is en-
titled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to 
prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's prior hold-
ing that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite to prosecu-
tion by information. Beck v. W a..<:hington, 360 U. S. 
541, 545 (1962); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 586 
(1913). Nor do we retreat from the established rule 
that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent 
conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952); 
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, as the Court 
of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is 
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for 
that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated 
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending 
trial without a determination of probable cause. 483 
F. 2d, at 786-787. Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 
F. 2d 6 (CA5 1968), with Brown v. Fauntleroy,- U.S. 
App. D. C.-, 442 F. 2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone, 
--U.S. App D. C.-, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969). 
III 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
held that the oetermination of probable cause must be 
accQinpanied by the full panoply of adversary safe-
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guards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and 
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary' 
hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in 
many States to determine whether the evidence justifies 
going to trial under an information or presenting the 
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 
1 (1970); Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern 
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974). 
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is 
usually referred to as "probable cause," but in some juris-
dictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt. 
A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Com-
mentary on Article 330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 
1972). When the hearing takes this form, adversary pro-
cedures are customarily employed. The importance of 
the issue to both the State and the accused justifies the 
presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their 
testimony on cross-examination. This kind of hearing 
also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defend-
ants. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. And, as the hearing 
assumes increased importance and the procedures become 
more complex, the likelihood that it ca,n be held promptly 
after arrest diminishes. See A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-
arraignment Procedure, supra, at 33-34. 
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the 
probable cause determination required by the Fourth 
Amendment. The sole issue ie whether there is probable 
cause for detaining the arrested person pending further 
proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably with .. 
out an adversary hearing. The standard is the same 
as that for arrest.21 That standard-probable cause to 
21 Because the standards are identical, ordinarily there is no need 
:for further investigation before the probable cause determination can 
be made. 
~'Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must aTrest on 'prob-
~ble ca1,\se.' It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it we:r~ 
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believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditionally 
has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary pro-
ceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court 
has approved these informal modes of proof. 
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that 
which long experience in the common-law tradition, 
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has 
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with 
that standard. These rules are historically grounded 
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men 
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting 
forfeitures of life, liberty and property. 
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the 
very name implies, we deal with probabilities. 
These are not technical; they are the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correla-
tive to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-P5 (1949). 
Cf. McCray v.Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). 
The use of an informal procedure is ju~tified not only 
by the lesser consequences of a probable cause deter-
mination but also by the nature of the determihation 
itself. It does not require the tine resolution of conflict. 
ing evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a prepond-
erance standard demands, and credibility determinations 
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidenee sup-
ports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, Prosecu .. 
at large and to use an interrog-ating process at police headquarters 
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing 
magistrate on 'probable cause!" Mallory v. United States, 35.£ 
(J, s. 449~ 456 (1957). 
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appointed counsel. The Court has identified as "critical 
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair de-
fense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed 
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 
(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 226-227 
(1967). In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held 
that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of an Ala-
bama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions 
identified two critical factors that distinguish the Ala-
bama preliminary hearing from the probable cause deter-
mination required by the Fourth Amendment. First, 
under Alabama law the function of the preliminary hear-
ing was to determine whether the evidence justified charg-
ing the suspect with an offense. A finding of no probable 
cause could mean that he would not be tried at all. The 
Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is ad-
dressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure, pretrial 
custody may affect to some extent the defendant's ability 
to assist in preparation of his defense, but this does not 
present the high probability of substantial harm identi-
fied as controlling in Wade and Coleman. Second, Ala-
bama allowed the suspect to confront and cross-examine 
prosecution witnesses at the preliminary hearing. The 
Court noted that the suspect's defense on the merits could 
be compromised if he had no legal assistance for exploring 
or preserving the witnesses' testimony. This considera..-
tion does not apply when the prosecution is not required 
to produce witnesses for croSfil-examination. 
Although we conclude that the Constitution does not 
require an adversary determination of probable cause, we 
recognize that state systems of criminal procedure vary 
widely. There is no single preferred pretrial procedure, 
and the nature of the probable cause determination 
usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pretrial 
procedure viewed as a whole. While we limit our hold .. 
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ing to the precise requirement of the Fourth Amend· 
ment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility and ex-
perimentation by the States. It may be found desirable, 
for example, to make the probable cause determination at 
the suspect's first appearance before a judicial officer,24 
see McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 342-344 
( 1943), or the determination may be incorporated in to 
the procedure for setting bail or fixing other conditions 
of pretrial release. In some States, existing procedures 
may satisfy the requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
Others ma:y require only minor adjustment, such as accel-
eration of existing preliminary hea.rings. Current 
proposals for criminal procedure reform suggest other 
ways of testing probable cause for detention.25 Whatever 
24 Several States already authorize a determination of probable 
cause at this stage or immediately thereafter. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 39-2-3 (1965 Supp.); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708-9 (5) (1968); Vt. 
Rules Crim. Proc. 3 (b), 5 (c) (1974). This Court has interpreted 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require a determination 
of probable cause at the first appearance. Jaben v. United States, 
381 U. S. 214, 218 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449, 
454 (1957). 
25 Under the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure (Proposed 
Final Draft 1974), a person arrested without a warrant is entitled, 
"without unnecessary delay," to a first appearance before a magis-
trate and a determination that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest 
warrant. The determination may be made on affidavits or testimony, 
in the presence of the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remain in 
custody for inability to qualify for pretrial release are offered another 
opportunity for a probable cause determination at the detention hear-
ing, held no more than five days after arrest. This is an adversary 
hearing, and the parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay 
evidence may be considered. Rule 344. 
The A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent. 
Draft No. 5, 1972, and Tent. Draft N(). 5A, 1973) also provides a 
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported 
by a reasonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. Th~ 
magistrate may make a determination of probable cause to hold tb.~ 
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procedure a State may adopt, it must provide a fair and 
reliable determination of probable cause as a condition 
for any significant pretrial restraint on liberty,Z6 and this 
determination must be made by a judicial officer either 
before or promptly after arrest.27 
accused, but he is not required to rio so and the accused may request 
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be 
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes 
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written 
and live testimony: 
"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence 
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present addi-
tional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of 
which he is accused. The state's submission may be made by means 
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the 
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the 
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appear-
ance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks 
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause." 
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973). 
26 Because the probable cause dete\ffiination is not a constitutional 
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those 
suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition 
that they appear for trial. There are many kinds of pretrial release 
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146; 
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, 
Pretrial Release § 5.2 (1974); Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Rule 341 (Proposed Final Draft 1974). We cannot define spe-
cifically those that would require a prior probable cause determina-
tion, but the key factor is significant restraint on liberty. 
27 In his concurring opinion, post, at - n. -, MR. Jus1'ICE 
STEWART objects to the Court!s choice of the Fourth Amendment as 
the rationale for decision and suggests that the Court offers less pro-
cecj.ural protection to a person in jail than it requires in certain civil 
cases. Here we deal with the complex procedures of a. criminal case 
and a threshold right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The 
historical basis of the probable cause requirement is quite different 
from the relatively recent application of variable procedural due 
process in debtor-creditor disputeR and te'rmination of government-
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IV 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth 
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of 
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we 
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we 
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the 
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree, 
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
created benefits. The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for 
the criminal justice system, and its balance betwren individual and 
public interests always has been thought to define the "process that 
is dur" for seizures of person or property in criminal cases. More-
over, the Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is in fact 
only the first stage of an elaborate system, unique in jurisprudence, 
designed to saJeguard the rights of those accusrd of criminal conduct. 
The relatively simple civil procedures (e. g., prior interview with 
school principal before suspension) presented in the cases cited in 
the concurrmg opmion are inapposite and irrelevant in the wholly 
different context of the criminal justice system. 
It would not bt> practicable to follow the further suggestion implicit 
in MR. JusTICE STEWART's concurring opinion that we leave for 
another day determination of the procedural safeguards that are 
reqmred in making a probable cause determination under the Fourth 
Amendment. The judgment undf>f review both declares the right 
not to be detained without a probable cause determination and 
affirms the District Court's order prE'Scribing an adversary hearing 
for the implementation of that right. The circumstances of the 
case thus reqmre a dPcision on both if'..'>nes 
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The issue in this case is whether a person arrested 
under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally en-
titled to a judicial determination of probable cause for 
pretrial restraint of liberty, 
I 
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were 
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged 
with several offenses under a prosecutor's information.1 
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against 
him ca.rried a potential life sentence, and Henderson re-
mained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500 
bond, 
1 Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971. On March 1& 
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a con-
cealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a 
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrel:lted on March 2, and charged 
by information on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and 
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate 
whether there was an arrest warrant m either case .. 
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu• 
tion of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all other 
crimes by information, without a prior preliminary hear-
ing and without obtaining leave of court. Fla. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 3.140 (a); State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109 
(Fla. 1968) ; Di Bona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1960) . At the time respondents were arrested, a 
Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary 
hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases. 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the 
Florida courts had held that the filing of an information 
foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing. 
See State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 
1972) .2 They had also held that habeas corpus could not 
be used, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances, to 
test the probable cause for detention under an inform~V 
tion. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 29 So. 2d 
794, 797 (Fla. 1951). The only possible methods for ob-
taining a judicial determination of prohable cause were a 
special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30 
days, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973) ,a and arraignment, 
which the District Court found was often delayed a month 
or more after arrest. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 
1107, 1110 (SD Fla.1971)! As a result, a person charged 
2 Florida law also denies preliminary hearings to persons confined 
under indictment, see .Sa11{Jaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970) ; 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a), but that procedure is not challenged 
in this case See n. 19, post, at 14. 
8 This statute may have been construed to make the hearing per-
missive inst<''l.d of mandatory. See Evans v. State, 197 So. 2d 323 
(Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 067-29 (1967). But cf. 
Karz v. Overton, 2'19 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971) . It may also 
have been superseded by the subsequent amendments to the rules of 
criminal procedure. In re Florida Rt.de1 of Criminal Procedure, 
272 So. 2d 65 (1972) . 
4 The Flonda rules do not suggest that the issue of probable 
.cansc can be raised at arraignment, Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.160, but 
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by information could be detained for a substantial period 
t!olely on the decision of a prosecutor. 
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action 
against Dade County officials in the Federal District 
Court,5 claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hear-
ing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declara-
tory and injunctive relief.6 Respondents Turner and 
Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently 
interven~d.7 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for 
Dade County, was one of several defendants.8 
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature con-
sidered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hear. 
ings to persons charged by information, the District Court 
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, supra. 
The court certified the case as a class action under Fed. 
counsel for Petitioner represented at oral argument that arraign~ 
ment affords the suspect an opportunity to "attack the sufficiency of 
the evidence to hold him." Tr. of Oral Arg., Mar. 25, 1974,. at 17. 
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deci4ing, that this was true. 
483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8. 
~The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and juris-
diction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). 
6 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as 
an alternate remedy. They asked only that the state authorities be 
ordered to give them a probable cauee determination. This was 
also the only relief tha.t tbe District Court ordered for the named 
respol'.dents. 332 F. Supp., at U15-1116. Because release was 
neither asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class 
of cases for which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. M~Donnell, 417 U. S. 
-,- (1974) . 
1 Turner was being held on a charge of auto theft, following arrest 
on March ll, 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges 
of soliciting a ride and possession of marihuana. 
8 The named defendants included justices of the peace and judges 
of small-claims courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary 
bearings in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officer~ 
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein wa& th~ onl~ 
m\C who petitioned. for eertiorari. 
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Rule Civ. Proc. 20 (b)(2), and held that the Fourth and 
.Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged 
by information a right to a judicial hearing on the ques .. 
tion of probable cause. The District Court ordered the 
Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an 
immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable 
cause for further detention.9 It also ordered them to 
submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases 
instituted by information. 
The defendants submitted a plan authored by Sheriff 
E. Wilson Purdy, and the District Court adopted it with 
modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed post-
arrest procedure. 336 F. Supp. 490. Upon arrest the 
accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first 
appearance hearing." The magistrate would explain the 
charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel 
if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause 
determination unless either the prosecutor or the accused 
was unprepared. If either requested more time, the 
magistrate would set the date for a "preliminary hearing," 
to be held within four days if the accused was in cust,ody 
and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial. 
The order provided sanctions for failure to hold the hear~ 
ings at prescribed times. At the 11preliminary hearing" 
the accused would be entitled to counsel, and he would be 
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, 
9 The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for 
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal inter-
vention in state prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
The injunction was not directNI at the state prosecutions as such, 
~mt only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hear-
mg, an 1ssue that could not be tmsrd m defenRC of the criminal 
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not 
tJrejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. M ant.!~ 
mttro, 477 F'. 2d 107:{ 1082 (CA3 1973), cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 40' 
U.S, 82 (1971) i Stefand1t v. Minaul, 3·i2 U, S. 117 (1951), 
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to summon favorable witnesses, and to have a transcript 
tnade on request If the magistrate found no probable 
cause, the accused would be discharged. He then could 
hot be charged with the same offense by complaint or in-
formation, but only by indictment returned within 30 
days. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the 
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case 
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary volun-
tarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon 
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals re-
manded the case for specific findings on the constitu-
tionality of the new Dade County system. Before the 
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida 
Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing 
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed 
that the Di-strict Court should direct its inquiry to the 
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures. 
Under the amended rules every arrested person must 
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130 (b). This 11first appearance" is 
similar to the 11first appearance hearing" ordered by the 
District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the mag-
istrate does not make a determination of probable cause. 
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for 
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges 
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to 
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule 
3131; see In re Rule 3.131 (b), Florida Rules of Crim-
in,al Procedure, 289 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974). 
In a suppiemental opinion the District Court held 
that the amended rules had not answered the basic con-
stitutional objection, since a defendant eharged by in-
formation still could be detained pending trial without 
t\ judicial determination of prQbable cause. 355 F. Sup}!). 
13--471.....0P1N19N 
GERSTEIN v. PU(lH 
1286. Reaffirming its original ruling, the District Court 
declared that the continuation of tflls practice w~s uncon• 
stitutionaP0 The Court of Appe~fs affirme~, 483 F·. 2d 
778, modifying the District ,Coqrt'$ decree iq minor par" 
ticulars and suggesting that the fpl"m of prelirpinary hear• 
ing provided by the amended Florida rules would be ac• 
ceptable, as long as it was provide4 ~o all defendants in 
custody pending trial. !d., 1\t 788-'789. 
State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review, and we 
granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue.11 
414 U. S. 1062. We affirm in part and r~verse· in part. 
10 Although this ruling held a statewide '!legislative rule" unconsti-
tutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by vir-
tue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did ~ot ask for 
an injunction against enforcement of a~y ~tate statutf;) or legislative 
rule of statewide application, since the prfctice of denying prelim-
inary hearings to persons charged by mformation' 'was then em-
bodied only in judicial decisions. The Distr~ct Court therefore had 
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction; and the Co~rt of Appeals 
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the constitutionality 
of a state "statute" was drawn into que~tion for the first time when 
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental 
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the 
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never 
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court 
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District 
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. See 483 F, 
2d, at 788-790. Accordingly, a district court of three judges was not 
required for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1903); Flemming v. Neltor, 363 
u.s. 603,605--608 (1960). 
11 At oral argument counsel informed us that the named respopd,. 
~nts have been convicted. Their pretrial detention therefore has 
ended. This case belongs, however, to that narrow class of cases in 
which the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot 
the claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa, 
,.._. U. S. - (19'75) . Pret rial detention is by nature temporary, 
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As framed by the proceedings below, this case presents 
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial 
on an information is entitled to a judicial determination 
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the 
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and 
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the 
Constitution. 
A 
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and 
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amend-
ment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v. 
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Ex parte 
Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex pa,rte Bur· 
constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or 
convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated depriva-
tions, and it is certain that other persons similarly situated will be 
detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The elaim, 
in ~hort, is one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review." 
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were 
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable 
cau~e determination, but the record does not indicate whether any 
of them were still in custody awaiting trial when the District Court 
certified the class. Such a showing ordinarily would be required to 
avoid mootness under Sosna. But this case is a suitable exception 
to that requirement. See Sosna, supra, at - n. 11; cf. Rivera v. 
Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159, 1162-1163 (CA9 1972). The length of pre-
trial custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended 
at l).ny time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or 
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is 
by no means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff, 
would be in pretrial custody lonv enough for a district judge to 
certify the class. Moreover, in this case the constant existence of 
a elass of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney 
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we can 
safely assume that, he has other clients with a continuing live interest 
in the case. 
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ford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806). The standard for 
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and 
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was com-
mitting an offense." Beck v. Ohio, ;379 U. S. 89, 91 
(1964) . See also Henry v. United State8, 361 U. S. 98 
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176 
(1949). This standard, like those for searches and seiz-
ures, represents a necessary accommodation between the 
individual's right to liberty an9 the State's duty to con-
trol crime, 
"These long-prevailing standards seek to safe-
guard citizens from rash and unreasonable inter-
ferences with privacy and from unfounded charges 
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for 
enforcing the law in the community's protection. 
Because many situations which confront officers in 
the course of executing their duties are more or less 
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes 
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of 
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to 
their conclusions of probability. The rule of prob-
able cause is a practical, nontechnical conception 
affording the best compromise that has been found 
for accommodating these often opposing interests. 
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforce-
ment. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding 
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." 
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176. 
To Implement the Fourth Amendment's protection 
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the 
Court has required that the existence of probable cause 
be decided by a neuttal and detached magistrate when-
ever possible. The classic statement of this principle 
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appears in Johnson v, United States, 333 U.S, 10, 13-14 
(1948): 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often 
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies 
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its pro-
tection consists in requiring that thoseinferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detacl).eq magistrate instead 
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferretin'g out crime." 
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-22 (1968).12 
Maximum protection of individual rights could be 
assured by requiring a magistrate's review' of the factual 
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement 
would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate 
law enforcement. Thus, whil~ the Court has expressed a 
preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible, 
Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 96; Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U. S. 471, 479-482 (1963), it has never invalidated 
an arrest supported by probable cause solely- because the 
officers failed to secure a warrant. SeeKer v. California, 
374 lJ. S. 23 ( 1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S, 
307 (1959); 7'rupiano v. United States, 334 U, S. 699, 705 
(1948).13 
l 2 We reiterated this principle .in United States v. United States 
Di.strict Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972) .. In terms th11>t apply equally 
to arrests, we de$cribed the 1'very heart of the Fourth Amendment 
directive" as a requirement that "where practical, a governmental 
search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer 
to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the mag-
istrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a 
citizen's private premises or conversation." ld., at 316. See also 
Terry V" Ohio, 392' U.S. 11 20-22 (1968) . 
:~a Another 8Sl)ect of Trupiano was overrt\led in United Sto;te8 v. 
iO 
Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the .. 
scene assessment of proba..ble cause provide$ legal justin• 
cation for arresting a pereon suspected of crime, and for 
a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps 
I • 
incident to arrest. Once the suspect i~ in custody, how~ 
ever, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magis-
trate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is 
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit fu~thel' 
crimes while the police submit ' their evidence to a magis .. 
trate. And, wllile the State's reasons for taking spmmary 
.action subside, the s1,1spect's need fo~ a neutral determina-
tion of probable cause ipcreMes significantly. The con~ 
sequences of prolonged detention may be mpre serious 
than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial con-
finement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his 
source of income, and impa..ir his family relationships. 
See R . Goldfarb, Ransom !32-91 (196[)); L. Katz, Justice. 
Is the Crime 51- 62 ( 1972) . Even pretrial release may be 
accompanied by burdensome conditions tha~ effect a sig .. 
nificant restraint on liberty. See, e. g., lS U, S. C. § 3146 
(a) (2) , (5). When the stakes are this high, the detached 
judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth 
Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from un .. 
founded int erference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold 
that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial deter-
mination of probable cause as a. prerequisite to extended 
restraint on liberty following arrest. 
This result has historical support in the common law 
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), which W3/! ove.rruled in turn by 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1009). 
The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most con. 
troversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what 
circumstances an offi,cer may enter a suspect's home to make a war· 
rantless arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-:--
481 (1971); id., at 510-512 n. 1 (W,a:ITE, J., qissenting); Jones y. 
U'IJ,ited States~ 357 U. S. 49il% 499...:500 (1958). 
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th&t has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. See Carroll v, United States, 267 p, S. 132, 149 
(1925). At common law 1t was customary, if not obliga-
tory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice 
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 M. ~ale, Pleas of the 
Crown 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W.lfawkins, Pleas of the 
Crown 116-117 (4thed.1792). See ;alsoKurtzv.Moffitt, 
115 U.S. 487, 498-499 (1885).a The justipe of the peace 
would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to deter-
mine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner 
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect wpuld 
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he 
would be discharged from custody. 1 M. Hale, supra, at 
583-586; 2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 116-119'; 1 J. Stephen, 
History of the Criminal Law of Englanq 233 (1883) .u 
14 The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have 
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact 
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment, 
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of 
commitment, called a mzttimm, waa required for more than brief 
detention. 
"When a private person bath arr61!ted a felon, or one suspected 
of felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dis-
miss himself of him; but with lUI much l!lpeed 1\8 conveniently he can, 
he may do either of these things. 
"1. He may carry him to ihe common gaol, ... but that is now 
rarely dcne. 
"2. He may deliver hirn to the constable of the vill, who may either 
carry him to the commot• p;aol, . . , or to a justice of peace to 
be examined, and farther proceeded ngainst as case shall require .... 
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to any justice of peace of the 
county where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail, 
or commit him, as the case shall requtre. 
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private 
person to a justice of peace is most usuat and safe, because a gaoler 
will expect a Mittimtt~ for his warrant of detaining." 
1 M. Hal~. supra, :\t 589-590. 
u The examination of the prisouer was inquisitorial, and the; 
witnesses were questio ed outside thl" prisoner's pre8ellcc. Although 
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The initi~l determination of probable cause also could b~ 
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus. 
2 W. Hawkins, supra, 't 112-1\5; ~ J. Stephen, supra, at 
243; see Ex parte BollrJUtn, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75, 97-
101 (1807), This practice furnished the model for 
criminal procedure in America immediately following the 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see :Ex parte Boll· 
man, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); 16 Ex parte Burford, 
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton, 
3 U, S. ( 3 Dall.) 17 ( 1795), and there are indications that 
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model 
for a "reasonable" seizure. , See Draper v. United States, 
358 U.S.307, 317-320 (1959) (DouGLAB,J.,concurring).17 
this method of proceeding was considered quitfl har!lh, 1 J. Stephen, 
at 219-225, it was well established that the prisoner was entitled to be 
discharged if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of hi!> 
guilt. ld., at 233, ' 
16 In Ex parte Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr case 
were committed following an examination in the cirouit court of 
the District of Columbia, They filed a petition for writ of habeas: 
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, In an opinion by Chief 
·Justice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to 
persons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following 
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause, 
the Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that 
it did not establish probable cause that they were guilty of treason, 
The prisoners were discharged. 
17 See also N. Lasson, The History and Development of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 15-16 (1937) . 
A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery of 
stolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reason-
able" search under the Fourth Amendment . The victim was re· 
quired to appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath 
of probable cause that'his goods could be found in a particular place. 
After the warrant was executed, a.nd the goods seized, the victim 
and the alleged thief would appear before tl1e justice of the peace 
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods 
£J.nd detention of the thief. 2 :M, HalfJ1 supra, at 141} .... 15Z i T. Taylor .• 
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Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a per-
son arrested without a warrant and charged by informa-
l 
tion may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending 
trial without any opportunity for ~ probable cause 
determination.18 Petitioner defends tpis practice on the 
ground that the prosecutor'IS decision to file an informa-. 
tion is itself a determinatiop of prob~ble cause that fur-
nishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending 
trial. Although a conscientious decblion tl)at the evi-
dence warrants prosecution :affords · a :me8$qre of protec-
tion against unfounded detention, ~e dp not think 
prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the require· 
ments of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, we think the 
Court's previous decisions .compel disapprqval of the 
Florida procedure, In Albrecht v. Unitf3d Stq,tes, 273 
U. S. 1, 5 ( 1927), the C!)q.rt held that an arrest warrant 
issued solely upon a United States Attorney's infor111ation 
was invalid' because the accqmpa,nying affidavits were dec 
fective. Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly 
. I 
state that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish 
probable cause, that conplusion w~s hnplicit in the J~dg­
ment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amend-
ment.19 More recently, in C~olidge v. New Hampshire, 
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969); 
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626-629 (1886). 
18 A per~on arrested under a warrant would have received a prior 
judicial determination of probable ca:use. Under Fla,. Rule Crim. 
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint 'that 
state.CJ facts showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The 
magistrate may also take testimony undet oath to determine if there 
is reasonable ground to believe the complaint Is true. · 
10 By contrast , the Court has held that an iudictment, 11fair upon 
its face ," and returned by a 11properly constituted grand jury" cons 
elusively determines the existence of probal>le cause an4 requires 
i~~Suauco of an a,rrest warrax\t without further inquiry. E:e parte 
13-477-0PINION 
14 GERSTEIN v. PUGH 
403 U. S. 443, 449-453 (1971), the Court held that a 
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is incon .. 
sistent with the constitutional role of a neutral and de .. 
tached magistrate. We reaffirmed that principle in Shad .. 
wick v. City of Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 (1972), and held 
that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant 
must be determined by someone independent of police 
and prosecution. See also United States v. United States 
Di.crtrict Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (19-72).20 The reason 
for this separation of functions was expressed by Justice 
Frankfurter in a similar context: 
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dig-
nity of all men is central, naturally guards against 
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal 
in i.racking down crime is not in itself an assurance 
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law 
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cher .. 
ished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled 
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v. 
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a 
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached 
magist,rate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the 
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust 
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346 
(1974). 
20 The Court had earlier rPached a different result in Ocampo v. 
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the 
Philippine Islands. Interpreting a statutory guarantee substantially 
identical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5, 
.32 Stat. 693, the Court held that an arrest warr<:mt could issue 
solely upon a prosecutor's informatioo. The Court has since held 
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philip .. 
pmes is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision iJJ 
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 
194-198 (1957). Even If it were, the result reached in Ocampo 
is incompatible with the later hold ings of Al()recht, Coolidge, a..n4 
Shadwick. 
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that safeguards must be provideq against the dan .. 
gers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The 
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be 
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated 
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into 
different parts, responsibility for which is separately 
vested in the various p&.rticipants upon whom the 
criminal law relies for its vindication." McNabb v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 332,343 (1943) . 
In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable 
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty 
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is en~ 
titled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to 
prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court'('! prior hold-
ing that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite to prosecu-
tion by information. Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 
541, 5t5 ( 1962) ; Lem W oon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 586 
(1913). Nor do we retreat from the established rule 
that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent 
conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 ( 1952) ; 
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, as the Court 
of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is 
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for 
that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated 
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending 
trial without a determination of probable cause. 483 
F. 2d, at 786-787. Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 
F. 2d 6 (CA5 1968) , with Brown v. Fauntleroy,- U.S. 
App. D. C.-, 442 F. 2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone, 
-U.S. App. D. C.-, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969). 
III 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
held that the determination of probable cause must be 
accQinpanied by the fuU p.~noply of ~dversa.ry safE? 
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guards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and 
compulsory process for witnesses. A full · preliminary 
hearing of this sort is modeleq after the procedure used in 
many States to determine whether the evidence justifies 
going to trial under an information or presenting the 
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S, 
1 (1970); Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. I~rael, Modern 
Crimipal Procedure 957-!')67, 996-1000 (4th ed, 1974), 
The standard Qf proof requjred of the prosecution is 
usually referred to as "probable cause," butin some juris-
dictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt. 
A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Com-
mentary on Article 330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 
1972). When the hearing takes this form, adversary pro-
cedures are customarily employed. The iJnportance of 
the issue to both the State and the accused justifies the 
presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their 
testimony on cross-examination. This kind of hearing 
also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defend-
ants. Coleman v. Alaba711a, w,pra. And, as the hearing 
assumes increased importance &nd the procedures become 
more complex, the likelihood that it can be held promptly 
after arrest diminishes. See A. L. I. Model Code of Pre .. 
arraignment Procedure, supra, at 33-34. 
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the 
probable cause determination required by the Fourth 
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable 
cause for detaining the arrested person pending further 
proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably with ... 
out an adversary hearing. The standard is the same 
as that for arrest.21 That stand~trd-proqable cause to 
21 Because the standards are identical, ordinarily there is no need 
for further investigation before the probable cause determination can 
be made, 
"Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must arrest on 'prob .. 
~iblt;~ caQ.se.' It is t\Ot the functiot\ of the police to arrest, .as it we.r~ 
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believe the suspect has committed a crii~e~trarlitionally 
haa been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary pro-
ceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court 
has approved these infor~al modes of proof. 
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that 
which long experience in fhe common-law tradition, 
to aome extent embodied in the Constitution, has 
crystallized into rules of evidence co:p.sistent with 
that standard. These rules are historically grounded 
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men 
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting 
forfeitures of life, liberty and property, 
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the 
very name implies, we deal with probabilities, 
These are not technical; they are the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and 'prudent men, not legal technicians, 
act. The standard of proof is accordlngly correla.. 
tive to what must be proved." Brinega,r v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949). ' 
Cf. McCray v.Illinois, 386 U.S, 300 (1967), 
The use of an informal pro~~dure is justified not only 
by the lesser consequences of a probable cause deter-
mination but also by the nature of the determihation 
itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflict ... 
ing evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a prepond-
erance standard demands, and credibility determinations 
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence sup .. 
ports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, Prosecu .. 
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters 
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing 
magistrate on 'probable cause.' " Mallory ·V. United States, 35• 
\)', s, 449~ 456 (1957). 
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tion: The Decision ~o Charge a Suspect with a Cri~e 64-
109 (1969).22 This is not tq ~y that confrontatiop and 
cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of 
probable cause determinations jn some cases. In most 
cases, however, their value would be too slight to justify 
holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these 
formalities and safe~uard11 desigped for trial must also be 
employed in making the Foufth Amendment determina-
tion of probable cause. 23 
Because of its limited function and its nonadvereary 
character, the proqable cau~e petermination is not a 
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require 
22 In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), and GQ{Jnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee or proba~ 
tioner arrested prior to revocatioJt is entit~ed to an informal pr~ 
liminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live 
testimony. 408 U.S., at 487; 411 U. 8., at 786. That preliminary 
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by 
the Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and pre-
serving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently 
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred. 
408 U. S., at 485; 411 U. S., at 782-783 n. 5. Mqreover, revocation 
proceedings may offer less protection from initial error than the 
more formal criminal process, wher~ violations are defined by statute 
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect 
with crime unless he is satisfied of vrobable cause. See ABA Code 
of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-103 (A) (a prosecutor "shall 
not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows 
or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable 
cause"); ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Crim-
inal Justice, The Prosecution Function, §§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); Amer-
ican College of Trial Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4 (c) 
(1972). 
23 Criminal jlliltice is already overburdened by the volume of caee:s 
and the complexities of our system. The processing of misdemeanors, 
in particular, and the early stages of prosecution generally are marked 
by delays that can seriously affect the quality of justice. A consti-
tutional doctrine requiring adversary hearings for all persons detained 
pending trial could exacerbate the problem of pretrial delay, 
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appointed counsel. The Court has identified as "critical 
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair de-
fense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed 
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 
(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 226-227 
(1967). In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held 
that a preliminary hearing wa~ a critical stage of an Ala.-
barna prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions 
identified two critical factors that distinguish the Ala-
bama preliminary hearing from the probable cause deter~ 
mination required by the Fourth Amendment. First, 
under Alabama law the function of the preliminary hear~ 
ing was to determine whether the evidence justified charg-
ing the suspect with an offense. A finding of no probable 
cause could mean that he would not be tried at all. The 
Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is ad-
dressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure·, pretrial 
custody may affect to some e:x;tent the defendant's ability 
to assist in preparation of hi~ defense, but this does not 
present the high probability of substantial harm identi-
fied as controlling in Wade and Coleman. Second, Ala-
bama allowed the suspect to confront and cross-examine 
prosecution witnesses at the preliminary hearing. The 
Court noted that the suspect's defense on the merits could 
be compromised if he had no legal assistance for exploring 
or preserving the witness~s' testimony. This considera,.o 
tion does not apply when the :prosecution is not required 
t,o produce witnesses for cross-examination" 
Although we conclude that the Constitution does not 
require an adversary determination of probable cause, we 
recognize that sta.te systems of criminal procedure vary 
widely. There is 'no single preferred pretrial procedure, 
and the nature of the probable cause determinatiofi 
usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pretrial 
procedure viewed 8iS ~ whole. While we limit our hold ... 
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ing to the precise requirement of the Fourth Amend .. 
ment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility and ex-
perimentation by the States. 'It may be found desirable, 
for example, to make the probable cause determination at 
the suspect's first, appearance before a judicial officer,24 
see McNabb v. United State~, 318 U. S. 332, 342~344 
( 1943)' or the determination may be incorporated into 
the procedure for setting bajl or fixing other conditions 
of pretrial release. In some 'states, existing procedures 
may satisfy the requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
Others may require only minor adjustment, such as accel-
eration of existing preliminary hea.rings. Current 
proposals for criminal procedure reform suggest other 
ways of testing probable cause for detention.2 ~ Whatever 
24 Several States already authorize a detertnination of probable 
cause at this stage or rrn'mediately. thereafter. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 39-2-3 (1965 Supp.); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708-9 (5) (1968); Vt. 
Rules Crim. Proc. 3 (b), 5 (c) (1974). This Court has interpreted 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require a determination 
of probable cause at the first appearanGe. Jaben v. United States, 
381 U. S. 214, 218 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449, 
454 (1957). 
2~ Under the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure (Proposed 
'Final Draft 1974), a person arrested without a warrant is entitled, 
"without unnecessary delay," to a first appearance before a magis-
trate and a determination that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest 
warrant. The determination may be made on affidavits or testimony, 
in the presence of the accused. Rule 311. Persons ' who remain in 
custody for inability to qualify for pretrial re1ease are offered another 
opportunity for a probable cause determination at the detention hear-
ing, held no more than five days after arrest. This is an adversary 
hearing, and the partie~ may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay 
evidence may be considered. Rule 344. 
The A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent. 
Draft No. 5, 1972, and Tent. Draft N~. 5A, 1973) a1so provides a 
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported 
by a reasonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. Tile 
magistrate may make a determination of probable c.ause to hold th~ 
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procedure a State may adopt, it must provide a fair and 
reliable determination of probable cause as a condition 
for any significant pretrial restraint on Uberty,26 and this 
determination mud be made by a judicial officer either 
before or promptly after arrest.~7 
accused, but he is not required to tio so and t4e acct1-sed may request 
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be 
held within 2 "court days." At tpat session, the magistrate makes 
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written 
and live testimony: 
"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence 
and arguments for his discharge and the state may ' present addi-
tional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that he has col!lmitted the crime of 
which he is accus¢. The state's submission may be made by means 
of affidavits, and no witnesses sha~ be r~uired to 1\P:Pear unless the 
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the 
parties, determines that there is a l:)asis for believing that the appear-
ana~ of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks 
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause." 
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973). 
26 l3ecause the probable cause determination is not a constitutional 
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those 
suspects who suffer restrainte on liberty other than the condition 
that they appear for trial. There are many ldnds of pretrial release 
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146; 
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, 
Pretrial Release § 5.2 (1974); Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Rule 341 (Proposed Final Draft ~974). We cannot define spe-
cifically those that would require a prior probable cause determina-
tion, but the key factor is significant restraint on liberty. 
21 In his concurring opinion, os at - · ~1. -- MR. Jus'l'IC 
STEWAR'l' objects to the Court.'s choice of the Fourth Amendment as 
the rationale for decision and suggest~ that the C01~rt offers Jess pro-
requral protection to a person in jail than it requires in certain civil 
cases. Here we deal with the COlJtP!ex procedures of a. criminal case 
and a threshold :right guaranteed 'by the Fourth Amendment. 'Fheo 
hir.;torical basis of the probable cause requirement is quite different 
from the relatively recent application of variable procedural due 
process in debtor-creditor disput<>s cmd temlirnttiq~ bf government~ 
.... . ; 
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IV 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth 
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of 
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we 
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we 
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the 
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree, 
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
created benefits. The Fourth Amendment waE> tailored explicitly for 
the criminal justice system, and its balance between indivjdual and 
public interests always has beep thought to define the "process that 
is due" for seizures of person or property in criminal cases_, ,(More-
over, the Fourth Aml)ndment probable cause determination is in fact 
only the first stage of an elaborfl,te system, unique in jurisprudence, 
designrd to safeguard the rights of those accused of criminal conduct. 
The relatively simple c1vil procedures (e. (]., prior interview with 
:>chool principal before suspension) presented in the cases cited in 
the concurrin~S opinion are inapposlt(' and irrelevant in the wholly 
different context of the cnminal jm>tice system. 
It would not be practicable to follow the further suggestion implicit 
in Mn. JusTICE STEWART's concurring opinion that we leave for 
another day determination of the proredural safeguards that are 
reqmred in making a probil bl e cause deterrnina tion under the Fourth 
Amendment. The judgment under review both declares the right 
not to be detained without a probable cause determination and 
affirms the District Court's order prt'l'lcribing an adversary hearing 
for the Implementation of that right. The circumstances of the 
case thus reqmre a deciswn on both lP.'>UPS. 
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The issue in this case is whether a person arrested 
under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally en-
titled to a judicial determination of probable cause for 
pretrial restraint of liberty, 
I 
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were 
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged 
with several offenses under a prosec\Jtor's information.1 
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges aga.inst 
him carried a potential life sentence, and Henderson re-
mained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500 
bond, 
1 Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971. On March 16 
an. information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a cop-
cealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during com~nission of a 
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrested on March 2, and charged 
by information on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and 
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate 
whether there was an arrest warrant in either case. 
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu" 
tion of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all other 
crimes by information, without a prior preliminary hear-
ing and without obtaining leave of court. Fla. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 3.140 (a); State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109 
(Fla. 1968); Di Bona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1960). At the time respondents were arrested, a 
Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary 
hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases. 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the 
Florida courts had held that the filing of an information 
foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing. 
See State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 
1972).2 They had also held that habeas corpus could not 
be used, except perhaps in exc':lptional circumstances, to 
test the probable cause for detention under an informa-
tion. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 29 So. 2d 
794, 797 (Fla. 1951). The only possible methods for ob-
taining a judicial determination of probable cause were a 
special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30 
days, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973),8 and arraignment, 
which the District Court found was often delayed a month 
or more after arrest. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 
1107, 1110 (SD Fla. 1971)! As a result, a person charged 
2 F1orida law also denies preliminary hearings to persons confined 
under indictment, see Sangaree v. HamUn, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla.1970); 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a), but that procedure is not challenged 
in this case See n. 19, post, at 14. 
8 This statute may have been construed to make the hearing per .. 
missive instead of mandatory. See Evans v. State, 197 So. 2d 323 
(F1a. Ct. App. 1967) ; Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 067-29 (1967). But cf, 
Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971). It may also 
have been superseded by the subsequent amendments to the rules of 
criminal procedure. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
272 So. 2d 65 (1972). 
• The Florida rules .do not suggest that the issue of probabl-~ 
cause can be raised at arraignment, Fla. Rule Crim. P:roc. 3.160, ibl;lt 
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by information could be detained for a substantial period 
solely on the decision of a prosecutor. 
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action 
against Dade County officials in the Federal District 
Court,5 claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hearw 
ing on the issue of probable cause a..nd requesting declara-
tory and injunctjve relief.6 Respondents Turner and 
Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently 
intervened.7 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for 
Dade County, was one of several defendants.8 
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature con-
sidered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hear-
ings to persons charged by information, the District Court 
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, supra. 
The court certified the case as it class action under Fed. 
counsel for Petitioner represented at oral argument that arraign-
ment affords the suspect an opportunity to "attack the sufficiency of 
the evidence to hold him." Tr. of Oral Arg., Mar. 25, 1974, at 17. 
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that this was true. 
483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8. 
6 The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and juris-
diction in the District Court was baGed on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). 
6 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as 
an alternate remedy. They asked only that the state authorities be 
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was 
also the only relief that the District Court ordered for the named 
respondents. 332 F. Supp., at 1115-1116. Because release was 
neither asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class 
of cases for which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 417 U. S. 
-,- (1974). 
'~ Turner was being held on a charge of auto theft, following arrest 
on March 11, 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on chargeS' 
of soliciting a ride and possession of marihuana. 
8 The named defendants included justices of the peace and judges 
of small-claims courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary 
hearings in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officer$ 
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only 
Q~f) who petitioned for certiorari, 
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Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b)(2), and held that the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged 
by information a right to a judicial hearing on the ques· 
tion of probable cause. The District Court ordered the 
Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an 
immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable 
cause for further detention.9 It also ordered them to 
submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases 
instituted by information. 
The defendants submitted a plan authored by Sheriff 
E. Wilson Purdy, and the District Court adopted it with 
modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed post-
arrest procedure. 336 F. Supp. 490. Upon arrest the 
accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first 
appearance hearing." The magistrate would explain the 
charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel 
if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause 
determination unless either the prosecutor or the accused 
was unprepared. If either requested more time, the 
magistrate would set the date for a upreliminary hearing," 
to be held within four days if the accused was in custody 
and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial. 
The order provided sanctions for failure to hold the hear-
ings at prescribed times. At the upreliminary hearing" 
the accused would be entitled to counsel, and he would be 
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, 
9 The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for 
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal inter-
vention in state prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, 
but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hear-
ing, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal 
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not 
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. M vnte-
muro, 477 F. 2d 1073, 1082 (CA3 1973); cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 
U.S. 82 (1971); StefaneUi v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (1951), 
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to summon favorable witnesse~, and to have a transcript 
made on request. If the magistrate found no probable 
cause, the accused would be discharged. He then could 
not be charged with the same offense by complaint or in-
formation, but only by indictment returned within 30 
days. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the 
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case 
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary volun-
tarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon 
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals re-
manded the case for specific findings on the constitu-
tionality of the new Dade County system. Before the 
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida 
Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing 
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed 
that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the 
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures. 
Under the amended rules every arrested person must 
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130 (b). This "first appearance" is 
similar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the 
District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the· mag-
istrate does not make a determination of probable cause. 
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for 
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges 
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to 
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule 
3.131; see In re Rule 3.131 (b), Florida Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, 289 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974). 
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held 
that the amended rules had not answered the basic con-
stitutional objection, since a defendant charged by in-
formation still could be detained pending trial without 
tl. judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F, Sup}'. 
T 
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1286. Reaffirming its original ruling, the District Court 
declared that the continuation of this practice was uncon• 
stitutional."0 The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d 
778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor par• 
ticulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hear .. 
ing provided by the amended Florida rules would pe ac .. 
ceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in 
custody pending trial. ld., at 788-789. 
State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review, and we 
granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue.n 
414 U. S. 1062. We affirm in part and reverse, in part. 
" 0 Although this ruling held a statewide "legislative rule" unconsti-
tutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by vir-
tue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for 
an injunction against enforcement of any state statute or legislative 
rule of statewide application, since the practice of denying prelim-
inary hearings to persons charged b~r information was then em-
bodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had 
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appeals 
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the constitutionality 
of a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when 
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental 
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the 
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never 
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court 
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District 
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. See 483 F, 
2d, at 788-790, Accordingly, a district court of three judges was not 
required for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. Mendoza,. 
Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 
u.s. 603, 606-608 (1960) . 
11 At oral argument counsel informed us that the named respond .. 
.ents have been convicted. Their pretrial detention therefore has 
ended. This case belongs, however, to that narrow class of cases in 
which the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot 
the claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa, 
- U. S. - (1975). Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, 
:and it is most unlikely that any gjven individual could have h~ 
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II 
As framed by the proceedings below, this case presents 
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial 
on an information is entitled to a judicial determination 
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the 
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and 
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the 
Constitution, 
A 
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and 
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amend-
ment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v. 
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Ex parte 
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Bur-
constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or 
convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated depriva-
tions, and it is certain that oti1er persons similarly situated will be 
detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, 
in short, is one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review." 
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were 
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable 
cause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any 
of them were still in custody awaiting trial when the District Court 
certified the class. Such a showing ordinarily would be required to 
avoid mootness under Sosna. But this case is a suitable exception 
to that requirement. See Sosna, supra, at - n. 11; cf. Rivera v. 
Freeman, 469 F . 2d 1159, 1162-1163 (CA9 1972). The length of pre-
trial custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended 
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or 
a. guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction ~tfter trial. It is 
by no means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff, 
would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to 
certify the class. Moreover, in this case the constant existence of 
a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney 
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we can 
safely assume that he has other clients with a continuing live int~rcat 
in the caee. 
... 
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ford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806). The standard for 
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and 
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was com-
mitting an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91 
(1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176 
(1949). This standard, like those for searches and seiz· 
ures, represents a necessary accommodation between the 
individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to con-
trol crime, 
"These long-prevailing standards seek to safe-
guard citizens from rash and unreasonable inter-
ferences with privacy and. from unfounded charges 
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for 
enforcing the law in the community's protection, 
Because many situations which confront officers in 
the course of executing their duties are more or less 
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes 
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of 
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to 
their conclusions of probability. The rule of prob-
able cause is a practical, nontechnical conception 
affording the best compromise that has been found 
for accommodating these often opposing interests. 
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforce-
ment. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding 
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." 
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176. 
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection 
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the 
· Court has required that the existence of probable cause 
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate when-
ever possible. The classic statement of this principle 
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appears in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 
{1948): 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often 
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies 
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its pro~ 
tection consists in requiring that those inferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead 
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-22 (1968).12 
Maximum protection of individual rights could be 
assured by requiring R magistrate's review of the factual 
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement 
would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate 
law enforcement. Thus, while the Court has expressed a 
preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible, 
Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 96; Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U. S. 471, 479-482 (1963), it has never invalidated 
an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the 
officers failed to secure a warrant. SeeKer v. California, 
374 U. S. 23 ( 1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 
307 (1959); 1'rupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 
(1948).13 
12 We reiterated this principle in United States v. United States 
District Court, 40i U. S. 297 (1972). In terms that apply equally 
to arrests, we described the "very heart of the Fourth Amendment 
directive" as a requirement that "where practical, a governmental 
search and seizure should represent. both the efforts of the officer 
to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the mag-
istrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a 
citizen's private premises or conversation." /d., at 316. See also 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968). 
ta Another tlSpect of Trupiano was overruled in United States v. 
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Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the-a 
scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justifl· 
cation for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for 
a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps 
incident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, how• 
ever, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magis-
trate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is 
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further 
crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magis· 
trate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary 
.action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determina-
tion of probable cause increases significantly. The con-
sequences of prolonged detention may be more serious 
than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial con-
finement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his 
source of income, and impair his family relationships. 
SeeR. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91 (1965); L. Katz, Justice 
Is the Crime 51-62 ( 1972). Even pretrial release may be 
accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a sig-
nificant restraint on liberty. See, e. g., 18 U, S. C. § 3146 
(a) (2), (5). When the stakes are this high, the detached 
judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth 
Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from un-
founded interference with liberty, Accordingly, we hold 
that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial deter .. 
mination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended 
restraint on liberty following arrest. 
This result has historical support in the common law 
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), which wa, overruled in turn by 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) . 
The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most con~ 
troversy, and which remains unsett1e4, is whether and under what 
circumstances an officer may enter a suspect's home to make a war .. 
rantless arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-. 
481 (1971); id., at 510-512 n. 1 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Jones v. 
United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499-500 (1958). 
. ! I 
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that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amend• 
ment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 
(1925). At common law it was customary, if not obliga-
tory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice 
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the 
Crown 116-117 (4th ed. 1792). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 
115 U. 8.487, 498-499 (1885).14 The justice of the peace 
would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to deter-
mine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner 
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would 
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he 
would be discharged from custody. 1 M. Hale, supra, at 
583-586; 2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen, 
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 (1883).15 
14 The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have 
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact 
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment, 
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that 11 judicial warrant of 
commitment, called a. mittimus, was required for more than brief 
detention. 
"When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected 
of felony, he :tnay detain him in custody till he can reasonably dis-
miss himself of him; but with a!! much epeed as conveniently he can, 
he may do either of these things. 
"1. He may carry him to the common gaol, ... but that is now 
rarely done. 
"2. He may deliver him to the constable of the vill, who may either 
carry him to the common gaol, . . . or to a justice of peace tQ 
be examined, and farther proceeded against as case shall require .... 
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to any justice of peace of the 
county where he is taken; who upon examination may discharge, bail, 
or commit him, a~ the ease shall require. 
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private 
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler 
will expect a Mittimm for his warrant of detaining." 
1 M. Hale, supra, at 589-590. 
u The examination of the prisoner was inquisitorial, and tbt 
witness~ were questioned outsicle the prisoner's presence. Although 
I. 
12 GERSTEIN v. PUGH 
'the initi!tl determination of probable cause also could b~ 
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus. 
2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at 
243; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 75, 97-
101 ( 1807). This practice furnished the model for 
criminal procedure in America immediately following the 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Boll· 
man, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); 16 Ex parte Burford, 
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and there are indications that 
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model 
for a "reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States, 
358 U.S. 307, 317-320 (1959) (DouGLAS, J., concurring).H 
this method of proceeding was considered quite harsh, 1 J. Stephen, 
at 219-225, it was well established that the prisoner was entitled to be 
discharged if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of his 
guilt. Id., at 233. 
16 In Ex parte Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr case 
were committed following an examination in the circuit court of 
the District of Columbia. They filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in the Supreme Court, The Court, In an opinion by Chief 
Justice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to 
persons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following 
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause, 
the Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that 
it did not establish probable cause that they were guilty of treason, 
The prisoners were discharged. 
17 See also N. Lasson, The History and Development of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 15-16 (1937). 
A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery of 
stolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reason-
able" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was re-
quired to appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath 
of probable cause thafhis goods could be found in a particular place. 
After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim 
and the alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace 
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods 
llJl.cl detentjon of the thjef. 2M. Hale, suprq, at l~-15~; 'f, Taylor, 
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B 
Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a per-
liOn arrested without a warrant and charged by informa-
tion may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending 
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause 
determination.18 Petitione1· defends this practice on the 
ground that the prosecutor's decision to file an informa-
tion is itself a determination of probable cause· that fur-
nishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending 
trial. Although a conscientious decision that the evi-
dence warrants prosecution afforus a measure of protec-
tion against unfounded detention, we do not think 
prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, we think the 
Court's previous decisions compel disapproval of the 
Florida procedure. In Albrecht v. United States, 273 
U. S. 1, 5 (1927), the Court held that an arrest warrant 
issued solely upon a United States Attorney's information 
was invalid because the accompanying affidavits were de-
fective. Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly 
state that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish 
probable cause, that conclusion was implicit in the judg-
ment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amend-
ment.19 More recently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969); 
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626-629 (1886). 
18 A per:;on arrested under a warrant would have received a prior 
judicial determination of probable cause. Under Fla. Rule Crim, 
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that 
states facts showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The 
magistrate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there 
is reas<.onable ground to believe the complaint is true. 
19 By contrast , the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon 
its face," and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" con~ 
elusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires 
issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parte 
73--477-0PINlON 
14 GERSTEIN v. PUGH 
403 U. S. 443, 449-453 (1971), the Court held that & 
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is incon-
sistent with the constitutional role of a neutral and de-
tached magistrate. We reaffirmed that principle in Shad-
wick v. City of Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 (1972), and held 
that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant 
must be determined by someone independent of police 
and prosecution. See also United States v. United States 
District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 317 (1972). 210 The reason 
for this separation of functions was expressed by Justice 
Frankfurter in a similar context: 
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dig-
nity of all men is central, naturally guards against 
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal 
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance 
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law 
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cher-
ished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled 
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also GiordeneUo v. 
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a 
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached 
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the 
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust 
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346 
(1974). 
211 The Court had earher reached a different result in Ocampo v. 
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the 
Philippine Islands. Interpreting a statutory guarantee subi\tantially 
identical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 19CY2, c. 1369, § 5, 
32 Stat. 693, the Court held that an arrest warrant could issue 
solely upon a prosecutor's infonnation. The Court has since held 
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philip· 
pines is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision in 
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 
194-198 (1957). Even if it were, the result reached in Ocampo 
is incompatible with the later hoi-lings of Albrecht, Coolidge, and 
Shadwick. 
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that safeguards must be provided against the dan .. 
gers of the overzealous as well a.s the despotic. The 
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be 
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated 
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into 
different parts, responsibility for which is separately 
vested in the various participants upon whom the 
criminal law relies for its vindication." McNabb v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 332,343 (1943). 
In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable 
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty 
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is en-
titled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to 
prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's prior hold-
ing that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite to prosecu-
tion by information. Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 
541, 545 (1962); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229, U. S. 586 
(1913). Nor do we retreat from the established rule 
that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent 
conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952); 
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, as the Court 
of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is 
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for 
that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated 
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending 
trial without a determination of probable cause. 483 
F. 2d, at 786-787. Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 
F. 2d 6 (CA5 1968), with Brown v, Fauntleroy,- U.S. 
App. D. C. - , 442 F. 2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone, 
-U.S. App. D. C.-, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969). 
III 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
held that the determinatio:1 of probable cause must be 
accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safe ... 
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guards-counsel, confrontation, cross .. examination, and 
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary 
hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in 
many States to determine whether the evidence justifies 
going to trial under an information or presenting the 
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 
1 (1970); Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern 
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974). 
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is 
usually referred to as "probable cause," but in some juris-
dictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt. 
A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Com-
mentary on Article 330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 
1972). When the hearing takes this form, adversary pro-
cedures are customarily employed. The importance of 
the issue to both the State and the accused justifies the 
presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their 
testimony on cross-examination. This kind of hearing 
also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defend-
ants. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. And, as the hearing 
assumes increased importance and the procedures become 
more comple!X, the likelihood that it can be held promptly 
after arrest diminishes. See A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-
arraignment Procedure, supra, at 33-34. 
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the 
probable cause determination required by the Fourth 
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable 
cause for detaining the arrested person pending further 
proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably with .. 
out an adversary hearing. The standard is the same 
as that for arrest.2' That standard-probable cause to 
21 Because the standards are identical, ordinarily there is no need 
for further investigation before the probable cause determination can 
be made. 
"Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must a:rrest on 1prob. 
able cause.' It is not the functiou of the police :to arrest, as it were, 
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believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditionally 
has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary pro .. 
ceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court 
has approved these informal modes of proof. 
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that 
which long experience in the common-law tradition, 
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has 
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with 
that standard. These rules are historically grounded 
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men 
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting 
forfeitures of life, Jiberty and property. 
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the 
very name implies, we deal with probabilities. 
These are not technical; they are the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
act. The ~tandard of proof is accordingly correla-
tive to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949). 
Cf; McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), 
The use of an informal procedure is justified not only 
by t.he lesser consequences of a probable cause deter~ 
mination but also by the nature of the determination 
itself. It does not require the tine resolution of conflict .. 
ing evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a prepond-
erance standard demands, and credibiliW determinations 
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence sup-
ports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, Prosecu ... 
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters 
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing 
magistrate on 'probable cause, ' " Mallory v. United St(ltes, 354: 
u.s. 449, 456 (1957). 
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tion: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64-
109 (1969).22 This is not to say that confrontation and 
cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of 
probable cause determinations in some cases. In most 
cases, however, their value would be too slight to justify 
holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these 
formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be 
employed in making the Fourth Amendment determina-
tion of probable cause.28 
Because of its limited function and its nonadversary 
character, the probable cause determination is not a 
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require 
22 In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), and Gagrwn v. 
ScarpeUi, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee or proba-
tioner arrested prior t.o revocation is entitled to an infonnal pre-
liminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live 
testimony. 408 U. S., at 487; 411 U. S., at 786. That preliminary 
hearing, more than the probable cause detennination required by 
the Fourth Amendment, l!erves the purpose of gathering and pre-
serving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently 
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred. 
408 U. S., at 485; 411 U. S., at 782-783 n. 5. Moreover, revocation 
proceedings may offer less protection from initial error than the 
more fonnal criminal process, where • iolations are defined by statute 
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect 
with crime unless he is l!atisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code 
of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-103 (A) (a prosecutor "shall 
not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows 
or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable 
cause"); ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Crim-
inal Justice, The Prosecution Function,§§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); Amer-
ican College of Trial Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4 (c) 
(1972). 
n Criminal justice is already overburdened by the volume of cases 
and the complextties of our system. The processing of misdemeanors, 
in particular, and the early stages of prosecution generally are marked 
by delays that can seriously affect the quality of justice. A consti-
tutional doctrine requiring adversary hearings for all persons detained 
pending trial could exacerbate the problem of pretrial delay. 
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appointed counsel. The Court has identified as "critical 
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair de-
fense em the merits if the accused is required to proceed 
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 
(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 226-227 
(1967). In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held 
that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of an Ala-
bama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions 
identified two critical factors that distinguish the Ala-
bama preliminary hearing from the probable cause deter-
mination required by the Fourth Amendment. First, 
under Alabama law the function of the preliminary hear-
ing was to determine whether the evidence justified charg-
ing the suspect with an offense. A finding of no probable 
cause could mean that he would not be tried at all. The 
Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is ad-
dressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure·1 pretrial 
custody may affect to some extent the defendant's ability 
to assist in preparation of his defense, but this does not 
present the high probability of substantial harm identi-
fied as controlling in Wade and Coleman. Second, Ala-· 
bama allowed the suspect to confront and cross-examine 
prosecution witnesses at the preliminary hearing. The 
Court noted that the suspect's defense on the merits could' 
be compromised if he had no legal assistance for exploring 
or preserving the witnesses' testimony. This considera-
tion does not apply when the prosecution is not required' 
to produce witnesses for cross-examination. 
Although we conclude that the Constitution does not. 
require an adversary determination of probable cause, we· 
recognize that state systems of criminal procedure vary 
widely. There is no single preferred pretrial proc~dure,. 
and the nature of the probable cause determination 
usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pretrial 
procedure viewed a..a a whole. While we limit our hold .. 
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ing to the precise requirement of the Fourth Amend· 
ment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility and ex-
perimentation by the States. It may be found desirable, 
for example, to make the probable cause determination at 
the suspect's first appearance before a judicial officer,2"' 
see McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 342-344 
(1943), or the determination may be incorporated into 
the procedure for setting bail or fixing other conditions 
of pretrial release. In some States, existing procedures 
may satisfy the requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
Others may require only minor adjustment, such as accel-
eration of existing preliminary hea.rings. Current 
proposals for criminal procedure reform suggest other 
ways of testing probable cause for detention.25 Whatever 
24 Several States already authorize a determination of probable 
cause at this stage or immediately thereafter. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 39-2-3 (1965 Supp.); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708-9 (5) (1968); Vt. 
Rules Crim. Proc. 3 (b), 5 (c) (1974). This Court has interpreted 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require a determination 
of probable cause at the first appearance. Jaben v. United States, 
381 U. S. 214, 218 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449, 
454 (1957). 
25 Under the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure (Proposed 
Final Draft 1974), a person arrested without a warrant is entitled, 
"without unnecessary delay," to a first appearance before a magis-
trate and a determination that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest 
warrant. The determination may be made on affidavits or testimony, 
in the presence of the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remain in 
custody for inability to qualify for pretrial release are offered another 
opportunity for a probable cause determination at the detention hear-
ing, held no more than five days after arrest. This is an adversary 
hearing, and the parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay 
evidence may be considered. Rule 344. 
The A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent. 
Draft No. 5, 1972, and Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973) also provides a 
first appearance, at which a warrantless .arrest must be supported 
by a reasonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. The 
magistrate may make a determination of probable cause to hold the 
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procedure a Sta.te may adopt, it must provide a fair and 
reliable determination of probable cause as a condition 
for any significant pretrial restraint on liberty/6 and this 
determination must be made by a judicial officer either 
before or promptly after arrest.27 
accused, but he is not required to do so and the accused may request 
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be 
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes 
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written 
and live testimony: 
"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence 
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present addi-
tional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of 
which he is accused. The ~>tate's submission may be made by means 
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the 
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the 
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appear-
ance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks 
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause." 
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973). 
26 Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional 
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those 
suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition 
that they appear for trial. There are many kinds of pretrial release 
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146; 
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, 
Pretrial Release § 5.2 (1974); Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Rule 341 (Proposed Final Draft 1974). We cannot define spe-
cifically those that would require a prior probable cause determina-
tion, but the key factor is significant restraint on liberty. 
27 In his concurring opinion, Mn. JusTICE STEWART ob-
jects to thr Court's choice of the Fourth AmEJndment as the 
rationale for decision and suggests that the Court offers less pro-
cedural protection to a person in jail than it requires in certain civil 
cases. Here we deal with the complex procedures of a criminal case-
and a threshold right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The-
historical basis of the probable cause requirement is quite different 
from the relatively recent applicat10n of variable procedural due 
J?rocess in deb.tor-credJtor dispu~s and termination of government-
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IV 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth 
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of 
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we 
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we 
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the 
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree, 
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
created benefits. The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for 
the criminal justice system, and its balance between individual and 
public interests always has been thought to define the "process that 
is due" for seizures of person or property in criminal cases, includ- J 
ing the detention of suspects pending trial. Part II-A, ante:. More-
over, the Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is in fact 
only the first stage of an elaborate system, unique in jurisprudence, 
designed to safeguard the rights of those accused of criminal conduct. 
The relatively simple civil procedures (e. g., prior interview with 
school principal before suspension) presented in the cases cited in 
the concurring opinion are inapposite and irrelevant in the wholly 
different context of the· criminal justice system. 
It would not be practicable to follow the further suggestion implicit 
in MR. JusTICE STEWART's concurring opinion that we leave for 
another day determination of the procedural safeguards that are 
required in making a probable cause determination under the Fourth 
Amendment. The judgment under review both declares the right 
not to be detained without a probable cause determination and 
affirms the District Court's order prescribing an adversary hearing 
for the implementation of that right. The circumstances of the 
case thus require a decision on both issues, 
;NOTE: Where tt is feasible, a syllabus {hea<lnote) will be re-
leased, as Is being done ln connection with this case, at the time 
the oplnlon Is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the oplnlon 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for 
the s_onvenlence of the reader. See United States v. Detro't Lumber 
Oo,, ;oOO U.S. 321, 337. 
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1. The Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of prob-
able cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty follow-
ing arrest. Accordingly, the Florida procedures challenged here 
whereby a person arrested without a warrant and charged by 
information may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending 
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause determination 
are unconstitutional. Pp. 7-15. 
(a) The prosecutor's assessment of probiible cause, s,tanding 
alone, does not meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment 
and is insufficient to justify restraint of liberty pending trial. 
Pp. 13-15. 
(b) The Constitution does not require, however, judicial over-
sight of the decision to prosecute by information, and a conviction 
will not be vacated on the ground that the defendant was detained 
pending trial without a probable cause determination. P . 15. 
2. The probable cause determination, as an initial step in the crim-
inal JUstice process, may be rnP.de by a judicial officer without an 
adversary hearing. Pp. 15-2L 
(a) The sole issue is whether there is probable cause for detain-
ing the arrested person pending further proceedings, and this is-
sue can be determined reliably by the use of informal procedures. 
Pp. 16-18. 
(b) Because of its hmitecl function and its nonadversary char~ 
acter, the probable cause determination is not a "critical stage" 
in the prosecution that, would require appointed counsel. Pp .. 18-19. 
483 F . 2d 778, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court, 
The issue in this case is whether a person arrested 
under a prosecutQr's information is constitutionally en-
titled to a judicial determination of probable cause for 
pretrial restraint of liberty. 
I 
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were 
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged 
with several offenses under a prosecutor's information.1 
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against 
him carried a potential life sentence, and Henderson re .. 
mained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500 
bond. 
t Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971. On March 16 
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a con-
cealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a 
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrested on March 2, and charged 
by information on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and 
entering and a8sault and battery. The record does not indicate 
whether there was an arrest warrant il1 either case. 
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu .. 
tion of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all other 
crimes by information, without a prior preliminary hear-
ing and without obtaining leave of court. Fla. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 3.140 (a); State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109 
(Fla. 1968); Di Bona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1960). At the time respondents were arrested, a 
Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary 
hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases. 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the 
Florida courts had held that the filing of an information 
foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing. 
See State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 
1972).2 They had also held that habeas corpus could not 
be used, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances, to 
test the probable cause for detention under an informa-
tion. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 29 So. 2d 
794, 797 (Fla. 1951). The only possible methods for ob-
taining a judicial determination of probttble cause were a 
special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30 
days, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973),8 and arraignment, 
which the District Court found was often delayed a month 
or more after arrest. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 
1107, 1110 (SD Fla. 1971).• As a result, a person charged 
2 Florida law also denies preliminary hearings to persons confined 
under indictment, see Sangaree v Hamlin, 23.5 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970); 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a), but that procedure is not challenged 
in this case. See n. 19, pf)st, at 14. 
8 This ~tatute may have been construed to make the hearing per-
missive instead of mandatory. See Evam v. State, 197 So. 2d 323 
(Fla, Ct. App. 1967); Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 007-29 ( 1967). But cf. 
Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971) It may also 
have been superseded by the subsequent amendments to the rules of 
criminal procedure. In re F'lorida Rule1 of Criminal Procedure, 
272 So. 2d 65 (1972). 
• The Florida rule~:~ do not suggest that the issue of probable 
cause can be raised at arraignment, Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.160, but 
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by information could be detained for a substantial period 
solely on the decision of a prosecutor. 
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action 
against Dade County officials in the Federal District 
Court/ claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hear-
ing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declara-
tory and injunct.ive relief.6 Respondents Turner and 
Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently 
intervened.7 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for 
Dade County, was one of several defendants.8 
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature con-
sidered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hear-
ings to persons charged by information, the District Court 
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, supra. 
The court certified the case as a class action under Fed, 
counsel for Petitioner represented at oral argument that arraign-
ment affords the suspect an opportunity to "attack the sufficiency of 
the evidence to hold him." Tr. of Oral Arg., Mar. 25, 1974, at 17. 
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that this was true. 
483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8. 
8 The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and juris-
diction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3), 
6 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as 
an alternate remedy. They asked only that the state authorities be 
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was 
also the only relief \hat the District Court ordered for the named 
respondents. 332 F. Supp., at 1115-1116. Because' release was 
neither asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the cla~s 
of cases for which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 417 U. S. 
-,- (1974). 
1 Tmner was being held on a charge of auto theft, following arrest 
on March 11, 1971. Faulk was arrestcl on March 19 on charges 
of soliciting a ride and possession of marihuana. 
' 8 The named defendants included justices of the peace and judges 
of small--claims courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary 
bearings in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officers 
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only 
one who petitioned for certiorari. 
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Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (2), and held that the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged 
by information a right to a judicial hearing on the ques-
tion of probable cause. The District Court ordered the 
Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an 
immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable 
cause for further detention.9 It also ordered them to 
submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases 
instituted by information. 
The defendants submitted a plan authored by Sheriff 
E. Wilson Purdy, and the District Court adopted it with 
modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed post-
arrest procedure. 336 F. Supp. 490. Upon arrest the 
accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first 
appearance hearing." The magistrate would explain the 
charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel 
if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause 
determination unless either the prosecutor or the accused 
was unprepared. If either requested more time, the 
magistrate would set the date for a "preliminary hearing," 
to be held within four days if the accused was in custody 
and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial. 
The order provided sanctions for failure to hold the hear-
ings at prescribed times. At the "preliminary hearing'' 
the accused would be entitled to counsel, and he would be' 
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, 
9 The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for 
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal inter~ 
vention in state prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)'. 
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, 
but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hear~ 
ing, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal 
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not 
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. Monte-
muro, 477 F. 2d 1073, 1082 (CA3 1973); cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 40:1 
U.S. 82 (1971); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 TJ. S. 117 (1951). 
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to summon favorable witnesses, and to have a transcript 
made on request. If the magistrate found no probable 
cause, the accused would be discharged. He then could 
not be charged with the same offense by complaint or in-
formation, but only by indictment returned within 30' 
days. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the 
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case 
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary volun-
tarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon 
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals re-
manded the case for specific findings on the constitu-
tionality of the new Dade County system. Before the 
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida 
Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing 
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed 
that the District Court should direct .its inquiry to the 
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures. 
Under the amended rules every arrested person must 
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130 (b). This "first appearance" is 
similar to the "first appearance hea.ring" ordered by the 
District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the mag-
istrate does not make a determination of probable cause. 
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for 
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges 
and codifying the rule that no hea.rings are available to 
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule 
3.131; see In re Rule 3.1."31 (b), Florida Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, 289 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974). 
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held 
that the amended rules had not answered the basic con-
stitutional objection, since a defendant charged by in-
formation still could be detained pending trial without 
·a judicial determination of probable cause. 855 li'. Supp. 
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1286. Reaffirming its original ruling, the District Court 
declared that the continuation of this practice was uncon-
stitutionaJ.10 The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d 
778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor par·· 
ticulars and suggesting tha.t the form of preliminary hear..~ 
ing provided by the amended Florida rules would be ac-
ceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in 
custody pending trial. !d., at 788-789. 
State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review, and we 
granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue.11 
414 U. S. 1062. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
10 Although this ruling held a statewide "legislative rule" unconsti-
tutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by vir-
tue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for 
an injunction against enforcement of any state statute or legislative 
rule of statewide application, since the practice of denying prelim-
inary hearings to persons charged by information was then em-
bodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had 
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appeals 
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the constitutionality 
of a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when 
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental 
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the 
amended rules were uneonstitutional; the injunctive decree was neve!' 
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court 
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District 
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. See 483 F, 
2d, at 788-790. Accordingly, a district court of three judges was not 
required for the is~uance of this order. See Kennedy v. Mendoz~ 
Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1~3); Ji'temming v. Ne1tor, 363 
u. s. 603, 606--608 (1~). 
nAt oral argument counsel informed us that the named respond.,; 
ents have been convicted. Their pretr~a1 detention therefore haj 
ended. This case belongs, however, to that narrow class of cases in 
which the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot 
the claims of the unnllmed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa, 
-- U. S. - (1975). Pretrial detention is by nature temporary1 
and it is most unlikely that any given individual could have h.~ 
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II 
As framed by the proceedings below, this case presents 
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial 
on an information is entitled to a judicial determination 
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the 
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and 
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the 
Constitution, 
A 
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and 
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amend-
ment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v. 
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Ex parte 
Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Bur-
constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or 
convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated depriva-
tions, and it is certain that other persons. similarly situated will be 
detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, 
in short, is one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review." 
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were 
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable 
cause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any 
of them were still in custody awaiting trial when the District Court 
certified the class. Such a showing ordinarily would be required to 
avoid mootness under Sosna. But this case is a suitable exception 
to that requirement. See Sosna, supra, at - n. 11; cf. Rivera v. 
Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159,1162-1163 (CA91972). The length of pre-
trial custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended 
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or 
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after triaL It is 
by no means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff, 
would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to 
certify the class. Moreover, in this case the constant existence of 
a class of per<Jons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney 
representing the named respondents is a publie defender, and we can 
safely assume tltat he has· other clients with a continuing live interest 
in the case, 
> .•• 
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ford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806). The standard for 
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and 
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was com= 
mitting an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91 
{1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 
{1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175~176 
(1949). This standard, like those for searches and seiz~ 
ures, represents a necessary accommodation between the 
individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to con-
trol crime, 
1'These long-prevailing standards seek to safe-
guard citizens from rash and unreasonable inter= 
ferences with privacy and from unfounded charges 
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for 
enforcing the law in the community's protection. 
Because many situations which confront officers in 
the course of executing their duties are more or less 
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes 
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of 
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to 
their conclusions of probability. The rule of prob-
able cause is a practical, nontechnical conception 
affording the best compromise· that has been found 
for accommodating these often opposing interests. 
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforce-
ment. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding 
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." 
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176. 
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection 
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the 
Court has 1·equired that the existence of probable cause 
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate when-
ever possible. The classic atatement of this principle 
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appears in Johnson v, United States, 333 U, S. 10, 13-14 
(1948): 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often 
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies 
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its pro-
tection consists in requiring that those inferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead 
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-22 (1968).12 
Maximum protection of individual rights could be 
assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual 
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement 
would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate 
law enforcement. Thus, while the Court has expressed a 
preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible, 
Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 96; Wong Sun v, United States, 
371 U, S. 471, 479,-482 (1963), it has never invalidated 
an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the 
officers failed to secure a warrant. SeeKer v. California, 
374 U. S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S, 
::\07 (1959); 7'rupiano v, United States, 334 U, S. 699, 705 
(1948),18 
12 We reiterated this principle in United States v. United State$ 1 
District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972). In terms that apply equally 
to arrests, we described the "very heart of the Fourth Amendment 
directive" as a requirement that "where practical, a governmental 
search and seimre should represent both the efforts of the officer 
to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the mag-
istrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a 
citizen's private premises or conversation." ld., at 316, See also 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968). 
18 Another aspect of Trupiano was overruled in United States v, 
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Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the--
scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justifi~ 
cation for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for 
a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps 
incident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, how~ 
ever, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magis--
trate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is 
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further 
crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magis .. 
trate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary 
action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determina.. 
tion of probable caut~e increases significantly. The con~ 
sequences of prolonged detention may be more serious 
than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial con~ 
.finement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his 
source of income, and impair his family relationships. 
SeeR. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91 (1965); L. Katz, Justice 
Is the Crime 51--62 (1972). Even pretrial release may be 
accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a sig. 
nificant restraint on liberty. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3146 
(a) (2), (5). When the stakes are this high, the detached 
judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth 
Amendment is to furnieh meaningful protection from un~ 
founded interference with liberty, Accordingly, we hold 
that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial deter-
mination of probable cause as a. prerequisite to extended 
restraint on liberty following arrest. 
This result has historical support in the common law 
RabinO'witz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), which was overruled in tum by 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
'fhe issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most con .. 
troversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what 
circumstances an officer may enter a suspect's home to make a war ... 
rantless arrest. s~e Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-
481 (1971); id., at 510- ·512 n. 1 (WHITE, J ., dissenting); Jones v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 493,499-500 (1958). 
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that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 
(1925). At common law it was customary, if not obliga-
tory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice 
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the 
Crown 116-117 (4th ed. 1792). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 
115 U.S. 487, 498-499 (1885).14 The justice of the peace 
would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to deter-
mine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner 
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would 
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he 
would be discharged from custody. 1M. Hale, supra, at 
583-586; 2 W. Hawkir.s, supra, at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen, 
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 (1883).15 
14 The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have 
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact 
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment, 
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of 
commitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief 
detention. 
"When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected 
of felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dis-
miss himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can, 
he may do either of these things. 
"1. He may carry him to the common gaol, ... but that is now 
rarely done. 
112. He may deliver him to the constable of the viii, who may either 
carry him to the common gaol, . . . or to a justice of peace to 
be examined, and farther proceeded against as case shall require .... 
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to any justice of pea<1e of the 
county where he is taken, whn upon examination may discharge, bail, 
pr commit him, as the case shall require. 
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private 
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler 
will expect a Mittimw for his warrant of detaining." 
1 M. Hale, supra, at 589-590. 
u The mmmination of the prisoner was inquisitorial, and the 
witnesses were questioned outside the prisoner's presence. Altl1Qugb 
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The initial determination of probable cause also could bff 
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus. 
2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at 
243; see Ex parte Boll'm.(Jn, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75, 97-
101 (1807). This practice furnished the model for 
criminal procedure in America immediately following the 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Boll-
man, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); 10 Ex parte Burford, 
7 U.S. (3 Cra.nch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and there are indications that 
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it a.s a model 
for a "reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States, 
358 U.S. 307, 317-320 (1959) (DouGLAS, J., concurring).u 
this method of proceeding was considered quite harsh, 1 J. Stephen, 
at 219-225, it was well established that the prisoner was entitled to be 
discharged if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of his 
guilt. /d., at 233. 
16 In Ex parte Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr case 
were committed fo11owing an examination in the circuit court of 
the District of Columbia. They filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief 
.Justice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to 
per'!ons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following 
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause, 
the Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that 
it did not establish probab1e cause that they were guilty of treason. 
The prisoners were discharged. 
17 See also N. Lasson, The History and Development of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 15-16 (1937). 
A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery of 
stolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reason-
1l.ble" search under the Fomtb Amendment. The victim. was re. 
quired to appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath 
of probable cause that'his goods could be found in a particular place. 
After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim 
and the alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace 
for a prompt detennination of the cause for seizure of the goods 
:and detention o( the thiet 2M. Hale, supra, at 149-152; T. Tayl~r:, 
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Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a per-
son arrested without a warrant and charged by informa-
tion may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending 
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause 
determination.18 Petitioner defends this practice on the 
ground that the prosecutor's decision to file an informa-
tion is itself a determination of probable cause that fur-
nishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending 
trial. Although a conscientious decision that the evi-
dence warrants prosecution affqrds a measure of protec-
tion against unfounded detention, we do not think 
prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, we think the 
Court's previous decisions compel disapproval of the 
Florida procedure. In Albrecht v. United States, 273 
U. S. 1, 5 (1927), the Court held that an arrest warrant 
issued solely upon a United States Attorney's information 
was invalid because the accompanying affidavits were de-
fective. Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly 
state that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish 
probable cause, that conclusion was implicit in the judg-
ment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amend-
ment.19 More recently, iP.. Coolidge v. New Hampshirer 
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969); 
see Boya v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626-629 (1886) . 
18 A person arrested under a warrant would have rrceived a prior 
judicial determination of probable cause. Under Fla. Ru·le· Crim. 
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that 
states facts showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The 
magistrate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there 
ifJ reasonable ground to believe the complaint is true. 
10 By contrast , the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon 
its face," and returned by a "properly con~>tituted grand jury" con-
clusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires 
iss1il:a.D.ce of m urest wanant without further inquiry. E~ pane 
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403 U. S. 443, 449"--453 (1971), the Court held that a, 
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is incon .. 
sistent with the constitutional role of a neutral and de"' 
tached magistrate. We reaffirmed that principle in Shad-
wick v. City of Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 ( 1972), and held 
that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant 
must be determined by someone independent of police 
and prosecution. See also United States v. United States 
District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 317 (1972).210 The reason 
for this separation of functions was expressed by Justice 
Frankfurter in a similar context: 
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dig-
nity of all men is central, naturally guards against 
the misuse of the, law enforcement process. Zeal 
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance 
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law 
enforcement does not &lone prevent disregard of cher-
ished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled 
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v. 
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a 
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached 
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the 
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust 
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346 
(1974). 
20 The Court had earlier reachr.d a different result, in Ocampo v. 
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the 
Philippine Islanus. Interpreting a statutory guarantee substantially 
identical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5, 
32 Stat. 693, the Court held that an arrest warrant could issue 
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court has since held 
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philip-
pines is not conclusive for interpretatiOn of a eognate provision in 
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United State~~, 355 U. S. 184, 
194-198 (1957), Even if it were, the result reached in Ocampo 
is incompatible with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, ami 
8hadwick. 
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that safeguards must be provided against the dan~ 
gers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The 
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be 
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated 
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into 
different parts, responsibility for which is separately 
vested in the various participants upon whom the 
criminal law relies for its vindication." MeN abb v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 332,343 (1943). 
In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable 
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty 
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is en-
titled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to 
prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's prior hold-
ing that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite to prosecu-
tion by information. Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 
541, 545 (1962); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 586 
(1913). Nor do we retreat from the established rule 
that illegal arrest or detent,ion does not void a subsequent 
conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 ( 1952) ; 
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, as the Court 
of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is 
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for 
that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated 
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending 
trial without a determination of probable cause. 483 
F. 2d, at 786-787. Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 
F. 2d 6 (CA5 1968), with Brown v. Fauntleroy,- U.S. 
App. D. C.-, 442 F. 2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone, 
-U.S. App. D. C.--, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969). 
III 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
held that the determination of probable cause must be 
accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safe .. 
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guards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examinatio~, and 
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary 
hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in 
many States to determine whether the evidence justifies 
going to trial ttnder an information or presenting the 
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 
1 (1970); Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern 
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974). 
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is 
usually referred to as "probable cause," but in some juris-
dictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt. 
A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Com-
mentary on Article 330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 
1972). When the he~tring takes this form, adversary pro-
cedures are customarily employed. The importance of 
the issue to both the State and the accused justifies the 
presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their 
testimony on cross-examination. This kind of hearing 
also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defend-
ants. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. And, as the hearing 
assumes increased importance and the procedures become 
more comple", the likelihood that it ca.n be held promptly 
after arrest diminishes. See A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-
arraignment Procedure, supra, at 33-34. 
These adversa.ry safeguards are not essential for the 
probable cause determination required by the Fourth 
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable 
cause for detaining the arrested person pending further 
proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably with-
out an adversary hearing. The standard is the same 
as that for arrest.21 That standard-probable cause to 
21 Because the standards are identical, ordinarily there is no need 
for further investigation before the probable cause determination can 
bema.de. 
·"Presumably, whomever the pollee arrest they must arrest on 'prob •. 
:able cause:' It is not the fundion of the police 'to arrest, as it we~~. 
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believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditionally 
has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary pro-
ceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court 
has approved these informal modes of proof. 
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that 
which long experience in the common-law tradition, 
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has 
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with 
that standard. These rules are historically grounded 
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men 
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting 
forfeitures of life, liberty and property, 
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the 
very name .implies, we deal with probabilities. 
These are not technical; they are the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
act, The standard of proof is accordingly correla,.. 
tive to what must be proved." Brineg4r v. United 
l3tates, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949)o 
Cf. McCray v.Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). 
The use of an informal procedure is justified not only 
by the lesser consequences of a probable cause deter-
mination but also by the nature of the determination 
itself. It doee not require the fine resolution of conflict-
ing evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a prepond-
erance standard demands, and credibility determinations 
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence sup-
ports R reasonable belief in guilt. See F, Miller, Prosecu-
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headqua.rters 
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing 
magistrate on 'probable cause.'" Mallory v. United States, 354 
U, S. 449,456 (1957) , 
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tion: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64-
109 (1969).22 This is not to say that confrontation and 
cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of 
probable cause determinations in some cases. In most 
cases, however, their value would be too slight to justify 
holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these 
formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be 
employed in making the Fourth Amendment determinSF 
tion of probable cause.23 
Because of its limited function and its nonadversary 
character, the probable cause determination is not a 
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require 
22 In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), and Gagrum v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee or proba~ 
tioner arrested prior to revocation is entitled to an informal pre-
liminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live 
testimony. 408 U. S., at 487; 411 U.S., at 786. That preliminary 
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by 
the Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and pre-
serving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently 
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred. 
408 U. S., at 485; 411 U. S., at 782-783 n. 5. Moreover, revocation 
proceedings may offer less protection from initial error than the 
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute 
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect 
wit~ crime unless he is satisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code 
of Professional Responsibility, DR 7- 103 (A) (a prosecutor "shall 
not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows 
or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable 
cause") ; ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Crim-
inal Justice, The Prosecution Function, §§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); Amer-
ican College of Trial Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4 (e) 
(1972). . 
23 Criminal justice is already ove!'burdt:ned by the volume of case8 
and the complexities of our system. The processing of misdemeanors, 
in particular, and the early stages of prosecution generally are marked 
by delays that can seriously affect the quality of justice. A consti-
tutional doctrine requiring adversary hearings for all persons detained 
pending trial could exacerbate the problem of pretrial delay, · 
13-477-0PINION 
GERSTEIN v. PUGH 19 
appointed counsel. The Court has identified as 11critical 
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair de-
fense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed 
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 
{1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 226-227 
(1967). In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held 
that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of an Ala-
bama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions 
identified two critical factors that distinguish the Ala-
bama preliminary hearing from the probable cause deter-
mination required by the Fourth Amendment. First, 
under Alabama law the function of the preliminary hear-
ing was to determine whether the evidence justified charg-
ing the suspect with a:o1 offense. A finding of no probable 
cause could mean that he would not be tried at all. The 
Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is ad-
dressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure, pretrial 
custody may affect to some extent the defendant's ability 
to assist in preparation of his defense, but this does not 
present the high probability of substantial harm identi-
fied as controlling in Wade and Coleman. Second, Ala-
bama allowed the suspect to confront and cross-examine 
prosecution witnesses at the preliminary hearing. The 
Court noted that the suspect's defense on the merits could 
be compromised if he had no legal assistance for exploring 
or preserving the witnesses' testimony. This considera-
tion does not apply when the prosecution is not required 
to produce witnesses for cross-examination. 
Although we conclude that the Constitution does not 
require an adversary determination of probable cause, we . 
recognize that state systems of criminal procedure vary 
widely. There is no single preferred pretrial procedure, 
and the nature of the probable cause determination 
usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pretrial 
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ing to the precise requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility and ex-
perimentation by the States. It may be found desirablell 
for example, to make the probable cause determination at 
the suspect's first appearance before a judicial officer/' 
see McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 342-344 
(1943), or the determination may be incorporated into 
the procedure for setting bail or fixing other conditions 
of pretrial release. In some States, existing procedures 
may satisfy the requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
Others may require only minor adjustment, such as accel-
eration of existing preliminary hearings. Current 
proposals for criminal procedure reform suggest. other 
ways of testing probable cause for detention.25 Whatever 
24 Several States already authorize a determination of probable 
cause at this stage or irnmediatE>ly thereafter. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 39-2-3 (1965 Supp.); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708-9 (5) (1968); Vt . 
. l 
Rules Crim. Proc. 3 (b), 5 (c) (1974). This Court has interpreted 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require a determination 
of probable cause at the first appearance. Jaben v. United States, 
381 U. S. 214, 218 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449, 
454 (1957). 
25 Under the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure (Proposed 
Final Draft 1974), a person arrested without a warrant is entitled .. 
"without unnecessary delay," to a first appearance before a magis-
trate and a determination that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest 
warrant. The determination may be made on affidavits or testimony, 
in the presence of the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remain in 
custody for inability to qualify for pretrial release are offered another 
opportunity for a probable cause determination at the detention hear-
ing, held no more than five days after arrest. This is an adversary 
hearing, and the parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay 
evidence may be considered. Rule 344. 
The A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent. 
braft No. 5, 1972, and Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973) also provides a 
·Est appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported.· 
y a reasonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. Th~ 
'· gistrate may make a detemiination of probable cause to hold tll~ 
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procedure a State may adopt, it must provide a fair and 
reliable determination of probable cause as a condition 
for any significant pretrial restraint on liberty/6 and this 
determination must be made by a judicial officer either 
before or promptly after arrest.27 
accused, but he i8 not required to do so and the accused may request 
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be 
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes 
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written 
and live testimony: 
"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence 
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present addi-
tional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of 
which he is accused. The state's submission may be made by means 
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the 
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the 
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appear-
ance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks 
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause." 
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973). 
26 Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional 
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those 
suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition 
that they appear for trial. There are many kinds of pretrial release 
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146; 
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, 
Pretrial Release § 5.2 (1974); Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Rule 341 (Proposed Final Draft 1974). We cannot define spe-
cifically those that would require a prior probable cause determina-
tion, but the key factor is significant restraint on liberty. 
27 In his concurring opinion, MR. JuS'riCE STEWART ob-
jects to the Court's choice of the Fourth Amendment as the 
rationale for decision and suggests that the Court offers less pro-
cedural protection to a person in jail than it requires in certain civil 
cases. Here we deal with the complex procedures of a criminal case 
and a threshold right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The 
historical basis of the probable cause requirement is quite different 
from the relatively recent application of variable procedural due 
process in debtor-creditor disputes and termination of government~ 
73'-477-oPINION 
GERSTEIN v. PUGH 
IV 
We agree with' the Court of Appeals that the Fourth 
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of 
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we 
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we 
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the 
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree, 
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
cteated benefits. The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for 
the criminal justice system, and its balance between individual and 
public interests always has been thought to define the "process that 
is due" for seizures of person or property in criminal cases, includ-
ing the detention of suspects pending trial. Part II-A, ante:. More-
over, the Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is in fact 
only the first stage of an elaborate system, unique in jurisprudence, 
designed to safeguard the rights of those accused o.f criminal conduct. 
The relatively simple civil procedures (e. g., prior interview with 
school principal before suspension) presented in the case..<> cited in 
the concurring opinion are inapposite and irrelevant in the wholly 
different context of the crimmal jU&'tice system. 
It would not be practicable to follow the further suggestion implicit 
in MR. JusTICE STEWART's concurring opmion that we leave for 
another day determination of the procedural safeguards that are 
required in making a probable cause detetmination under the Fourth 
Amendment. The judgment under review both declares the right 
not to be detained without a probable cause determination and 
affirms the District Court's order prescribing an adversary hearing 
for the implementation of that right. The circumstances of the 
ca.se thus require a deci~1on on both issues .. 
